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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

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CONTENTS

5 November 1993

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

UMA Trade Exchange Statistics Reported [Tunis CONJONCTURE Aug-Sep]	1
--	---

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Report on PLO Economic Plan for 1994-2000	4
Economic Plan Outlined [Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE 1 Oct]	4
Israeli Expert on Agreement [LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE 1 Oct]	8
Jericho Economic Situation [Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE 1 Oct]	9

ALGERIA

Constantine 'Refuge' for Terrorists; Mosques Cited [ALGER REPUBLICAIN 22 Sep]	11
'Terrorists' Resort to Carjacking [EL WATAN 20 Sep]	11
Continued Attacks, Near Misses on Journalists [L'OPINION 12 Aug]	12
'Terrorists' Targeting Intellectuals Arrested [EL WATAN 22 Sep]	12
Malek Indicates Break With Former Economic Policy [EL WATAN 16 Sep]	12
Benhamouda Sets Conditions for Rescheduling [LIBERTE 21 Sep]	13
Security Agents Trained for Civil Protection [EL WATAN 22 Sep]	14
Drop in Oil Prices Threatens Production [LIBERTE 14 Sep]	15
Djaout Assassination Underlines FIS, Berber Conflict [London AL-MAJALLAH 21 Aug]	16
Inactivity at Ghazaouet Port Reported [EL WATAN 16 Sep]	17
Food Dependency: Agricultural Production Down [LE SOIR D'ALGERIE 17 Aug]	18

EGYPT

AL-AHRAM Editor on Crisis in U.S.-Egyptian Relations [London AL-HAYAH 28 Aug]	19
Profile of MB, Extremist Groups Given [ROSE AL-YUSUF 13 Sep]	21
Government-Sponsored Youth Group 'Challenges' Islam [AL-NUR 18 Aug]	23
Scholars on Failure to Implement Islamic Law [AL-NUR 4 Aug]	23
Cleric Calls Recognition of Israel Treason [Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' 24 Aug]	25
Terrorists' Use of Jordan as Haven Discussed [ROSE AL-YUSUF 30 Aug]	26
Cairo Seeks Entry Into African Trade Agreement [London AL-HAYAH 24 Aug]	29
Tax Increase on Imported Paper Challenged [AL-SAFIR 1 October]	29
Sugar Statistics Show Production Increases [ROSE AL-YUSUF 16 Aug]	30
Ex-Interior Minister Blames Extremism on Successors [UKTUBAR 29 Aug]	31
MB Official Lists Roots of Extremist Violence [AL-NUR 18 Aug]	32
Interior Ministry's Crime Statistics Disputed [ROSE AL-YUSUF 16 Aug]	32

IRAQ

Plight of Iraqis Under Saddam's Rule Explained [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 5 Aug]	34
Syria-Turkey-Iran Policies Towards Kurds Analyzed [London AL-HAYAH 1 Aug]	36
Kuwait Border Demarcation Called Cause for Peace [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 13 Aug]	39
Russian Ministries Said in Conflict on Iraqi Policy [London AL-HAYAH 14 Aug]	43
Movement for Restoration of Monarchy Praised [London AL-HAYAH 20 Aug]	44
Statement Issued by Kurdistan Revolutionary Party [AL-'IRAQ 17 Aug]	45

KUWAIT

Petroleum Minister Comments on OPEC Agreement [London AL-HAYAH 1 Oct]	46
---	----

MOROCCO

Evolving Political, Economic Climate Reviewed [London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 10 Sep]	47
Deputies Advised To Withstand 'Secret Party' [AL-'ALAM 18 Oct]	49

SUDAN

Extremists Training Camps Reported [AL-WAFD 10 Oct]	50
---	----

SOUTH ASIA

BANGLADESH

Paper Derides Commonwealth, Advocates 'Dismantling' [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 22 Oct]	51
---	----

IRAN

Rafsanjani, Nurbakhsh, Economy Discussed [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 24 Aug]	51
Azerbaijan's Plea for Combat Volunteers Rejected [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 16 Aug]	53
Composition, Development of Government Analyzed [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 17 Aug]	54
Regime To Promote Production by Limiting Imports [SALAM 8 Sep]	56
Elimination of Agricultural Imports Suggested [KEYHAN-E HAVA'I 15 Sep]	56
IRI Builds 3 Cement Factories in Azerbaijan [KEYHAN-E HAVA'I 22 Sep]	57
Nuclear Plants Provide 20 Percent of Energy [KEYHAN-E HAVA'I 6 Oct]	57
Diabetes Afflicts 2.5 Percent of Society [SALAM 7 Sep]	58
Reports on Schools, Illegal Charges [London KEYHAN 30 Sep]	58

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

UMA Trade Exchange Statistics Reported

94AF0012A Tunis CONJONCTURE (Supplement)
in French Aug-Sep 93

[Special Report by Khedidja Chahloul: "Intra-Maghreb Trade"]

[Text] The Maghreb, a vast region spanning 5,016,850 square kilometers, is well endowed with energy resources (oil and gas), mining resources (phosphate, iron, zinc, lead, etc.) and, to a lesser degree, agricultural resources (fruit, oils, wines, etc.) and industry.

A major industrial expansion has taken place since the seventies. Our industry is now largely centered on the processing of agricultural products, the transformation of local raw materials (phosphate derivatives and petroleum derivatives), and the manufacture of import substitutes. The import substitute industry is a flourishing activity in Tunisia and Morocco.

The countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) have a combined population of 59 million inhabitants. Their 1988 per capita incomes ranged from \$4,050 in Libya to \$617 in Morocco; per capita income was \$2,750 in Algeria and \$1,210 in Tunisia. These factors, in combination with sustained development policies, make the UMA an attractive market not only to the outside world but to its own member countries, as well.

How well have the UMA's member countries profited from their own market? That question can be answered by studying the various stages in the evolution of trade among the UMA countries and by analyzing the general framework that has been put in place to foster continued expansion of intra-Maghreb trade relations.

1. The Evolution of Intra-Maghreb Trade

The dynamic that exists in trade relations between the countries of the Maghreb is best presented through an analysis of the evolution in trade during the period up to 1988 and the period following 1988.

Why 1988? That was a pivotal year in intra-Maghreb relations. It had a positive impact on the start of the process of the Maghreb integration dynamic.

It was a turning point at the political level, first of all. The various countries of the Maghreb normalized relations with each other. It was a turning point at the economic level, as well, in that some of those countries embarked on structural adjustment plans and others took steps to relax their economic policies.

It was also a turning point in multilateral cooperation. Moves to form a regional grouping, beginning at the summit meeting in Zeralda in early 1988, culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Marrakech on 17 February 1989, which created the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).

Trade Relations Prior to 1988

A. Trends in Trade

Imports: Intra-Maghreb imports rose from US\$181.2 million in 1983 to US\$458.6 million in 1987, an increase of 158.5 percent. Products made in the Maghreb accounted for 0.7 percent of total imports by Maghreb countries in 1983, a level that rose to 2.4 percent in 1987.

The country that imported the most from other Maghreb countries was Tunisia. In 1987, imports from the Maghreb represented 4.3 percent of Tunisia's total imports, but only 2.7 percent of Libya's total imports, 1.7 percent of Morocco's, and 1.4 percent of Algeria's.

Exports: The value of intra-Maghreb exports rose from US\$161.3 million in 1983 to US\$401.2 million, an increase of 148.7 percent. The percentage of intra-Maghreb exports against total exports by the countries of the Maghreb rose from 0.6 percent to 2 percent.

The country that exported the most to other UMA countries was Algeria, followed by Morocco and Tunisia.

B. Trade Structure

A breakdown of the products traded during that same period reveals that trade between the Maghreb countries was dominated by manufactured goods and energy products.

The intra-Maghreb trade in energy products rose from US\$40.4 million in 1983 to US\$157.7 million in 1987, an increase of 290 percent.

In manufactured goods, intra-Maghreb trade grew by 100 percent, rising from US\$99.9 million in 1983 to US\$201.3 million in 1987.

Raw materials were at the bottom of the list of goods traded among the Maghreb countries. They totaled US\$11.2 million in 1987 and only US\$4.6 million in 1983.

Food products traded among the countries of the Maghreb rose from US\$16.2 million in 1983 to US\$30.7 million in 1987.

A breakdown of trade by product and by country shows that the largest exporter of energy products is Algeria, followed by Libya. The largest exporter of manufactured products is Morocco, followed by Tunisia. The latter is the largest exporter of food products.

The largest importer of energy products is Tunisia, followed by Morocco. Libya and Algeria import more food products and manufactured goods than the others.

The figures support the following observations:

- The volume of trade between the countries of the Maghreb is low when viewed against the volume of their trade with the rest of the world.
- The structure of trade indicates a certain complementary [text missing] (energy and manufactured products).
- Economic or political disturbances affect the level of trade. In 1985-86, Tunisia's trade with Libya declined

while its trade with Algeria increased. In 1986, because of economic recession, Tunisia imported less from the other Maghreb countries than in 1985, as imports fell from US\$186.5 million in 1985 to US\$100.2 million in 1986.

- The volume of trade, although low, has expanded perceptibly, and despite the disruptions that have occurred, its growth has been steady and sustained.

One of factors that explain this expansion is the legal framework that governs intra-Maghreb trade.

C. The Legal Framework for Intra-Maghreb Trade

With the start of the eighties, there emerged in the Maghreb a desire to foster and energize economic relations between the countries of the region.

The approach taken at that time was a bilateral approach with regard to both industry and trade, in contrast to the approach of overall industrial development initially proposed consequent to the creation of the Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee. The approach of overall industrial development, seen as a means of integrating the Maghreb, did not succeed, largely because of differences in the economic policies and ideologies pursued by the countries of the Maghreb.

The bilateral, sectoral approach took the form of revisions in the tariff and trade agreements that regulate economic and trade relations between the various countries of the Maghreb.

The following agreements were signed into force:

- the 1984 tariff and trade agreement between Tunisia and Algeria, which extended the exemption from customs duties to all traded products originating in the two countries;
- the 1984 tariff and trade agreement between Tunisia and Libya that also granted duty-free entry to all traded products originating in the two countries;
- the 1986 agreement between Tunisia and Morocco and the January 1986 agreement between Tunisia and Mauritania, which enacted the same provisions as those mentioned above; and
- the 1986 agreement between Morocco and Mauritania, which expanded the list of products traded duty-free by the two countries.

Several principles conducive to improved trade relations among the countries of the Maghreb were established, among them the principle of priority supply, the clause of first refusal, and national handling of invitations to tender.

In 1984, Tunisia and Algeria drew up a joint memorandum to their state-owned companies in which they spelled out the rules by which these principles would be applied.

In the manufacturing fields, potential joint ventures between Algeria and Tunisia were identified, and some of them became the subject of governmental agreements. Among the joint ventures that came into being were the Tunisian-Algerian White Cement Company (SOTACIB), the Tunisian-Algerian Diesel Motor Company (SAKMO), and the Tunisian-Algerian Structural Steel Company (SOTAC).

The 1988-1991 Period

The period between 1988 and 1991 saw the completion of a legal framework conducive to trade within the Maghreb, as the Tunisian-Libyan agreement went into effect in 1988, followed by the Tunisia-Mauritanian agreement in 1989.

In addition, Morocco and Algeria signed an agreement in 1989, and the dynamic of the Maghreb's integration under the UMA was set in motion in early 1990.

Moreover, Libya and Algeria enacted several measures lifting certain restrictions on foreign trade. The role of the state was reined in. In Algeria, company self-management increasingly became an issue. In Libya, the government's monopoly on imports was lifted on all but basic products. The partnerships with foreign companies were authorized to import goods.

This dynamic had a positive effect on the level of trade between the countries of the UMA.

For example, products from other UMA countries represented 2.7 percent of Morocco's total imports in 1990, and 5.7 percent of Morocco's total exports went to other UMA countries.

In the case of Tunisia, UMA imports remained stationary at 3 percent of the total (primarily due to lower imports of energy products from Algeria). At the same time, exports to other UMA countries rose to 7.6 percent of Tunisia's total exports in 1990 and 9.6 percent in 1991.

It should be pointed out that while these figures fall short of the level of trade that might be achieved by the countries of the Maghreb, they are nonetheless encouraging when the economic conditions in the region and the limits of existing incentives are taken into account.

Inadequate levels of financing as a result of the indebtedness of the countries of the Maghreb, the persistence of the recession, and the Gulf War all took a toll on trade relations among the countries of the Maghreb.

In addition, in spite of the import liberalization measures enacted by most UMA countries, protectionist tendencies persisted and, in some cases, grew stronger.

It was found that liberalization accompanied by complete exemption from tariffs (customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect) can constitute a source of dumping, bringing harm to national production.

Consequently, it became apparent that the real barriers to trade were nontariff factors (primarily administrative factors), much more so than tariffs themselves.

On the other hand, the industrial approach did not live up to expectations. Most of the planned production units were not completed, and those which did go into production ran into difficulties.

Given the limitations of the approaches that have been tried thus far and the moderate results achieved in the Maghreb integration process, a new approach emerged at the beginning of 1991.

Trade With UMA Countries as a Percentage of Tunisia's Total Trade

Trading Partner	1990		1991		1992	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Algeria	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.1	1.5	2.4
Libya	0.5	4.6	0.6	5.8	0.8	4.4
Morocco	1.0	0.7	1.2	0.7	1.2	1.1
Mauritania				0.1		
UMA total	3.5	7.6	3.8	8.7	3.5	7.9

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Report on PLO Economic Plan for 1994-2000

Economic Plan Outlined

94AA0003A Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French
1 Oct 93 pp 54-59

[Article by Vincent Nouzille: "The PLO's Economic Plan for the Year 2000"—first paragraph is LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE introduction]

[Text] In July the PLO's experts put the finishing touches on their economic program. This key text, drawn up by the very men who negotiated the peace agreement in Oslo, anticipates \$17 billion in investments between now and the end of the century. The objective: 8.2-percent growth per annum. Here is an exclusive document.

Palestinians did not wait for the 13 September peace accord to prepare for the future. For several months they had even drawn up an economic takeoff program for the occupied territories that extends to the year 2000. This plan will be at the center of discussions at the international conference on aid to the Palestinians, which will be held this 1 October in Washington. Today LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE can disclose the main directions in this confidential document of more than 100 pages.

Entitled *Programme pour le développement de l'économie nationale palestinienne pour les années 1994-2000* ["Program for the Development of the Palestinian National Economy for the Years 1994-2000"], it was written in Tunis last July by the PLO's department of economic affairs and planning. This text comes several weeks before the conclusion of the mutual recognition agreement between Israel and the PLO. "In fact, we have been working for several years on this project," a PLO official told us in his Orient House office, a huge building in East Jerusalem, which is the headquarters for the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations. In 1990 the PLO's economic department carried out a first study completely surveying the status of the territories. More than 90 researchers based in Tunis, Amman, and the territories took part. But this work seems sterile as long as the political horizon remains blocked. The start of negotiations in Madrid at the end of 1991 gave new impetus to the machinery. "This study had to be brought up-to-date and we had to draw up a plan for the interim autonomy period preceding final status," one of its authors observed. This document, 1994-2000, was completed last July.

It is a major work. For three reasons. First, despite its imperfections, it casts light, with its words and its deadends and its caution and its ambitions, on the PLO's overall economic vision, of which no one had thus far had an exact notion. It is a vision that is striking because of its pragmatism. Second, the head of the PLO's economic department and the author of this plan, Hamad Kreh (called Abu Alaa), is also the main architect behind the secret diplomatic negotiations conducted with the Israelis in Norway these past few months. This right-hand man of Yasir 'Arafat used this document extensively as a means of persuasion to achieve a peace accord, especially on all the aspects of bilateral cooperation with Israel. Third, this plan was recently sent to industrialized countries and financial institutions to prepare for the launching of an urgent international fund for the territories, which could be formed as a follow-up to the 1 October conference. Estimating overall outside aid necessary in the territories at \$13.4 billion over seven years, the Palestinian calculation seems very far from the \$3 billion in needs recently identified by the World Bank. Is this a tactical disagreement? Or a different way of calculating? Probably both. In any event, this document is the Palestinians' point of departure in a bargaining process that looks to be tight. Hence the urgency of being aware of it.

The *Palestine Development Program* (PDP in the text) is based on several revealing hypotheses: according to the Geneva convention and UN resolutions, the PDP—written, we would reiterate, in July—presupposes that all of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967—including the city of Jerusalem—will again come under the Palestinians' control so they can build the future State of Palestine there. Here is another pious hope: the 13 September accord only speaks of autonomy for Jordan and Gaza and puts off until later negotiations on the final status of the territories and of Jerusalem. But the PDP pragmatically explains: "The dynamics of self-government—even before complete independence becomes a reality—should contribute to the appearance of desirable social changes and a working economic structure" (page 10). Read: this plan should be launched whatever the final political result might be. The PLO's only demand: the establishment of a "long corridor" between the Gaza Strip and Jordan, guaranteed by an international accord and important to symbolize the territorial unity of the territories and ensure free passage of goods and people.

Caution

The second hypothesis is a political one: the document assumes that the interim autonomy government will really be

2. The Prospects of Intra-Maghreb Trade

The new approach is a close blend of multilateral and bilateral relations and it seeks to integrate the countries of the Maghreb by providing guidance to and fostering initiatives by Maghrebi business operators working directly with each other. Under the new approach, barriers and restrictions of all kinds are to be removed gradually, and the governmental role in production is to be reduced to a minimum.

Multilateral Relations

The strategy of common development was adopted in March 1991. It defines the Maghreb's economic area that the signatories of the Treaty of Marrakech of February 1989 agreed to establish. It also sets out the intermediate stages necessary in creating the Maghreb economic area and establishes the sector goals that will help to bring it into existence.

The intermediate stages are the free-trade zone, the customs union, the common market, and the economic unit.

Before each of these stages is implemented, studies must be conducted so that a plan of action may be drawn up, with consideration given to the specificities of certain countries.

Pending the creation of a free-trade zone, a provisional framework is planned.

Maghreb trade agreements. In 1990 and 1991, two Maghreb-wide agreements were concluded, one concerning agricultural trade and the other concerning tariffs and trade.

The two agreements provide for duty-free entry of all goods originating in the countries of the Maghreb and the free movement of a list of goods. The lists have been drawn up.

The tariff and trade agreement also institutes a 17.5-percent charge equivalent in effect to a customs duty on imported products when a like product already exists in the importing country. It also institutes safeguard measures and a mechanism to compensate losses resulting from customs-duty exemptions. These are transitional safety mechanisms aimed at mitigating the adverse impact that integration may have on any of the member countries.

Given the specificity of each member nation and in view of the contribution that bilateral relations can make to the integration process, the bilateral approach has not been

scaled back. On the contrary, it is evolving in the same direction as the multilateral approach.

Bilateral Relations

The Maghreb tariff and trade agreement currently functions as a general framework guiding bilateral relations. It has served as the model for various amendments made to existing bilateral agreements.

For example, the accord signed on 19 June 1991 supplementing the Tunisian-Moroccan tariff and trade agreement instituted the following mechanisms:

- a list of products to be traded duty-free and exempt from foreign-trade formalities;
- a list of products exempt from foreign-trade formalities and subject to a 17.5-percent charge; (This refers to sensitive products manufactured in both countries. The idea is to allow the economies of the two countries to compete without any harmful effect on local production.)
- all other products are exempt from customs duties but not from foreign-trade formalities.

A supplemental accord to the Tunisian-Algerian tariff and trade agreement was signed on 15 May 1991. It establishes the principle of exemption from customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect on all products originating in the two countries, as well as the principle of eliminating nontariff barriers.

Tunisia and Libya signed a similar agreement on 12 October 1992. It provides for a what amounts to a free-trade zone that will exclude only certain products. In fact, the free movement of goods will apply to all but certain products to be determined by a follow-up committee. The restrictions will be only temporary in nature.

No special safeguard measures are called for, although the follow-up committee, which meets every three months, has the authority to enact safeguard measures should the need arise. It is also authorized to modify the list of products subject to foreign trade formalities.

That, in fact, is an institutional framework that eliminates several barriers to trade and the protectionist measures are in some cases weak. It is hoped that the Maghrebi business operators will benefit from this framework to expand intra-Maghreb trade, improve the Maghreb's share of world trade, and speed up the creation in actual fact of a Maghreb free-trade zone.

Balance of Trade With the Arab Maghreb, 1990-92

Category	Value		
	1990	1991	1992
Food products	+32,150	+50,150	+44,900
Energy	-88,000	-103,600	-107,500
Textiles and leather	+1,000	+9,750	+8,300
IME [expansion not given]	+37,300	+55,600	+30,750
Various industries	+86,150	+102,100	+107,245
Total	+68,600	+114,000	+83,695

able to control the levers of the economy. It is known that the text signed in Washington gives substance to this hope because the Palestinian administration will gradually receive all economic and social authority over all of Jordan and the Gaza Strip (see *LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE*, issue 912).

The third hypothesis is a demographic one: the PLO estimates that 500,000 Palestinians—out of the 650,000 displaced at the time of the 1967 war—will exercise their natural right to return to the country between now and the year 2000. An internal movement of under 700,000 or 800,000 is generally expected. This caution—is it voluntary?—can be explained this way: given 500,000 returns and a natural demographic growth of 3.2 percent per annum, the population of Jordan and Gaza (plus East Jerusalem) should climb from 1.9 to 2.98 million by the year 2000. Now the territories' total resources should only increase, according to the PDP, 8.2 percent per annum, reaching \$5 billion in 2000. Thus per capita GNP [gross national product] would hardly go up, going from \$1,500 to \$1,700 per annum. That is, twice as much as the Egyptians' annual income but still 10 times less than that of Israelis. Autonomy will probably improve living conditions between now and the year 2000. But not its level.

About Money and Its Capabilities

This not very exciting outlook emerges directly from the PDP's hypothesis. Samir Hulaylah, an economics professor at Bir Zayt University and a member of the Palestinian delegation, drew the following conclusion: "If you want to avoid having all of economic growth being absorbed by demographic growth, if you want people's standard of living to improve, you have to limit returns from the diaspora to very qualified people or those who pledge to invest in the territories. Israel did this quite well when it began. Why shouldn't we?"

Will this selection by merit and money be politically acceptable? This is not certain. But it appears subtly in the PLO's plan: "The PDP will be open to other Palestinians of the diaspora (editorial note: approximately 3 million people) who have the training and the skills that the current residents of Palestine do not possess in sufficient quantity or quality" (page 21).

Throughout this document, Palestinian experts manifest their concern for realism and flexibility. On page 10: "Our main concern is to lift blockades and correct distortions, which have acted as a brake on the development of the occupied territories during the Israeli occupation.(...) We have no illusions regarding the immensity of the resolve, the efforts, and the resources that will have to be mobilized, and of the time required before we can reach a normal situation." Or again on page 30: "We will have to be flexible and open to the need to adjust investment budgets in response to circumstances."

They thus identify a first phase for rehabilitation and preparation (1994-95), during which the entire legal arsenal and the initial emergency measures will have to be made with regard to housing, tourism promotion, professional training, and basic infrastructure (water, urban renewal, garbage) so as

"to increase the economy's capacity to absorb major investments with a minimum of waste and inflation." The second phase (1996-2000) will make it possible to improve infrastructures and diversify the economy gaining support mainly from the private sector.

Because this plan wants to be very liberal: "It is not an administered economy instrument(...); it should be suggestive and indicative" (page 31), the text says, taking its inspiration, though it is not mentioned, from the "French-style planning" model. For the PLO, the government should be content with drawing up the rules of the game (legal, social, fiscal, and monetary) and facilitating the blossoming of a private, cooperative sector. Thanks in particular to the setting up of industrial zones, the restoration of networks of sewers, irrigation, telephone or electricity, roads, ports and airports as well as the creation of a half-dozen sectoral investment funds. The document even makes certain to emphasize (page 32): "It is essential to add that this planning should not lead to a disorganization of economic activity, an obstruction of economic principles, a distortion of economic structures, or heavy-handed bureaucracy acting as a brake on activity." What good intentions...


Next, sectoral needs are reviewed with the amounts of needed investment. It is an almost exhaustive survey from which several basic ideas emerge. The first concern will be to reduce the development gap between the Gaza Strip and Jordan. The very deteriorated state of infrastructures makes the 800,000 residents of Gaza endure serious health and pollution risks. Hence the emergency measures relating to water and urban renewal. To contain galloping unemployment (50 percent), the Palestinian plan forecasts the rapid construction of a deep water port, a sea water desalination plant, an oil pipeline coming from Jordan, a small refinery, a gas liquefaction unit, and a free industrial zone. An airport and a highway corridor to Jordan are also deemed vital by the Palestinians.

The Israelis have obviously understood this message: yesterday they were opposed to the construction of a port in Gaza (at an overall cost of \$400 million), which would compete with their Ashdod installations, today they are reported to be in agreement to guarantee the Palestinians a minimum of merchandise traffic coming from the Dead Sea. If this gesture were to prove true, the construction of the first segment of the Gaza port could quickly get off the ground. The French Government has said it is ready to cofinance it.

Reduce the Unemployment Rate to 10 Percent

The main driving force behind the territories' domestic growth will be construction. This sector should need more than \$6 billion in capital, employ 140,000 people by the year 2000—that is one-quarter of the active population—and grow at the breakneck rate of 21.5 percent per annum. Palestinian experts estimate at least 185,000 new units of housing will need to be constructed (housing an average of six people each) to cope with delays and the influx of refugees. "This program will rest entirely on the private sector," Samir Hulaylah told us. "The government would not have the means to finance it. It should only furnish the land, assist with loans, and limit taxes." The PLO's document even brings up the possibility of launching "a vast

The Construction Sites of the Next Century



campaign to mobilize volunteers or semivolunteers" (sic) to launch construction projects while reducing costs. Every industry tied to construction (cement, tiles, subcontracting) will thus be promoted to free them from prohibitively priced Israeli imports or protect themselves from

competitive Jordanian suppliers. These jobs, added to those created in the tourism, textile, or electronics sectors, should, according to the PLO, make the unemployment rate in the territories drop from its present 35 to 40 percent to 10 percent by the year 2000.

KEY:

1. Restore service to the abandoned oil pipeline that connected the Gulf countries to the port of Haifa.
2. Project to divert the Jordan River's waters starting at Lake Tiberias.
3. In Kalandia, the construction of an airport.
4. In Gaza: setting up a desalinization plant and a refinery; dredging a port that could handle heavy cargos; construction of an airport.
5. Oil exploration and development in Gaza and the Negev.
6. The Israelis want to build a highway making it possible to link Cairo to Ankara with legs to Damascus and Amman.
7. The Palestinians want to build a road from Gaza to Amman through Jericho.
8. In Hebron, a cement works is on the drawing board.
9. Exploration for ore and construction materials in the Dead Sea.
10. Channel planned to link Gaza with the Dead Sea.
11. Oil pipeline to the Gulf countries.
12. The digging of a channel between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea and the construction of a dam to feed a desalinization plant.
13. TABLE

Jordan	Gaza
Area: 5,678 km ²	350 km ²
Population: 1,221,000	800,000
Population density: 215 people/km ²	2,285 people/km ²
Per capita GNP: \$1,700/year	\$800/year
(in comparison: Egypt, \$600/year; and Israel, \$11,000/year)	
Resources: food crops, animal husbandry, textiles, leather, mechanical products	animal husbandry, beverage plants, textiles, business

Agriculture will remain a mainstay of the Palestinian economy. It already supplies more than one-quarter of the gross domestic product in the territories and its growth will be less rapid (5.4 percent per annum) than that of GNP, but its productivity and added value should increase, thanks to the introduction of irrigation technologies, the building of storage facilities, and the expansion of packaging or processing units. "We do indeed expect finally to be able to sell our lemons in Israel, Egypt, or Syria," Muhammad Shutayyah, a professor at Bir Zayt University and an active negotiator in Washington, told us. However this progress will remain limited, the document believes (page 14) until "the land and the water resources that Israel has appropriated have been returned. Since this return will require long negotiations with Israel, in which the possibility of delaying tactics cannot be excluded, in particular with regard to water resources, the development of agriculture will of necessity be selective."

Autonomy with respect to Israel will be sought within the framework of overall negotiations. The Palestinian economy will not be able to live inside a hermetically sealed jar. But the PLO wants to reduce the territories' "dangerous and excessive dependency," 91 percent of whose imports and 64 percent of whose exports go through Israel. So as to protect their nascent industries, the Palestinians anticipate a customs duty on the most subsidized Israeli agricultural or industrial products. Especially if Israel taxes their imports from the territories. Is this a protectionist threat? "There is nothing ideological in our attitude," said Samir 'Abdallah, the president of the Association of Arab Economists in Jerusalem. "We are favorable to free trade. We just want to develop our economy and be treated like partners."

These experts hope, for example, to keep the number of Palestinians authorized to work in Israel at around 100,000 to 120,000, although with a minimum negotiated salary and guaranteed social benefits. "The Israelis need this cheap labor and the Palestinian economy will not be

able to absorb them in the short term," said Muhammad Shutayyah. Manpower versus high-tech products, Jordan water versus Israeli electricity, tomatoes versus seeds, shoes versus tourists: the Palestinians want to bargain about everything with their exoccupiers "in everyone's mutual interest." Thanks to an anticipated opening up of Arab and European markets, the PLO's plan expects a \$2.6 billion flood of imports in 1994, increasing to \$3 billion by the year 2000. And they expect a quintupling of Palestinian exports up to \$1.2 billion.

Last, to make its plan succeed, the PLO is clearly counting on international financing neither whose amount nor its exact source—in July—it could predict. The document simply estimates the overall cost of the development program at \$17.1 billion over seven years. Where will this money be found? The PLO estimates that \$3.7 billion should be found locally thanks to domestic savings. So \$13.4 billion would need to be raised abroad, or about \$2 billion per annum.

Is this realistic? Compared with the \$100 billion spent by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the Gulf war, the Palestinian plan hardly seems an expensive one. When seen in relation to the \$5.5 billion given each year by the Americans to the signatories of the Camp David accords (Israel and Egypt), this amount seems quite within reach. In fact, it is scarcely far from the World Bank's estimates (\$3 billion) because the Bank has not included in this figure private sums of money and housing, port, airport, and highway needs that could exceed \$10 billion over seven years. "But we mustn't dream," Samir Hulaylah admits. "The international community has been extensively solicited. The money will be hard to get." The PLO is currently anticipating public assistance worth \$600 million each year, which seems to correspond to the first firm commitments of the G-7 and the Arab countries: \$125 million promised by the United States, \$120 million from the EEC, and the rest from Japan, the Scandinavian countries, and the Gulf countries. Palestinians next hope for a flow of capital from the diaspora or from international investors worth \$600 million per annum. The rest of their needs will be financed by

\$800 million in annual loans taken out at multilateral banks (the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the future Middle East Development Bank) and from Arab agencies. A schedule remains to be negotiated. "We're ready to discuss all of that and to put our plan on hold if necessary," one of the PDP's authors said. On page 29 of this document, the PLO adds, with a slight touch of irony, that above all its text is not a "holy book"!

The Palestinian Budget: Investments Drawn Up by the PLO for the Period 1994-2000
(in millions of dollars)

EXPENSES	
Water and agriculture	1,342
Water	256.5
Agriculture	1,089.5
Industry	454
Extensions to factories	123
New factories	123
High technology	72
Mining	89
Handicrafts	9
Energy	700
Transport and networks	112
Generation	487
Distribution	101
GNP	6,484
Housing	4,200
Various equipment	2,284
Infrastructures	3,255
Education, research	679
Health	538
Transportation and communication	1,674
Other public equipment	364
Other services	812
Social services and culture	269
Tourism	310
Commerce and marketing	34
Government	56
Currencies, treasury, banks	143
Total investments	13,047
Risk provision (10%)	1,304
Working capital needs	2,800
Total	17,151
RECEIPTS	
Domestic savings	3,744
International financing	13,407
Total	17,151

Israeli Expert on Agreement

94AA0003B Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French
1 Oct 93 pp 58-59

[Interview with Mark Heller of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University by Vincent Nouzille in Tel Aviv; date not given: "A Conversation With an Israeli Expert; Mark Heller: 'They've Got a Lot To Gain and Little To Lose; Not Us'"]

[Text] A specialist on military balances at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University since 1979, Mark Heller, 47, a graduate of the University of Toronto and Harvard, in 1991 coauthored with Sari Nusaybah, the director of the Center for Strategic Studies in East Jerusalem and a rising PLO star, a prescient book examining the outlines of—what was then an improbable—peace accord: *Israeliens, Palestiniens, le partage de la terre* ["Israelis and Palestinians: Dividing Up the Land"] (Balland).

[Nouzille] Did the Rabin-'Arafat handshake surprise you?

[Heller] No. It's just one stage in a pragmatic process of Israeli-Arab negotiations that began when al-Sadat came to Israel 15 years ago and was restarted by the Madrid conference in October 1991.

[Nouzille] But why is this mutual recognition accord only happening now?

[Heller] The two parties finally saw that after having tried all else—war, demonizing, occupation, guerrilla activity—only one solution remained, which would make it possible to halt the conflict: direct dialogue. Three factors helped open this door. First the end of the USSR, which was opposed to all negotiations, opened up strategic maneuvering room in the region. This became concrete when the Gulf war threw the moderate Arab countries into the American-Israeli camp while at the same time weakening the PLO, something that made the Israeli concessions less costly. On the other side, the intifadah, without putting Israel's existence in danger, deeply affected Israeli public opinion. Insecurity was no longer global, it was individual. The war waged with stones swept aside the illusion according to which Israel could continue to occupy the territories without doing anything. Hence the election of Yitzhaq Rabin, a supporter of "peace in exchange for the territories," in the wake of a Yitzhaq Shamir who repeated at the Madrid conference that the negotiations could last a hundred years. Last, the rise in power of fundamentalist Islamic movements probably precipitated events: the PLO and the lay movement ran the risk of quickly being overtaken by less conciliatory parties in the dialogue.

[Nouzille] Do you think this accord will make it possible to contain the fundamentalists' influence among the Palestinians?[Heller] I'm not certain. This political accord will not prevent the fundamentalists' progress; they're gaining in influence in other countries such as Egypt or Algeria; and that independent of a confrontation with Israel. The economic and social factors seem more important to me, with the failure of socialism and pan-Arabism. The economic takeoff could offset this influence in the territories. But only in part.

[Nouzille] Do you think this peace process will lead unavoidably to the creation of a Palestinian state?

[Heller] Nothing is automatic. During the transition, the Palestinians are going to express their national identity with different symbols: the Palestinian flag, the national anthem, a seat at the United Nations, an airline company that loses money, elections, and a political class that is more or less contested. All of these are things with which states supply themselves and that make up the fiction of sovereignty. I don't doubt that one day the Palestinians will have the symbols of a state. In rational terms, that would be the least unstable of solutions. But I think that the form of that state remains to be defined. It might be included in a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation or be completely demilitarized. There are lots of possible solutions which could satisfy Israel's security demands.

[Nouzille] Do these demands seem negotiable to you?

[Heller] No. To start with, the Palestinians have a lot to gain from this accord and little to lose, whereas the Israelis can gain a lot but are also running a big risk. In the equilibrium of the negotiations, this short-term Palestinian advantage can only be repaid with additional guarantees for Israel in the area of long-term security. The Israelis will demand a nonaggression pact and monitoring of Jordan's mountain peaks. I think the Palestinians have understood this. They will limit their military sovereignty if that's the price to pay to have their state.

[Nouzille] We're not there yet...

[Heller] We're far from it. The Washington text is only a statement of general principles, so general that they predetermine nothing. Everyone is going to have to demonstrate their good intentions on site. Between now and mid-November a precise and detailed accord will have to be negotiated pertaining to the transition period, regarding who will do what, regarding the promised elections and regarding economic cooperation projects. The style of the upcoming negotiations will also need to be defined, the form of arbitration, the reversibility of the process in case it fails, etc. And all this before tackling the delicate problems of water,

Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements, and Jerusalem. I do not rule out the possibility of serious incidents, indeed of periods of breakdown. The Palestinian problem has not been resolved... But today at least it is possible to aim at some solutions.

Jericho Economic Situation

94A40003C Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French
1 Oct 93 pp 60-61

[Article by Vincent Nouzille: "In Jericho Waiting for 'Arafat'"—first paragraph is LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE introduction]

[Text] *Just a few days ago owning it would have meant six months in jail. Today the Palestinian flag flies over every house. Here is where the PLO leader will settle and with him the business, the growth, and the dream of an agricultural paradise: fertilizers, tractors, and cold storage facilities...*

"He'll come that way," Jihad Haddad, an alert man between the age of 50 and 60, pointed out the road that goes from the east to the eastern edge of the city. In two months Yasir 'Arafat will cross the Allenby Bridge, coming from Jordan, and travel the 8 km that separate this strategic frontier post controlled by the Israeli Army from the entrance to Jericho. He will set up his headquarters in an elegant house on the outskirts of this town of 15,000 souls, which will become the "capital" of the future Palestinian government of what will henceforth be "autonomous" territories. Thousands of PLO officials coming from Tunis or Amman will follow him with their weapons and baggage, filling all the available housing and invading the calm little streets of the "oldest city in the world." "Look! Jericho has known such times of glory and decline in the past 6,000 years that it's not even close to tumbling down," Jihad sighed.

At the moment everything is quiet, suffering under a 45-degree heat wave that makes the horizon shimmer and causes the city to grind to a halt. As if all that political and diplomatic ado of recent days were but a distant mirage in this ancient geological basin, a faint echo at the bottom of the nearby Dead Sea. As if the late night crowd that had celebrated the signing of the accord in Washington on 13 September had evaporated, drunk with hope but still incredulous. Jericho is waiting for the tornado flegmatically. It is on vacation, with no drums or trumpets, with its usual nonchalance, a hundred leagues away from the daggers and black flags of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], which is stirring things up in Gaza 200 km away. You can slip into the garden of 'Arafat's future home without anyone appearing at the door. The banana trees that surround the house make up an oasis of verdant calm. In Jericho's main square, which measures 50 meters on each side, the town hall still sits opposite the Israeli police station, protected with barbed wire like a bunker. A single invisible soldier is on watch. Not a military vehicle on the horizon. No destitution visible. Just a general bareness and a nascent sense of pride. Some boys scrounge around the fruit and vegetable stands. "Twenty shekels for a flag, 10 Jordanian dinars for a T-shirt!" cries a

shopkeeper with a moustache in the midst of tempting Jordanian underwear and images of 'Arafat. The Palestinian colors are selling well. Peugeot 404's jam-packed with noisy children hoist them. Over each house a flag flies, while just owning one only a few days ago meant six months in jail. A few days, a century... Everything was banned. Without a special permit, no one could go towards the Allenby Bridge. Two km from the city, an Israeli checkpoint still monitors access to the border. "Beyond this point, up to the bank of the Jordan, we haven't been able to plant anything since 1967. But those are the better fields. I hope we'll soon be able to till them again," Jihad Haddad has no bitterness in his voice. He runs Jericho's agricultural cooperative. The upcoming autonomy makes him dream. Big reservoirs of water that, according to him, would make it possible "to double, even triple" the amount of land under cultivation in the Jericho area, which is currently limited to 10 percent of the lands. Fertilizers, seeds, and tractors to increase yields. Cold storage rooms to store the produce of 2,500 farmers. Agricultural credit that would alleviate daily cares. Thousands of tonnes of fruits and vegetables that he would at last be able to sell without restrictions in Israel and Jordan. Roads to the future port of Gaza from which its cargos of tomatoes and bananas would depart every winter. "The Jericho valley is a natural greenhouse. This could be an agricultural California here."

A Network of Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses

He believes in it. The road will be a long one. "We're starting from such a low point." With their 14 wells, the region's Jewish settlements—"We don't know how many of them there are"—used to pump 14 million cubic meters of drinking water each year while the 113 Palestinian wells were only allowed to use 10 million. And the settlers paid 10 times less for this strategic resource than the local farmers. "Things really do need to be rebalanced," the cooperative's director thinks. Lacking water, outlets, and storage facilities, farming in the Jericho region became more rarefied these past few years, down to 70,000 tonnes of vegetables and 15,000 tonnes of fruit. "It was impossible to plan and organize anything." It will not be the 1,100 tonnes of eggplants shipped in three years to Marseilles, which improved farmers' meager resources. "The Israelis imposed such fees on shipments from the port of Ashdod that those shipments cost us \$300,000!" Jihad Haddad explained. The European Community has covered half of this loss, the PLO the other half. First hopes: the Jericho cooperative will establish its Jericho Fruits label and is waiting for a green light from Italy for the financing of a first cold storage facility at a cost of 10 million francs. "That will make it possible for us to export to Europe."

Muhammad Halayiqah is just as pragmatic. As the coordinator of the Economic Development Group, a Palestinian financial institution supported by the European

Community, this 35-year-old engineer believes that a network of small- and medium-sized businesses will emerge to "increase added value." Since 1988 in Jericho he has cofinanced about 15 handicraft businesses with loans of between \$25,000 and \$100,000. "We're going to go into high gear," he announces. A factory to manufacture plastics for agriculture is in the process of being built in a refugee camp to the north of town. A \$300,000 investment for a few dozen jobs. "We mustn't overlook anything to build our autonomy," Muhammad Halayiqah emphasizes. "There are no reasons to buy these plastic products at a very high price in Israel!"

Much energy—and dollars—will be needed to awaken Jericho. "The Israelis have done nothing here since 1967 aside from making us dependent. We lack everything, starting with schools, transportation, and a hospital," complains Tawfiq Nuwaysir, the secretary general of Jericho's chamber of commerce, industry, and agriculture. "We need massive international assistance, support from a development bank to realize our agro-industrial potential as well as free trade agreements with our neighbors. Thanks to our cheap manpower, our products will be 40 percent less expensive!" The list of projects is a long one. Because Jericho is supposed to experience an economic and demographic boom in the years to come. "With the influx of 10,000 PLO officials and their families, plus the return of Palestinians who were refugees in Jordan, the Jericho area should go from 15,000 to 200,000 residents within five years," predicted Basil Shawwa, the director of the local branch of the Cairo-Amman Bank, the only Jordanian bank doing business here.

Priming the Pump

Since the announcement that the Palestinian administration would be set up in Jericho, real estate speculation has run rampant. Businessmen and international agencies are looking for offices; officials are looking for housing. "I let a 1,400-square-meter place slip by me whose price octupled in five months," the banker said ruefully. According to [?]Utman Halele], the town's only real estate agent, "at the moment no one is selling because everyone's waiting for things to go up again." The demand for housing will only be satisfied if the future government quickly uses new land. "It's possible," Basil Shawwa said. "The Jericho area is twice as big as Gaza." And only if there is a lot of capital. The loans promised by the World Bank, visits by rich Palestinians of the diaphora drawn by the increases in real estate values, and the announced reopening of the windows of the Egyptian Real Estate Bank or the Jordan Bank should prime this financial pump.

On this expected influx and this hoped for manna are based the hopes of Jericho, which in several months will be a

mammoth construction site. The Hisham Palace Hotel, the only proper place in the area, has just started its own remodeling—"at 'Arafat's request," they say in town. Two steps away from the central square, the carcass of a huge nightclub, which the Israeli authorities prevented from getting off the ground, should soon be turned into a new hotel. Its promoter, [?Akram Subagtani]—a rich Palestinian merchant from Jerusalem nicknamed "the king of electronics" because he controls the high-fidelity wholesale trade in Jordan—will negotiate all authorizations with the Israelis. He is also said to want to purchase a private airplane and settle down here. Nothing but a rumor added to the rumors, an additional dream in a town just emerging from a long sleep. And one that is waiting to see 'Arafat to really believe it.

ALGERIA

Constantine 'Refuge' for Terrorists; Mosques Cited

94AF0006E Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
22 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by A. Zoughailech: "Mosques Are Terrorist Sites"]

[Text] Constantine, the capital of the east, is on its way to becoming the favorite refuge for terrorists. Because they are being tracked down everywhere, the criminals have been withdrawing to the ancient town of Cirta for some time now, and from there they are attempting to redeploy.

A real terrorist plan for destabilization, aimed at assassinating ordinary citizens and citizens in uniform and carrying out acts of sabotage, is apparently being put together by the fundamentalist criminals. According to some sources, three large mosques in the city are the centers of terrorism in Constantine.

They are Ziadia, Aouinent El-Foul, and Chalet des Pins.

Those three places reportedly sustain the various terrorist groups that have been set up so far. But those three mosques are not the only ones to have been taken over by the criminals. There are also others that are smaller, to be sure, but that nonetheless train terrorists.

Since the closing of the detention camps in the south, intense activity by the terrorist cells in the governorate has been noted. It seems that several meetings by the terrorist leaders have been held.

Imam Mossaad, a dangerous criminal on the wanted list who has been convicted several times by the special court, is the top terrorist leader in Constantine. But it seems that his appointment at the head of the Constantine ring has caused murmurings among the fundamentalists.

Last, the crimes currently occurring in Constantine are proof that the terrorist ring in the governorate has reorganized with the help of a solidly established mafia.

'Terrorists' Resort to Carjacking

94AF0006D Algiers EL WATAN in French 20 Sep 93 p 5

[Article by D. Benabi: "Tizi-Ouzou: Armed Robberies"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Tizi-Ouzou—The summer must have been a very hot one in Tizi-Ouzou, not only because of the seasonal heat and the many forest fires but also because of the atmosphere of insecurity created by seemingly unimportant news items that have been blown out of proportion by rumors serving as the vehicle for a very strong upsurge of propaganda concerning the terrorists' "feats of arms."

Following the "raids" on certain villages in the region to relieve the inhabitants of their shotguns, a different kind of activity has developed. Basically, it consists of using firearms as a threat in order to steal cars from their drivers. The same system was used to hold up a bar-restaurant known for its many customers and the large amount of money it takes in every day.

Several drivers have been forced by gun-wielding individuals to hand over their automobiles at night without knowing why their cars were being hijacked.

One's first assumption is that the method is being used by terrorist groups wanting to attract less attention as they travel about and thus escape the vigilance of the security forces, which have recently stepped up their presence on certain strategic roads.

Another clue points to a possibility that is just as probable, although for the moment it has not been verified. One of the stolen vehicles was found completely stripped and burned, suggesting that its components had found their way to a destination that is easy to guess: the spare parts markets in Tizi-Ouzou or Tidjelabine. The uncertainty surrounding the real motives behind the thefts is further increased as a result of the armed holdup of the Amraoua Inn three days ago. That establishment, better known as the "Bougie Bridge," does a very flourishing business in the sale of beer and wine.

As dumbfounded customers looked on, an undetermined number of armed individuals first ransacked the premises and then fled with the day's receipts.

There again, rumor (an efficient conveyor of propaganda) had already done its work, since word was that the owner of the establishment had been threatened previously, with demands that he pay a large sum of money.

From carjacking to racketeering, everything seems to indicate that the gangs have found the "motherlode" enabling them to equip themselves with what they need. The terrorist networks in the region, especially those that have chosen to take to the bush, are taking full advantage of the uncertainty created in public opinion regarding who the gangs really are swarming in those remote places.

The gangs even take care to present an exaggerated image of themselves as "heavily armed and organized groups," because they never fail to force their victims to say in their statements that "those individuals were armed with Kalashnikov automatic rifles, and they were all dressed like paratroopers." The purpose is to make a bigger impression on people and make them believe in a presence and an impunity that can be reported by word of mouth only because of the credulity of uninformed citizens. That, too, is part of the terrorists' propaganda.

Continued Attacks, Near Misses on Journalists

94AF0007D Algiers L'OPINION in French 12 Aug 93 p 5

[Commentary by Said B.: "Journalists: the Easy Target"]

[Text] In its third phase, terrorism called for the physical elimination of intellectuals and journalists. That stage is now well under way. The terrorists began by circulating lists of the names of known journalists. That caused the first shudders, but as yet no one believed the threats were real. The terrorists then decided to go into action. The first bombs shook the press center. The first devices exploded at LE MATIN and LE SOIR D'ALGERIE. Although there were no victims up to that point, fears rose a notch. Threatening letters, each more virulent than the last, piled up in editorial offices. Anonymous telephone calls promised certain death. Not much importance was attached to them. The main thing was not to give in to fear. But the intimidating messages continued to target entire editorial staffs. The security measures adopted by some newspapers were reassuring. Fear was still held at bay. The newspapers persevered in their role of providing information. Although not protected, the press did not yield. The terrorists shifted into the next highest gear: they decided to kill journalists in order to silence them. Miraculously and thanks to his own vigilance, Omar Belhouchet, editor of the newspaper EL WATAN escaped an attempt on his life. On the morning of 17 May 1993, as he was taking his children to school, his car was riddled with bullets. That abortive attack served to warn the entire profession. Some of its members were already being forced to live partly in hiding. And they all began paying more attention to their safety. Was that enough? During the airport trial, El Miliani used the Algiers courtroom, which was filled to bursting, to send out a call for the murder of journalists: "In days to come, the journalists will pay," he yelled to those present. His call was heard loud and clear. A few days later, on 26 May 1993, Tahar Djaout—writer, journalist, and editor of the weekly RUPTURES—was killed in a cowardly fashion. One of his killers later said: "His writings are worse than bullets." The security measures in effect at the press center and at certain newspaper offices were no longer enough. The decision had been made to operate in the mornings and in front of the victims' homes. Moreover, the terrorists often struck when least expected. By attacking other journalists working for other papers, they succeeded in spreading the feeling of fear. Operations against journalists intensified. Through another miracle, Benmohamed, a journalist at EL MOUDJAHID, escaped an attempt on his life. A security guard at LIBERTE was followed to his home by a group of terrorists. Merzak Baghtache was wounded by four bullets. And just recently, there was a bomb scare at the offices of ALGER REPUBLICAIN. On Tuesday 3 August, Rabah Zenati, a journalist employed by the ENTV [National Television Company], was killed by three shots to the head. And just this week our profession lost one of its own in the person of Abdelhamid Benmeni, a journalist at ALGERIE-ACTUALITE. At a time when our profession is continuing to be the target of the terrorists, there seem to be plenty of [text illegible] of condemnation. But it is clear that other, more [text illegible] measures are needed today, before it is too late.

'Terrorists' Targeting Intellectuals Arrested

94AF0007E Algiers EL WATAN in French 22 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Mohamed Lamine: "Nine Murderers of Intellectuals Arrested"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The cowardly and heinous murders of Djillali Liabes, Abdelhafid Senhadri, Mahfoudh Boucebsi, and Tahar Djaout will not go unpunished.

Nine criminals belonging to the gang whose chosen objective is to rob Algeria of everything it has in the way of intellectuals were recently arrested by the security services, according to an announcement by national television on its newscast at 2000. Those under arrest included Selmi, Touti, Saidi, Aissat, Djebbari, and Kraba, whose faces were not shown on television. Two other members of the same gang—Lamara Abdelouahab and Brahimi Mohamed—escaped.

According to the television station, which was quoting the security services, the criminals in question murdered their victims because the latter were suspected of being communists. The gang is also responsible for the abortive attempt to assassinate Abdelhak Benhamouda, secretary general of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers].

Six Beretta automatic pistols and the knife that was used to stab Professor Mahfoudh Boucebsi were seized by the security services.

Like M'Hamed Boukhobza, director of the Institute of Global Strategic Studies, the four intellectuals killed by the gang in question were murdered with rare savagery, a circumstance that has aroused indignation both in Algeria and abroad. The murders also marked an end to the "political" ambitions of the people who ordered those horrible murders.

We should point out that Abdelhafidh Senhadri, Djillali Liabes, and Tahar Djaout were killed by gunfire as they were leaving their homes in the morning on their way to work. For his part, Professor Boucebsi was stabbed to death in front of the hospital where he worked.

Malek Indicates Break With Former Economic Policy

94AF0006C Algiers EL WATAN in French 16 Sep 93 p 1

[Editorial by Khaled Mahrez: "A Break?"]

[Text] When the new head of the government says that a rescheduling of the Algerian debt is not "formally on the agenda," he would seem at first glance to be responding "to the media and chancelleries," chiefly French, that have been stepping up their pressure on Algerian authorities to turn to the Paris Club to obtain temporary relief from the burden of Algerian debt.

But beyond his denial of reports saying that a rescheduling of the Algerian debt is a sure thing, Redha Malek's remarks do constitute a break with the official line that we have been hearing on that subject in recent years. Unlike his two predecessors, who made rejection of rescheduling a matter of principle not open to debate, Malek simply says that rescheduling is not on the agenda. The implication is that

it might be at a later date if conditions required it. For those of our partners who were waiting for a "signal" from the new head of the government, this is one, and a significant one at that.

The rigidity with which negotiations were being conducted with foreign lenders to obtain new loans had the effect of drying up every source of foreign financing, thus placing the Algerian economy in a phase of prolonged recession.

The new government team therefore considers it necessary to find fresh money fast in order to stimulate an economic machine that has grown accustomed to turning over at slow speed. While rejecting a rescheduling for the time being, Malek, who claims the same nationalist lineage as his predecessor, has stated that he is open to any option that would not jeopardize national sovereignty.

It seems that the authorities have decided to depoliticize the issue of debt management. The big challenge for the new government team is to combine national sovereignty, social equilibriums, and a market economy.

Benhamouda Sets Conditions for Rescheduling

94AF0007B Algiers LIBERTE in French 21 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Samir Knayaz: "Benhamouda Sets His Conditions"; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] *The UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] has finally stated its position on debt rescheduling. "It is not a matter of being for it or against it; first we have to think about assessing the situation."*

During a press conference given by Benhamouda late yesterday morning, issues related directly to current event dominated the discussion. Among them was the touchy issue of rescheduling, which is currently causing very widespread debate. Benhamouda, who had not previously stated an official position on the question, said that it was not a matter of being for it or against it. "That is not the real problem. What interests us is knowing the form that rescheduling will take, what the social cost will be—because our mission is to defend the interests of the workers—and whether it is worthwhile economically." The top official in the UGTA continued his analysis by saying that before definitely choosing that alternative, we must first assess the situation and determine what our possibilities are.

"Some people persist in saying that rescheduling is a third lung. We are willing to believe it. But let them prove it. Let them tell us what the price will be and what the consequences will be."

Benhamouda also mentioned once again the idea of holding a dialogue involving all the vital forces of Algerian society to debate economic issues. It is a necessary dialogue, he says, so that we will be united when we begin negotiations with the international financial institutions, "because negotiating means making concessions on both sides. So it is not a question of giving without getting anything in return."

Along the same lines, the secretary general of the UGTA was somewhat critical of the participants in last week's economic workshop who supported that option. He said: "I will ask those people this question: how do you expect to manage a debt when you failed to manage the income? Because it must be remembered that they are the same people who were in control of the country for many years." On the subject of the workshop, however, Benhamouda pointed out that the debates had not been politically impassioned. "That in itself is a positive point." While denying that he was engaging in populism or one-upmanship, Benhamouda explained, still on the subject of rescheduling, that the UGTA relies on facts and real data. He went on to say that we should not focus on managing the foreign debt to the point of ignoring the domestic debt, and he provided figures. "One of the most important conditions for rescheduling is, of course, that we devalue our currency by at least 50 percent. If that is accepted and implemented, the domestic debt, which is estimated by experts to total some 930 billion dinars, will rise to 1,400 billion dinars within a few months. How will it be possible to deal with that other huge problem?" Using that as his starting point, Benhamouda argued in favor of another solution—or at least more thorough negotiations with our financial partners to come up with something favorable, he said, to "the interests of the country and the workers. What it amounts to is deciding whether we will be able to reschedule without necessarily carrying out a devaluation, and that is one of the things the UGTA is proposing." The union official also discussed privatization, which, incidentally, he called a secondary issue "because before reaching that point," he said, "it will first be necessary to reorganize the companies that are up for privatization. They must be reorganized financially because—and I feel that private businessmen are unanimous on this point—no one is going to invest in a money-losing project." Another high point in the press conference came when the central union's secretary general answered a question concerning the UGTA's position on the new government. It was a somewhat evasive answer, however, since Benhamouda did not spend too much time on the subject. In substance, he said: "We will state our opinion once the Malek cabinet's program is made public. We have no bias. We are waiting to talk first, and then we will decide what to do. For the moment, we are consulting each other." Concerning the holding of the UGTA congress, Benhamouda tried to be reassuring.

Last, on the subject of announcements here and there concerning the establishment of other autonomous union organizations, specifically in El-Hadjar, Benhamouda claimed that he had no objection to it. He said: "There are 49 union organizations in the national territory as a whole, so one or two more are not going to bother us." What is more, the secretary general of the UGTA said that the more unions there are, the fewer problems there will be. That statement leads one to wonder whether the UGTA favors union pluralism or whether, instead, it is admitting failure in its efforts to deal with the workers' social problems.

Security Agents Trained for Civil Protection

94AF0006B Algiers EL WATAN in French 22 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview with Seriak Belahcene, governor of Alger in charge of security, by Zineb Oubouchou; place and date not given: "Security Agencies Operational Soon"; first two paragraphs are EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Terrorists have been attacking industrial units for some time now. Several of those plants have been partially or completely devastated by arson because they lacked adequate protection. What are the authorities doing to deal with this new form of terrorism? Have they taken steps to protect our economic assets?

Those are the questions that Seriak Belahcene, governor of Alger in charge of security, was kind enough to answer for us.

[Oubouchou] In cooperation with the General Directorate for Civil Protection (DGPC), you have organized a program to train unemployed young people to be security agents. Can you give us more details?

[Belahcene] The new groups of security agents are the result of an operation carried out jointly by the governorate and the DGPC in response to a request by the firms for a kind of "labor force" specializing in security. The notion of security is something new for the firms.

The only institution capable of meeting that demand is the DGPC. It has all the constitutional, organic, and operational resources for training large groups of young people who will then know the basics of prevention and security in a general way.

The 300 young men who have graduated in Alger will not be the only ones. They will be followed by several other classes over the next few days. It must be said that this is really a lifesaver, and as the saying goes, "it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good."

This exceptional circumstance of widespread insecurity, which is being experienced by institutions and individuals alike, triggered the responses necessary for normalizing society, which was lagging in the field of security. Now all the firms are reviewing and reorganizing their organic and rational operating status.

It should be realized that the security function is in fact the matrix of everything that should be faultless and disciplined. It has been absent from our environment for a very long time, but now it is making a strong comeback. With this training program for unemployed young people, we are not only making the firms safe but also taking hundreds of young people off the street by giving them training and a job. I can say that we have come up with a positive and legal reason for recruitment from the standpoint of budget and management.

[Oubouchou] Do you think that 45 days of training are enough for men who will be put to work protecting industrial units or even financial institutions?

[Belahcene] The training provided by the DGPC's officers and cadres is based on the Algerian Orsec (disaster relief) plan, which is the same as that used in the city of Paris. So

the DGPC's pedagogical, disciplinary, didactic, and scientific foundation is extremely up-to-date. For that matter, civil protection agents have proven their professional capabilities abroad on many occasions.

A DGPC agent is not a fireman who simply puts out fires. He is a security agent in the proper meaning of the term and knows the basics of food safety, ecological and electronic safety, chemical dangers, and so on. He is versatile, if you will, and capable of specializing in any area of security or prevention. All he has to do is choose the niche that suits him best.

[Oubouchou] Was it the firms that made their need for specialized manpower known?

[Belahcene] Yes, it was the firms that turned to us, and we are unable to satisfy all the requests, which are so numerous because security was not among the chief functions of the firms. In developed countries, security is a basic function.

The need for security makes it imperative that firms have internal rules to discipline people. Now, with this strong comeback, you are going to see that if there is consistent activity and objectivity in the scientific response to security requirements, even the negative aspects that we have been denouncing so far—such as negligence, carelessness, and collusion—will necessarily disappear forever.

[Oubouchou] Will there be sanctions?

[Belahcene] Obviously. Simply because it is becoming a matter of life or death. With this new notion of security, things that could not be changed by means of vague decrees and official circulars will be changed out of fear or by the adoption of more drastic security measures.

[Oubouchou] Have you recommended protective measures for people targeted by the terrorists?

[Belahcene] A structure comprising a whole arsenal of regulations is being put together, and it should bring us up to the international technical standard in terms of human security measures.

In other words, an important Algerian figure in Algiers will have the same guarantees of protection as his counterpart living in New York or Paris. On the practical level, this will be reflected in a special organization of the kind that exists in the world of security systems, involving not only the state police, whose duties include public order, judicial responsibilities, and the protection of property and people, but also other police forces that might be set up in accordance with the law. Examples are protection agencies or services. It is with that in mind that we are going to organize ourselves to protect the modern social, economic, and human contract.

[Oubouchou] Could this be the famous plan for private police that was announced during the exhibit of security equipment that you sponsored at the CPVA [People's Council of the City of Algiers] early this year?

[Belahcene] To some extent, yes. It is being done in the world's major capitals. There will soon be security agencies. It must be realized that there is a multitude of special fields that need to be understood. On the one hand, there is the security of funds, individuals, and industrial units, and on the other, there are matters such as insurance and the legal and regulatory aspects.

There is a whole range of disciplines that will be organized to even out the situation in the area of high security. By sponsoring the exhibit, we put domestic manufacturers of security equipment in touch with the people who need that equipment. The result was extraordinary, because this new product attracted a very large crowd of company executives.

[Oubouchou] Can we talk about the cost of security in the firms?

[Belahcene] A moment ago I mentioned the matter of insurance, because it is a rather important factor that is very often ignored. You cannot put a price on security. I don't think one should ever talk about the financial cost when it comes to protecting a firm, and that is where the idea of insurance comes in.

The principle of total attention to security must become established among us at every level. For example, when you have a teacher who complies scrupulously with his classroom's security rules, you will find the blackboard, the seats, and the desks in their original state when the year is over. If he doesn't, you will end up with just an empty classroom stripped of furniture.

[Oubouchou] Speaking of schools, have you taken steps to protect them, especially since they have been subjected to bomb scares over the past few days?

[Belahcene] Protecting public property is the responsibility of the state police, who are on the lookout for trouble every day. And that, incidentally, is why we in Algiers do not have much reason to complain about a lack of safety in public places such as the schools or universities. The mechanism cannot be revealed, but it exists; I can assure you of that.

[Oubouchou] Do you have anything to add?

[Belahcene] Disciplinary law must be reinstated, because it disappeared completely a long time ago. Have you noticed any public notices at all inside a commercial establishment?

I challenge you to find any internal regulations posted in a lycee or other institution or even in a caretaker's office.

With disciplinary law, we have every kind of administrative police—dealing, for example, with water, pollution, taxes, municipalities, and so on. And with those police forces, the neighbor on your floor or above you will no longer have fun repairing things in the middle of the night or dumping his garbage right next to your building. Those are all negative aspects of life, which ought to be gotten rid of forever.

Drop in Oil Prices Threatens Production

94AF0006A Algiers LIBERTE in French 14 Sep 93 p 11

[Article by M. Kheireddine: "Is Sonatrach (National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons) Program in Jeopardy?"; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] A petroleum price of around \$15 or \$16 per barrel is likely to slow the flow of foreign investments into exploration and the development of producing deposits.

The foreseeable drop in the volume of invested capital will prevent an increase in petroleum production and the replacement of deposits. It should be pointed out that we will probably see a decline in petroleum production if prospecting efforts are not intensified.

Since the law on hydrocarbons was promulgated in 1986, 30 exploration contracts—26 of which are still in force—have been signed with foreign partners. During the period from 1986 to 1992, Sonatrach [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] drilled 124 wells, an average of 20 per year. To replace reserves and achieve the worldwide average, it would have to drill 100 wells per year. Sonatrach's objective is to get up to 55 exploration wells per year by 1995 and 100 in the year 2000. That objective cannot be achieved without the help of foreign oil companies. Petroleum groups operating in Algeria invested \$150 million in exploration in 1992. The volume of investment planned by the partners will rise from \$235 million in 1993 to no less than \$290 million in 1994. Prospecting work since 1986 has resulted in the discovery of 270 million metric tons of oil. AGIP (of Italy), a subsidiary of the ENI group, recently discovered a deposit in the southeast with reserves estimated at 1 billion barrels of petroleum (150 million metric tons).

If the price per barrel continues to drop, prospecting efforts are likely to slacken, thus jeopardizing the eventual recovery of petroleum production.

In the case of oil recovery, a price below \$18 per barrel does not provide foreign oil companies with enough incentive to invest in Algeria. We should remember that the average recovery rate in Algeria is 23 percent, or less than the worldwide average of 50 percent. Sonatrach's objective is to achieve a recovery rate of around 40 or 50 percent.

Since Algeria's proven reserves are estimated at 7.5 billion metric tons of petroleum, that would make it possible, with the know-how of our foreign partners, to recover more than 3 billion metric tons. The investment necessary in the area of recovery is estimated at around \$14 billion.

The Ghazali government expected the partnership agreements with foreign oil companies to provide it with from \$6 billion to \$7 billion in cash in the form of what are called entrance fees—amounts paid by the firms so they can participate in developing deposits.

In return, those companies would obtain primarily an additional share of the crude oil produced.

Former Prime Minister Ghazali expected the operation to give Algeria a whiff of oxygen enabling it to get out of debt and thus to give the economy a boost.

Those expectations have now been lowered. The offers made by foreign companies are well below the initial estimates. That has not prevented Sonatrach from continuing its negotiations. A call for bids was announced in June 1992 with a view to selecting foreign companies interested in that formula. Contrary to expectations, it was not possible to sign the first contract of that kind during the first half of 1993.

So achievement of the development program's objectives is linked to an inflow of foreign capital. If the price per barrel continues to fall, it is likely to slow efforts to prospect for oil, discourage partnerships for recovering liquid hydrocarbons, and, last, jeopardize the production objective of 1.2 million barrels per day by the year 2000 or even lead to a drop in exports of liquid hydrocarbons.

Djaout Assassination Underlines FIS, Berber Conflict

93AF0842A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
21 Aug 93 pp 43-44

[Article by (Osman Tezgart): "Algeria: Second Belhadj Trial May Embroil Tribes in Armed Conflict; Some Tribal Organizations Have Threatened to Retaliate Against Islamic Groups in Wake of Assassination of Tahar Djaout; Dilemma May Revive Confrontation Between Berber Tendency and Islamic Movement"]

[Text] Algerian judiciary sources have said that Shaykh Ali Belhadj, the number two man in the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) previously, has been transferred from the Blida military prison (where he is serving a 12-year prison term) to the civilian prison in the city of Tizi Ouzou, in the tribal region, prior to referring him to the Algiers Special Court shortly to be tried for a second time on the charge of sending from jail a message—smuggled out by an attorney of the FIS shaykhs—in which he instructed armed Islamic groups to assassinate a number of public figures.

The interrogating magistrate of the Blida City Military Court ordered on 2 February 1993 the detention of attorney Ibrahim Touati on the charge of smuggling a 17-page message from Ali Belhadj—a message which contained comprehensive instructions to Algeria's armed Islamic groups on the methods of action, the strategy that must be adopted, and the leaders to whom the various duties must be entrusted. The message contained, moreover, instructions for the assassination of a number of civilian political figures, military figures, journalists, and intellectuals.

Touani was tried on 3 May 1993 and was sentenced by the Blida Military Court to a three-year prison term in accordance with article 25 of the Algerian military judiciary law. In the trial, the attorney confessed that he had smuggled the message out of jail, adding that he had done it out of goodwill and without knowing the contents of the message, which was given to him as a message addressed to the Supreme Court. At the time when this message was smuggled out of jail, the Supreme Court was considering the appeal that had been submitted by the attorneys on the

sentences issued previously against Belhadj and other FIS leaders—sentences later confirmed by this Supreme Court.

During Touani's trial, the military prosecutor said that Ali Belhadj would be presented for trial by the Algiers Special Court in accordance with articles one and four of law no. 92/3, issued on 30 November 1992, on countering terrorism. The aforementioned article one provides for setting up special courts to which people involved in terrorism cases are referred throughout the emergency period. Article four states that "whoever engages in, defends, or promotes radicalism and terrorism shall be punished by a prison term of 5-10 years and fined a sum ranging of 10,000 to 500,000 Algerian dinars."

Orders to Kill

In addition to the provisions of the said article, the charges made against Belhadj have gone beyond promoting radicalism and terrorism, especially in wake of the wave of assassinations experienced by Algeria recently. The Blida Court military prosecutor has said that Hafid Senhadri—who was assassinated near his home in Garidi, one of the capital's quarters, on 14 March 1993—was one of the figures targeted for assassination in Belhadj's message. Senhadri is a founder of the Committee for the Preservation of Algeria which exerted efforts to get the army to intervene and void the legislative elections that had been won by the FIS. Senhadri was a member of the National Advisory Council and director of the office of the Ministry of Vocational Training. According to the military prosecutor's statements, Belhadj's message characterized Senhadri as the "criminal Senhadri." The military prosecutor also said that the message included orders for the assassination of numerous political and cultural figures whose identities were not revealed at the time for security reasons. It is believed that some of these figures have already been assassinated and that others have been subjected to attempts on their life since the message was smuggled out.

The special circumstances engulfing the first trial of Belhadj and the other FIS shaykhs, which took place a few takes after President Boudiaf's assassination, dictated a "political settlement" for the case—a settlement which led to relatively light sentences (a 12-year prison term each for Belhadj and Abassi Madani). Only two charges were proved against them, namely "plotting against the government" and "distributing pamphlets detrimental to public security and the economic interests." The other charges made against the two men, including the charges of "undermining state security" and "organizing a rebellion, under the cover of a political strike, to overthrow the regime," were dropped. These are charges that could have led to the execution of both men.

But the circumstances under which this second trial is going to be held seem to be totally different. Based on the harsh sentences issued by the Special Courts since they were created and started operating last December, all signs indicate that Belhadj may not escape the death sentence this time. This sentence has been issued against a number of Islamic figures, such as Rabih Kebir, and Abassi Madani's

three sons. The charges made against these people (organizing networks abroad to supply Algerian Islamic groups with weapons) seem to be milder than the charges that will be made against Belhadj. The aforementioned message provides an irrefutable proof confirming these charges.

Involving "Tribal" Region

However, the difference between Ali Belhadj and the other Islamic figures sentenced to death lies in the great popularity Belhadj enjoys among supporters of all organizations (both moderate and radical) of the Islamic Movement, especially among their young supporters. The reputation of other figures, such as Rabih Kebir and Abassi Madani, has been created by the Western, particularly French, media with all the attention and, at times exaggerated, followup they have devoted to these figures. This reputation does not make up for these figures' lack of a true popular base, which explains the absence of reaction or the weak reaction to the death sentences issued against them.

Perhaps it is this particular quality about Belhadj that has dictated his transfer to the city of Tizi Ouzou be tried instead of in Algiers, the capital. It should be noted, however, that Algeria has conducted a number of trials in some provinces adjacent to Algiers for security reasons.

But the selection of Tizi Ouzou (capital of the Berber tribes) specifically to hold this trial is engulfed in dangers. This region has already experienced numerous confrontations against the regime since what became known as "Berber spring developments" in the early 1980s. Any acts of violence or any explosions that may occur in Tizi Ouzou during or after Belhadj's trial can revive the conflict between the Berber tendency and the Islamic Movement—a conflict which experienced previously some bloody turns, as was the case in the universities of Algiers, the capital, in 1982.

The tribal region, where the "Berber tendency" is known to be deeply rooted and which is also a stronghold of the most prominent secular parties and of some radical leftist tendencies, has remained tranquil until now. However, this does not mean that we should belittle the possibilities that Ali Belhadj's trial in this region could turn into a crisis that embroils the region in an armed conflict, especially since some violent threats, which have not materialized to date, were made by some of the region's organizations in the wake of the assassination of pharmacist Tahar Djaout, a man well-known for his sympathy for the Berber tendency.

Inactivity at Ghazaouet Port Reported

94AF0007A Algiers EL WATAN in French 16 Sep 93 p 7

[Article by Nacera Benali: "Ghazaouet: the Forgotten Port"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The port of Ghazaouet experienced a 30-percent drop in activity during the last fiscal year. Although the restriction on imports was the main cause, there are older problems due to the port's isolated location, silting, and the lack of interest on the part of domestic businessmen. And yet, "dispatch money is very easy to obtain there, and it is easy to avoid demurrage," say the port's managers.

Ghazaouet—On the fence marking the port's boundaries, there is a sign reading "No to the Importation of History and Ideology." Inside, a silence that is inappropriate in a port reflects the vague melancholy enveloping the wharves. As though reproaching businessmen for avoiding this important facility, the port of Ghazaouet ranks fourth—on the basis of its annual transit capacity (1.5 million metric tons [t])—after the ports of Algiers, Oran, and Annaba. But it was 1984 before this port was able to achieve 50 percent of its potential activity. That figure has declined every year since then, and by 1992 it was down to only 700,000t.

As regards the current fiscal year, the figure as of July shows 237,206t. Turnover (7 billion dinars in 1992) is rising all the same, but the reason is higher rates, not increased activity.

Although the supervising ministry ranks it as one of the most efficient ports because of the speed with which it unloads cargo, the fact remains that Ghazaouet ranks seventh among the country's 10 commercial ports. The total number of employees, including handlers, pilots, and tugboat and administrative personnel, comes to 245. In peak periods, that number is increased by casual labor.

The port had flourishing traffic back when it was trading with Morocco and serving the entire eastern part of that country—a position that earned it the name of "the Moroccan port." But the Saharan issue and the closing of the border quickly discouraged Moroccan businesses from using Ghazaouet's services. So it became necessary to win back Algerian firms and take business away from the other ports.

But the task turned out to be a difficult one, especially since our businessmen have been unable to control transportation costs. "We offer businesses better advantages, and we have the best productivity compared to the other ports. The customer can benefit from dispatch money, because the price-time ratio we offer is better able to serve his business," says B. Abdelmalek, secretary general of the Ghazaouet Port Enterprise.

Dispatch Money and Demurrage

Some firms, however, among them Edipal, have backed Ghazaouet and entrusted all their west-bound traffic to it. It is undeniable that urban transportation costs are ridiculously low compared to the demurrage caused by delays in unloading cargo at certain ports.

Where the Nedroma road was once the only link between the port and the country's interior, the Ghazaouet area is now less isolated thanks to the Maghnia and Tlemcen roads and the railroad. It also serves the governorates of Tlemcen, Sidi Bel Abbes, Ouargla, Saida, and Bechar. "Despite that, slower moving ports such as Mostaganem are draining away more and more activity," says A. Khenafou, the port's operations manager. The other handicap hampering the port's growth is the phenomenon of silting, a permanent fear in every port.

The port of Ghazaouet has not been dredged since 1962, and it is becoming increasingly shallow in some spots. In some places, for example, the draft has dropped from 12 to 7 meters, making it impossible to charter large ships.

"Importers choose big freighters because that reduces costs," says the operations manager. Water flowing out of the Ghezouanah Wadi does not help matters.

Household refuse and sewage help make the layer of mud thicker. While not being alarmist, port officials considered that silting process to be a serious threat to port activity in the short term.

But as soon as they managed to convince authorities of the urgent need for dredging and obtained an appropriation to carry it out, Algeria signed the Geneva convention prohibiting firms from dumping waste at sea. And studies conducted by a Danish laboratory led to the conclusion that the silt contained highly polluting chemicals, particularly zinc oxide.

The Directorate of Infrastructure and Equipment is currently working on a plan to build a coastal barrier that might hold back the toxic muck, but it is turning out to be a very expensive proposition.

Fishing is the port of Ghazaouet's second area of activity, and port officials continue to hope that they will be able to relieve the burden on the infrastructure by transferring that activity to a fishing port built especially for the purpose. "Instead of that, the decisionmakers have decided in favor of shelters, something that is not going to solve the problem. One (for sardine boats) was built in Honaine, and the arbitrary choice of that isolated site is no help at all. The second shelter will be built in Marset Ben M'Hidi. But several sites are suitable for establishing a fishing port," we were told by the port's secretary general.

Despite those constraints, the port of Ghazaouet has not stopped cherishing hopes for other projects, the most important of which concerns construction of a maritime station. The idea does not seem so ludicrous when one considers the number of emigrants who are forced to travel by way of Morocco.

"A passenger line would satisfy two objectives: it would diversify the port's resources and provide our community abroad with a cheaper means of travel," says one port official.

If the project is approved, the first requirement would be to protect the port from the western wind that periodically sweeps down on the port. According to port officials, the CNAN [Algerian National Shipping Company] claims that its fleet is too small and lacks the capacity to handle Ghazaouet's needs. Local authorities say that what has discouraged the parties concerned is the angle, which is obtuse rather than being a right angle.

"With that angle, ships may not tie up, and no one is willing to invest billions to correct it."

Food Dependency: Agricultural Production Down

94AF0007C Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French
17 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Ali El-Hadj Tahar: "The Bill Is Likely To Be a Big One"; first paragraph is LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] *The low volume of water in the reservoirs will probably continue for a long time to be a basic cause of the inadequacy of domestic agricultural production and, consequently, the big bill for imports of food products.*

Algiers—Domestic agricultural production yielded a surplus during the early years of independence for obvious reasons linked to population and the traditions of working the land that had been inherited from the colonial period, and it remained in balance until the early 1970's. But since then it has declined steadily, even during the height of the agrarian revolution, which saw the collectivization of land and means of production and the creation of a kind of "ownership," which the people's level of awareness could not assimilate. Production methods and long-term investments were ignored. Today, two-thirds of the calories and over half the protein available in our kitchens are imported. Algeria's food dependency means that one-sixth of the foreign exchange earned from hydrocarbons is used to pay a bill that now, following the drop in the price of a barrel of petroleum, is worry number 1, ahead of the modernization of farm equipment and other concerns.

In recent years there has been a relative increase in the domestic production of both cereals and fruits and vegetables, but a single season of drought is all it takes for production to be lost. An example is this year, when the yield from combine harvesting will not reach 8 million quintals because over 60 percent of the area sown in cereal crops was adversely affected by weather conditions. Regardless of the incentives for cereal production and the technical advice liberally provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, low rainfall can result in real disasters affecting the size of the bill to be paid to big American and European producers. But along with fallow land, cereal crops account for nearly 70 percent of the usable land—that is, an area of from 3 million to 3.5 million hectares[ha] is sown in cereal crops, one-third of which receives inadequate rainfall (from 400 to 450 mm per year), a fact that partly explains the low yield per hectare. At from 20 to 30 quintals per hectare, Algerian cereal yields barely equal those recorded on colonial farms. The records set nationally, which in some parts of the eastern and central regions amount to from 40 to 60 quintals per hectare, are not likely to become the national norm, as is the case in the cereal exporting countries. Cereal production during the 1991-1992 season totaled 32 million quintals—of which 13 million quintals were hard wheat, 5 million quintals were soft wheat, and 17 million quintals were barley—but that did not prevent Algeria from importing subsidized American wheat. Self-sufficiency in cereals, which some experts are predicting for 1998-1999, may be only a mirage, considering that dam construction and the dredging of existing reservoirs is not a national priority. Irrigating cereal crops using the center pivot system has enabled a dry country such as Saudi Arabia to produce enough for domestic consumption and even a surplus. The experiments tried by Algerian farmers on the high plateaus give reason to hope that the gamble to achieve self-sufficiency in cereals may be won, provided that the state makes agricultural development and the development of cereal growing in particular an objective for guaranteeing independence and subsequently making it possible to develop a whole series of instruments for production and

services. The 1980's and these early years of the 1990's, a period in which rainfall has declined, have made it clear that the necessary condition for reducing food imports is investment in the hill reservoirs and dams and not too much reliance on rainfall. This year's agricultural production will be 15 percent below last year's, a fact that will have to be taken into account in next year's budget. We pay a high price for the water that we have not been able to capture and hold, and the price goes higher when nature becomes capricious.

The government, which has called for an increase of from 4 to 6 percent in agricultural production, should be talking about ways to fill our shops with the products affected by drought. Even potatoes, which we thought we had produced in sufficient quantities this year, are going to be imported to overcome the shortage, or even the lack, of that product and above all to force down prices, which are rising steadily and in some cases have gone above 15 dinars. But hiding in the markets is another problem as well: that of speculation.

EGYPT

AL-AHRAM Editor on Crisis in U.S.-Egyptian Relations

93AF0820A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 28 Aug 93 p 13

[Article by Salah-al-Din Hafiz: "Drama of Egyptian-U.S. Relations; Genius Balance: How to Befriend United States and Still Disagree With It"]

[Text] Is there a real silent or latent crisis in the Egyptian-U.S. relations these days and how deep has this crisis penetrated into the bones of these relations?

On our part, and within the bounds of our limited information and through our reading of what goes behind the scenes and on the lighted stage, we do actually believe that there is a crisis of some sort. Big or small, it does not make much difference. There is a crisis.

"On the contrary," says Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa, a diplomat we respect greatly, "Egyptian-U.S. relations have experienced no crisis of any sort. Rather, great relations of cooperation exist between the two countries. Moreover, there is mutual and common respect for each side's role in the effort for the Middle East's stability and security."

The Egyptian foreign minister went on to add, and well he did, "This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of the presence of some disagreement in viewpoints, considering that Egypt has its regional perspective which is tied to its Arab role and relations. This makes congruence difficult at times."

We conclude from 'Amr Musa's words that there is disagreement in viewpoints between Egypt and the United States, especially on some Arab issues, even though these disagreements have not reached a critical level. Hence, the official Egyptian admission acknowledging this disagreement and the lack of congruence in U.S. and Egyptian policies. This is an extremely normal and logical condition. How could we imagine complete conformity in the objectives, tendencies, and policies of two countries like

Egypt and the United States, their friendship and cooperation which—reach the level of alliance—notwithstanding?

Perhaps this brings to mind a counter-testimony made by some of U.S. President Bill Clinton's closest friends when they visited Cairo a few days ago. In three closed symposiums held in Cairo, William Marshal and Al Froemme [name as published] admitted that Egyptian-U.S. relations are clouded but that they have not reached the crisis point, despite all the external appearances of a crisis.

To start, whoever thinks that we are trying to fabricate a crisis in these special relations or that we are searching the consciences and intentions of Egyptian and U.S. officials to promote the emergence of a crisis is wrong. But we are seriously trying to look for elements of the hidden and evident tension which poses the threat of deterioration in Egyptian-U.S. relations. We are confident that neither side wishes to reach the phase of deterioration for numerous reasons. Both sides may agree on these reasons and each side may wish to keep them concealed because of its own motives.

We guess that Egypt's reasons for maintaining relations with the United States at their best and highest level are well-known and evident reasons. Egypt is aware that the United States is the sole crowned world leader and the only player in a wrestling arena where there are no rival wrestlers. Egypt is also aware that a major part of its national and pan-Arab interests, be they political, military, economic, financial, material, or moral interests, depends on its good relations with this sole leader.

It is also certain that the Egyptian Government is aware that the broad range of options to which it was accustomed in the past has narrowed and that the margins for moving and maneuvering have also narrowed, even vanished. What alternative does this government have, at least in this phase? The IMF policy is American in nature. The Security Council follows the United Nations in theory and the United States in practice and decision-making. Whatever falls between the two institutions is Americana in tendency.

Perhaps all of this represents not only Egypt's real crisis but the crisis of the entire Third World now that the equation of balance between the two superpowers in that past age has collapsed.

On the other hand, the United States is better aware than others of the true nature of the international circumstances that have put the world's leadership in her lap, to the exclusion of others. Everybody has collapsed or surrendered without resistance. Thus, today's world has become, at least for the phase, a world with a U.S. identity and citizenship, and oh how heavy is the burden of the obligations this new world creates!

Amidst this awareness, the U.S. public turned on itself and dropped, through election, President Bush who fought the Desert Storm battles to regain for the United States its military prestige and to protect the U.S. economic and financial interests. The U.S. public dropped Bush and elected the young and inexperienced Bill Clinton under the

slogan of the desire for change, and perhaps in response to a hidden tendency urging that the great United States pay attention to the facts of the new age—an age of immensely dramatic developments.

Thus, government and leadership in the great United States have moved from an experienced—or, most likely, semi-experienced—administration to a new administration which gave the initial impression of being naive and weak, especially in international relations and foreign policy, and even in domestic policy. The first year of Clinton's administration is about to be completed when he has fulfilled none of his glittering election promises, whether domestic or international. Here he is being confronted with crisis after crisis day and night but failing to offer practical, daring, satisfactory, and convincing solutions!

While the U.S. administration was turning from an experienced Republican administration into a new democratic administration, Egypt was sinking into the fog of the unknown that had been created by armed terrorism hiding behind the name of Islam. Even though this terrorism is not a totally new phenomenon to Egypt, it has been the most violent and the cruellest form of terrorism throughout history.

Because the Clinton-led U.S. administration is a new administration with little experience, it seems that it gave Egypt, with its difficult circumstances, a superficial look incompatible with Egypt's status in its geo-strategic environment. Perhaps this administration simplified matters and judged Egypt from the perspective of the annual aid it receives from Washington, thus viewing Egypt just as a satellite that revolves, or should revolve, in the orbit of the Greater United States. This has generated among Egyptians generally a sense of humiliation and rejection.

Because of miscalculation, the new U.S. administration selected human rights, for example, as an issue with which to test the Egyptian administration at the first meeting between Presidents Mubarak and Clinton. We say miscalculation because, to raise the human rights issue under those circumstances was, in fact, an attempt on the U.S. administration's part to put immediate, even acute, pressure on Egypt so as to reduce the space of Egyptian national independence, despite all the old and revived sensitivities among Egyptians in this regard and even though the U.S. administration was aware that it was talking about armed terrorist attacks threatening the security and stability of an ally. This caused the Democratic Washington to confuse the necessities of fighting armed terrorism and violence with the slogans of defending human rights under normal circumstances. Washington did not become aware of this confusion until it started to experience on the spot the bitter taste of terrorism and of explosions staged in the heart of New York.

Between this and that latent dispute and this and that element of disagreement in viewpoints, concepts, and assessment, signs proliferated on both sides to give the impression that bilateral relations were sliding, or were about to slide, to a new level. This condition was reflected on pages of the press, and especially on television screens. A strong and ceaseless U.S. media campaign, which

accused the Egyptian Government of practicing police oppression, violating human rights, obstructing the democratic development process, and preventing the circulation of power was voiced. Moreover, doubts were raised with questions about the fate of U.S. aid and about how it is spent, thus hinting at corruption. The questions culminated ordinarily in provoking apprehensions and fears about what is hidden in the Egyptian mind, especially about the mutually-sensitive "national independence" issue, about the idea of revolving in the U.S. orbit, and about how close or how far Egypt is from this orbit.

Opposite the U.S. media campaign, we had the responses of the Egyptian media campaign. The Egyptian media, with their various affiliations and connections; the official press and the national papers; and the majority of papers belonging to the opposition parties contributed to this campaign. Each of the above found for itself in the campaign an opportunity to voice a certain objective and, in part, to serve its interest by responding to the U.S. attack.

In this Egyptian campaign, we found a lot of talk about independent national decision-making, about Egypt's independence being "dearer than all friendships," and about U.S. aid, which will compel us to capitulate and be subservient. In the details, we found recurrent talk about the duplicity of U.S. policy and about its double standards on complex positions and crises.

The Egyptian national press, for example, found in this U.S. duplicity an opportunity to respond to the U.S. media campaign; the opposition party papers—beginning with the liberal AL-WAFD and the religious Islamic tendency papers and ending with the leftist press, embodied in the papers of the Marxist Grouping Party and the Nasirist Party—found another opportunity. Every party contributed to criticizing the U.S. policy and its conflicting positions by the degree to which it thought the criticism would accomplish one of its objectives. The liberal right criticized this policy's duplicity on the issues of terrorism which uses religion for a cover, for example; the Islamic tendency criticized the policy for keeping silent on the massacres perpetrated against Bosnian Muslims; and the left criticized it for continuing to strike Iraq and for transforming the humanitarian mission in Somalia—mission Restore Hope—into an aggressive military combat mission, and so forth.

Under the umbrella of the U.S. and Egyptian media campaigns, people started to open the disagreements dossier publicly and to discuss it in broad daylight. Disagreement had been previously concealed for a while and this concealment had depended on officials from both sides denying the presence of any disagreement and asserting that everything was fine. We guess that official denials do not so much mean that relations are tranquil and balanced as they mean that both sides are eager to conceal the crisis-like disagreement and not to subject it to open public discussion so it will not worsen. We, however, find that the opposite is true. Denial and secrecy are not weapons for reform. The way to reform is to engage in open dialogue, to seek the roots and causes of the disagreement, and to deal with its negatives and failures. It is for this purpose that we

have made this endeavor of ours, and the honor of a diligent endeavor is enough for us.

We still have in this regard several points that we will sum up in the following:

The crisis, or the declared or silent disagreement, in the Egyptian-U.S. relations must not be subjected to the criteria of belittlement or exaggeration. Disagreement between any two countries generally, and between the United States and Egypt in particular, is always possible and expected for numerous reasons. When such disagreement occurs, it does not mean the end of the world; it does not mean the outbreak of war; and it does not mean estrangement and hostility in an age that does not recognize sentiments—an age in which hearts are dead and feelings cold and rigid, and in which only interests move warmly, energetically, and actively. By the same token, if such disagreement develops, nobody should be alarmed in Egypt and the Arab region, especially if we put the disagreement in its right context and give it its true dimensions. As Egypt has an interest in keeping its special relations with the United States prosperous, the United States, the sole superpower, also has a similar interest. Thus, interests are mutual.

The prevalent concept of relations between the United States and other small countries—a concept inherited throughout the ages—must be changed. This is the concept of the wealthy and strong looking down on those who are not as wealthy and as strong as he is. Bill Clinton was elected to the White House with just 43 percent of the vote under the slogan of the “mandate for change” so he will change past concepts and policies that have become old in the U.S. tradition. This mandate is not just for domestic change but also for change abroad, i.e., in international relations in a new and unfolding age in which the United States wants to be the sole leader. Therefore, the priorities of this foreign change must focus on reconsidering important issues, especially in dealing with the less wealthy and the weaker.

On the other end, Egypt is also facing the winds of an apparent, latent, and expected change under these particular domestic, regional, and international circumstances. It is necessary to introduce change into the concepts, policies, and options. But by necessity, this change must move in the direction of accomplishing the supreme national and pan-Arab interests. This change in Egypt must spearhead the procession of necessary changes in this part of the world because Egypt is the radiating center in its strategic environment. This environment is Arab in the first place, African in the second place, and Islamic in the third place. It must be a change that establishes a difficult and many-sided equation. It must preserve independence and escape subservience and capitulation on the one hand and, on the other hand, must merge in the movement of the old and new world order—a movement that accomplishes independent human development but does not shut the doors of mutual reliance with others; that establishes democracy and protects human rights; and that does not open the door to fascism and to the proliferation of terrorism, violence, radicalism, and the tendency toward dictatorship and totalitarianism in all their inherited and modern forms.

Perhaps all this requires a rich imagination and genuine creativity in drafting balanced equations that emanate from the country's soil and not from foreign pressure, even if it is pressure from the United States, the sole superpower. This, truly, is a difficult equation at a difficult time.

Profile of MB, Extremist Groups Given

93AA0178A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
13 Sep 93 pp 30-32

[Article by Ibrahim 'Isa: “Berlin Awaits 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman”]

[Excerpt] I came back from Berlin as it was preparing to receive the shaykh of the al-Shadhli sect of the Sufi order. The shaykh was on a European tour, during which he visited thousands of his followers and members of the order in the capitals of the West, Paris, Geneva, and Berlin, and from there to other capitals.

In Berlin, preparations were in full swing. Financial contributions had been collected from the members of the order in Berlin, for the shaykh's travel and accommodations during his European tour were at their expense.

The members of the Sufi order in Berlin purchased a 200-meter apartment in a crowded neighborhood. They made it into a mosque for the order, furnishing it with the most modern and beautiful carpets, and readied it for its inauguration by the shaykh.

It is said that 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman may also come to Berlin.

The first ones to travel to Germany from here, from Egypt, was a group of students sent by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1958 as part of a scientific mission from the Technical Industrial Institute.

Most of them, however, stayed in Berlin and obtained German citizenship years later. [passage omitted]

Now, in Germany—and the language of numbers is Germany's native language—there are 14,000 Egyptians, of whom 4,000 are in the capital, Berlin.

The Egyptians in Berlin alone, for instance, own 50 restaurants, not all bean and falafel restaurants, and 14 pharmacies and 34 mosques.

Berlin's mosques are not mosques in the conventional Egyptian architectural sense. They are very spacious apartments, or the floor of a building furnished with carpets, with a small library adjoining, with technical equipment: microphones, speakers, and a stereo.

It was in one of these mosques that a brief civil war took place between the Islamic groups that rule over the Arabs (including Egyptians) of Germany. The leader of one of the organizations threatened there would be bloodletting if the mosque did not join his organization.

But what are these organizations? In practical terms, the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] was the first organization to invade Germany. Their headquarters was in Munich, and the virtually took over the Islamic Center of Munich.

Thanks to their influence, more or less, there are over 13 Islamic centers under Arab control in German cities (chiefly in Berlin and Aachen); they also own the highest proportion of German mosques.

In the 1970s the Brotherhood began its German advance (I cannot say specifically that Germany is the headquarters for the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood; nor can I say that it is not).

The Brotherhood in Germany is distinguished by its awesome organizing power, the wealth of its members, their old age, and their slow, orderly ability to recruit, but they are hated by the new extremist organizations.

Among the most famously hard-line of these organizations are the Followers of al-Habashi, who disavowed Ibn-Taymiyah and Sayyid Quth (whom everyone disavowed in turn). Egyptians may be the least part of this Arab organization, but they are deeply affected and very hard-line, even the youth.

There is also the Islamic Liberation Party, controlled by Jordanians, though Egyptian participation is heavy and widespread. Accusing the Egyptian government of having deserted Islam is one of the priorities in its sermons from the pulpit!

And then there is the Vanguard [al-Tali'ah] organization headed by 'Isam al-'Attar. This is a Syrian-Palestinian-Egyptian group that relies on the young and has excellent organizational powers.

The foundation of these extremist groups and organizations, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, rests on the young new generation of immigrants. It is focused on private sector businessmen (unconnected with the German government, labor organizations, or official projects). The membership of each organization does not exceed 100 individuals, but quick action and the movement's energy compensate for the small numbers. Other organizations are joined by hundreds of people (mostly entire Arab families), and the thousands are the sympathetic public and silent majority that go to the mosques and listen to the sermons. The most important methods of recruitment or winning people over to the organizations are personal meetings, weekly lectures, lessons at mosques, cassette tapes, and the organization's books.

Members' donations, which range from the hundreds to the thousands, are the most important means of financial support for them to brainwash their members, stir up their religious sense, and exploit their homesickness and their Islam against the features of European life. They exploit the subject of family, and children who may have adopted values and habits other than those of their ancestors, who have deviated or changed, thus requiring huge financial participation from Egyptian and Arab families to build mosques and support the groups. They are quick, however, to use the money in political dramas and huge financial swindles, but the most widely discussed subject among Arabs in Germany is the official funding of Arab oil countries, growing frequent for some of the extremist Islamic organization leaders in Germany, in the same way

that the pilgrimage season has seen a massive German presence, and meetings of figures from financial oil organizations that gave financial support to what were called the Afghan mujahidin.

What shows the true dimensions of the disaster is the fact that the Arab extremists and hardliners in Germany are declaring war from their pulpits and in their sermons, in their communiques and their family meetings, against German Muslims. In the past few years, 800 Germans have converted to Islam in Berlin alone. They are openly and frankly accused of being agents of the German government—of being Kohl's spies on Islam!

The information I obtained on a visit to five German cities convinced me that Germany is the likeliest European country to follow New York and New Jersey in hosting Islamic extremism. Germany was even mentioned as a candidate for receiving 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, the leader of the extremists and mufti of the accusations, when the names of European capitals were being bandied about as to which would be ready to receive him should he be deported from the United States.

But the painful question about the extremist Muslim phenomenon in the West still remains.

And it is a phenomenon, with all the meanings and implications of that word. It is a phenomenon with dimensions, breadth, and width, a phenomenon with form and content, its supporters and its men—and women.

Some explanations that are gaining credibility in the analysis of the phenomenon say that, in European countries, Muslims are facing a strange cultural challenge that calls for their going to war against the religious sense and feelings inside them.

They see and meet half-naked women and girls who dispense with their virginity right in front of their parents, young men wearing earrings, homosexuality allowed everywhere, pornographic movies on television on Sundays, a red-light district in the heart of each city, beer being drunk nationwide, wine as cheap as dirt, and so on.

This is why an Arab Muslim has nothing but his religion with which to resist all this. In no time his faith, with its rites and feelings, becomes a shield, a cage, with which to protect himself. Then, even more quickly, it becomes a fortress to fight everything around him, into which he may flee from what surrounds him.

But this explanation still falls short of explaining the mystery (Muslim extremism in the heart of the Western world). The truth is that the West—and all we have said about the red-light districts, virginity, and sexual deviance is true—but is it not shallow and superficial for the West to be only this?

It is the West itself that distorts and misleads the Arabs! // opened its doors to the Muslims and treated them better than they were treated in their own "Islamic" countries, gave them job opportunities, success, and the ownership of stores and companies. It turned their poor men into millionaires, and gave their children the greatest and most

genuine educational opportunities, gave them the use of technology, gave them its passports and protection under the law, giving them even the broad and unlimited freedom to preach Islam, allowing them even to bring hundreds and thousands of Westerners into the Islamic faith, without accusing any of them of unbelief, subversion, or breaking the law!

It is the West, too, that made it so extremely permissible to worship God and insult the West, which allowed thousands of Arab Muslim women to wear the veil in the streets of its cities and capitals; nor has it struck any of the Muslims for daring to pray in its city parks!

The West does have moral depravity (as does the East) and values contrary to ours (as we have values contrary to theirs), but with all the West has given to Muslim citizens residing there, I am not now getting into the position of the West's governments toward the Arab and Islamic countries. That is another story, with all the West has given to Muslims. Is it their right to make accusations of blasphemy? A citizen—"MB"—has left Egypt angry with it, wanting to get even with it—as he is free to do—and goes to Europe, choosing Germany, and loiters in its streets, takes employment, makes money, gets married to a citizen and takes German citizenship; buys a shop, then a second, then a third; owns two cars; has children studying in the schools for free (all levels of education are free there); is able to retain the Arabic language and the Holy Koran, to go to the mosque and give donations for the building of another mosque. He provides the bookstore with books by Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Sabiq, preaches Islam, and converts his in-laws to Islam. All this, and the Germans do not touch a hair on his head; all this and more, and no one stands in his way, or the way of his car. Then, after all this, he says that the West is blasphemous and Germany is blasphemous, and the Germans are infidels! Now who is the fanatic? Who is the racist? The Germans, or Mr. MB?

But they will say, "What is all this prejudice from this writer with his dishonorable motives? He is smitten with the West. He is fighting Islam. Why all the prejudice? In the days he spent in Germany (which he visited to attack us and make these accusations against us) did he not see the neo-Nazis and the racists in Germany?"

No, I did not see them. If they want the truth, the only demonstration I saw in Germany, in Hamburg to be exact, had thousands of people, and it was against Nazism and the neo-Nazis.

Government-Sponsored Youth Group 'Challenges' Islam

93LD0036C Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 18 Aug 93 p 1

[Article by Safwat al-Sandfawi: "130 Million Pounds From the Higher Council for Youth and Sports to Horus...to Counter Islamist Youth!"]

[Text] The Higher Council for Youth and Sports (HCYS) has allocated 130 million pounds in support of the dubious organization, Horus, established specifically to counter

Islamist youth in all Egyptian universities at the levels of athletic associations, youth centers, and congregations throughout Egypt.

HCYS reports confirm that these funds have not achieved any noticeable success, because, in addition to countering Islamist youth, Horus has turned to prurient and pleasurable interests, the disgraceful mixing of youth and female students at the university, mixed-sex recreational trips, and alcoholic beverages.

The reports added that Horus had failed to achieve its intended goal of stamping out Islamist youth; thus HCYS Chairman 'Abd-al-Mun'im Amarah resorted to finding an alternative organization to Horus in the Egyptian universities. He has transferred one-half of the Council's budget in support of this new organization. As such, a decision was made to provide them textbooks and notebooks free-of-charge and to provide free travel tickets, athletic clothing, and the costs of attending camps, all at Council expense.

Scholars on Failure to Implement Islamic Law

93LD0037A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 4 Aug 93 p 3

[Article by Majdi Zalam and Muhammad 'Ali-al-Din: "Apply Shari'ah in Cultural Fields"]

[Text] Amending the Censorship Law so that it agrees with Article Two of the Constitution.

For years, Islam's ulema in Egypt and the Islamic world have been demanding that the Islamic Shari'ah be applied in various areas of life. They always emphasize that there is no escape from our times and no deliverance from our problems except by applying God's Shari'ah. Meanwhile, other voices call out for secularism, or other schools of thought, whose owners reiterate the difficulty of applying the Shari'ah in our contemporary lives. They ask: How do we apply the Shari'ah in our lives? Or is the intention to apply it only within limits and for punishments?

AL-NUR has sought out the views of Islam's ulema concerning a limited question: How do we apply Islam or the Islamic Shari'ah in public affairs and issues? How do we apply it in cultural life, the economy, sports, in punishment, education, the arts? Beginning with this edition, AL-NUR will publish a series regarding applying the Islamic Shari'ah in various fields of life.

Undoubtedly, culture is responsible for forming the ideas and minds of people. Accordingly, it is a two-edged weapon. If it is ideally used through specialized agencies in the state, it is used for society to lift it to the level of the advanced nations, without perversion or deviation in ideas and behavior. This installment concerns how to apply Islam in cultural life, as represented by its official agencies in the state, such as the writers' organization, cultural houses, mass culture, the theater, cinema, etc.

Cultural Institutions

Dr. Sha'ban Isma'il, professor in the College of Islamic Studies of al-Azhar University, says that "culture, in its general sense, is a group of sciences and educational matters that influence human civilization and help it to

progress and advance. In this sense, it began with the birth of the first person, when he sensed his need for food, drink, and a table, or swapped property with someone else. Generations have inherited these cultural affairs, generation after generation, adding to what had gone before.

"Only one world [ummah] has influence in these cultural affairs, sometimes toward prosperity, other times toward deviation and misdirection. When Islam came, matters were put in their proper place. The outlines of the good life that brings man religion and this world, what makes this world prosper and what comes after human life, so that one does not outweigh the other, were put in God's Revelation.

"The duty of cultural institutes is to apply these concepts as we received them from the Teacher of humanity. This is a serious and trusted responsibility that will be answerable to God. It is the duty of state officials who are responsible for these institutions to choose men whose faith is correct, who are characterized by moderation and the true understanding of Islam, so that they will be able to apply God's Revelation in their works and institutions, in order to share in creating a generation with Islamic culture, unsullied by deviation or extremism.

"With regard to what we are seeing today in these institutions, their officials have private inclinations and dubious tendencies. The proof for that is that they subsidize books and studies that tear down Islam and harm the people."

Dr. Sha'ban concluded: "We ulema must expose them and make our youth see the perversion of these officials, or else we will be partners in what they are doing."

Mass Culture

Dr. Sabri 'Abd-al-Ra'uf, professor of comparative law in al-Azhar University, says that the ulema have agreed that Shari'ah laws provided by the Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet are immutable laws that cannot be replaced or changed, because they were only given after faith was implanted in hearts. "People are disposed to love God and His Prophet. Accordingly, we see Muslims as the first to commit to God's Revelation outwardly and inwardly. These days we see various manmade sectors, whose general content violates God's Shari'ah. As just one example, we see the mass culture sector in the month of Ramadan erecting a large tent, not for religious purposes, but for plays and parties that are not compatible in any way with religion. If this is one of the cultural sectors, how can we expect it to apply the Islamic Shari'ah. It knows that applying the Shari'ah would put an end to itself, because the Shari'ah only works for the interests of the individual and society through implanting high values and principles free of heretic tendencies, carnal appetites, and the like. Accordingly, I think that, if these sectors would send out the correct message, change their programs on which it is based, exert their efforts and dedicate all their time on behalf of building a new generation to instruct the youth, educate them in sound religious teachings, make them want to work for good, and warn them against working for evil, then it can also do its duty toward calling for applying the Shari'ah. It will then have corrected its course and followed the correct path that pleases God."

Dr. Sabri added: "As for the Board of Writers, that is one of the serious cultural sectors where we find that, in recent times, those in charge are printing and publishing books at cheap prices for sale to the masses, which are in truth not in harmony with the teachings of Islam, but are incompatible and in total disagreement. However we, despite all that, see these officials circulating these books, which have been rejected by al-Azhar and everyone who is zealous about his religion. However, they have rejected the words of everyone and, accordingly, those who have done this must be replaced by men in whom the love of religion and the nation in which we live is abundant, who would work to plant spiritual values and train the youth to read correct Islamic books. We must correct the youth's understandings as pertains to these superstitions that have filled the minds of many of our youth. By showing youth their affiliation with their nation and acquainting them with religious affairs, we can all work to apply God's Shari'ah. It is up to the Islamic ruler [wali al-amr] to entrust these matters to specialists who are earnestly concerned with their religion, so that everything may be put in its proper place. They must seek the assistance of the specialized ulema who are God fearing and who work on God's behalf. As the saying goes: 'Take knowledge from its authorities and demand wisdom from the wise.' When we put everything in its place, we can build a community and establish a state built on the shari'ah of God and the Sunna of His Prophet."

Dr. Zaki Muhammad Abu-Sari', assistant professor of Koranic interpretation and studies in the College of Islamic Studies, al-Azhar University, says that applying the Islamic Shari'ah in cultural fields can be summarized in several points:

- "1. Establish a curriculum for teaching, so that it is compatible with the mental power of the various classes of people.
2. Have this curriculum reviewed by ulema of the Islamic religion for its soundness.
3. Have the ulema of religion carefully study these programs, retaining what religion approves and rejecting what religion disavows.
4. Those questions that require interpretation can only be decided by someone who is qualified to make an independent judgement.

If these four points are applied, we would find that any instructional method would succeed in applying God's Shari'ah and establishing a generation on the Koran and the Prophet's Sunnah.

"Regarding the role of officials responsible for those organizations, they should present or submit a work to the public, whether printed, audio, or visual, only after submitting it to the ulema of Islam for study and establishment of its virtue. The business of these officials should be restricted to mere administrative affairs only, although it would be preferable for those in charge of these cultural organizations to be persons with an excellent knowledge of religious affairs."

Types of Culture

Dr. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman added: "Islam is an integrated program of life; we believe in all the Koran and correct Sunnah. When we talk about applying the Islamic Shari'ah in cultural areas, we must first define the concept of culture. It has multiple meanings, which include ideas, morals, education, and many customs. All of that has priority, with education and teaching leading the way, followed by the media, especially visual, in the second place. Then, we have the press, books, etc., in third place. It should be stressed that our problem in Egypt is that these agencies work against Islam. Therefore, we find that the effectiveness of these agencies is extremely limited, because they clash with the basics of Islamic culture. They try to cover themselves by copying from Islam, so that it can be said that there is Islamic education. The solution is to enforce Islamic rules and censorship, in order to control what these organizations are offering. A work should only be presented after its review and authorization by the ulema of Islam, so that everything offered will serve Islam. In this way, we can avoid secular tendencies that are hostile to Islam, we can offer an Islamic culture that serves Islam, and we can apply God's Shari'ah and His Prophet's Sunnah."

Islamic Program

Dr. Mahmud Mutawalli, instructor of interpretation in the College of Islamic Studies, al-Azhar University, says that the solution is to produce an Islamic program for everything offered in these cultural organizations, because culture shapes the minds of the people and, consequently, it is responsible for their ideas. Moreover, everything these organizations do must be submitted to the ulema of religion to establish its correctness and to eschew the corrupt. With all the shades of views pouring in, and the godless escapades, Islamic awareness is developing gradually. Furthermore, laws must be enacted for all Islamic dealings, and the ulema, religious judges, and officers of the executive power must participate in this. The ruler will implement these laws."

Children's Libraries

Dr. Hasan al-Shafi'i, assistant dean of Dar al-'Ulum College, Cairo University, says: "I welcome this question, because applying the Shari'ah, in some people's understanding, is limited to carrying out legal punishments and legal limits on the criminal and civil side. In fact, however, the Shari'ah does embrace this and other matters. When you talk about applying the Shari'ah in cultural activities, the concentration must be on the age of the one receiving this culture. The young must be protected. We must begin to prepare the child; his education is begun with preparing stories for children appropriate for their age. Children's cultural activities should be suitable, whether they are simple or complex. On the contrary, children's games and their ways of occupying idle time, and I don't say killing time, are very important matters in building their personality and protecting their future. The logical concern with children in recent circumstances is praiseworthy, whether by making libraries available or certain theaters, especially the puppet theater. On the one hand, one may note that they are inadequate and, on the other hand, one might not

be concerned with or agree that they meet the true needs of a child of the city or village. The fact is that I, as one concerned with the young, am to a certain extent very worried about the city child especially. The child of the village, or the rural child, might have room to breathe, a close-knit family, and useful jobs to take up his time and energy. But in the city, with the exception of the upper middle class, the child hardly ever finds an opportunity to spend his idle time enjoyably. Therefore, I hope that this deficiency can be filled as far as possible. I would like once more to remind the intelligentsia that they have power over the youth of the city, especially in the overcrowded communities and popular gathering places, where special concern is needed. What are those fields?

"Culture represents the hope of the community; it is the essence of man. Does our Ministry of Culture carry out its various activities, and do its multiple agencies enrich and deepen our way of life? Is its culture, which is distinguished within the framework of the culture of the age and its intellectual directions, compatible with God's Shari'ah and His Prophet's Sunnah?"

As Dr. Ahmad Muhammad 'Abd-al-Dayim, professor of grammar in Dar al-'Ulum College, Cairo University, said: "The Islamic Shari'ah enters into all of life's business. If we want to apply it in the field of culture on all its agencies, the following rules must be considered:

- We come with facts supported by proof
- Do not expose the people to any harm
- Do not attempt to dishonor people and reveal their secrets

Cleric Calls Recognition of Israel Treason

93LD0034A Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
24 Aug 93 p 23

[Interview With His Eminence Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi by Mahmud Khalil in Cairo; date not given; first paragraph AL-MUJTAMA' introduction]

[Text] The signs of a political deal between the PLO and the Zionist enemy government have begun to loom in the horizon. Jerusalem, with its Islamic holy places and with its status among Muslims, will be the pivotal item that 'Arafat and his comrades will cede to the Jews for the sake of a feeble form of a so-called self-rule. To find out the Islamic legal opinion on what has developed and what is developing on the pretext of political coexistence with the Jews, AL-MUJTAMA' has conducted the following interview with His Eminence Dr. Yusuf al-Qardawi:

[Khalil] Is it permissible for an individual, a party, a faction, an organization, or any similar body to cede a part of Jerusalem in political negotiations on the pretext of establishing peace with the Jews?

[Al-Qardawi] This is absolutely impermissible, whether for Jerusalem or for other parts of the Muslim world. Rather, recognition of the Zionist entity is tantamount to betrayal of God, of the apostle, and of the trust Muslims have been assigned to preserve. What betrayal is worse and more harmful than selling or ceding Islamic sanctities! There is a

well-known religious dispensation that was signed by more than 60 ulema and published by the Kuwaiti Social Reform Society in 1989. But if circumstances impose on us at times, as in the case of Bosnia currently, an unjust peace with the occupier's force and with the might of weapons, then we must view such matters in light of the future Islamic generations and not in light of our current weakness and division.

[Khalil] Is it permissible to declare the jihad anew to liberate territories ceded in accordance with accords signed to establish peace?

[Al-Qardawi] These accords haven't been signed by the Muslims' caliph and they haven't been accepted by everybody. Those who have signed or who are signing them did not proceed on the basis of an Islamic legal opinion. Their acts haven't been approved by an international Islamic council, for example. Therefore, others are entitled to oppose them because they are a faction that has acted on the basis of a political opinion totally unrelated to God's law. There is nothing to prohibit dissenting with what these people are doing.

[Khalil] This concession could be a "tactical" act. What is your opinion?

[Al-Qardawi] In principle, Islamic legal opinion is perfectly clear in this regard. If we aren't assigned to regain Palestine for the Muslims in our lifetime, then we are assigned to work to achieve this noble goal. But we shall be always entitled to struggle for liberating that which has been usurped unjustly and forcefully. These points need no proof because they are agreed principles. We haven't and we will not recognize these accords that shackle people for periods known only to God and that harass strugglers. How could this be the only solution, as these people allege?

What significance does a Palestine without al-Aqsa and without Jerusalem have?

Palestine without Jerusalem is a body without a head.

[Khalil] What is your opinion, based on your observation of the current developments in Palestine and Lebanon and of the peace negotiations?

[Al-Qardawi] In principle, we must emphasize that no part of the Muslim land may be ceded to any usurper. But does the presence of a usurper in some territory for a period of time make it permissible to let him keep what he has usurped? In the past, we used to say, "Israel in its entirety must be eliminated because it has been founded on usurpation." The 1956 aggression came and it made people forget what had happened in 1948. Then 1967 came and it made Arabs forget what had happened in 1956. In 1967, the Arab slogan became the slogan of "eliminating the traces of the aggression." Now, we have the current developments that have made the Arabs forget all things past. But the jihad will continue to have its adherents and God will make them gladly. The blessed intifadah, whose followers are sculpting their accomplishments in rock, is the clearest proof that where there is true will, the path becomes clear. Muhammad Sayam, an Islamic poet, has said the truth in his verses:

"When our guns went silent, our children proceeded to destroy the barriers on all fronts, and the children are to be followed."

This is the land of the prophets and of the message. It is the land of al-Aqsa and of the Dome of the Rock. Its soil was irrigated with the blood of the apostle's companions and this soil must be generously irrigated by the blood of their followers. No generation is entitled to commit the abominable act of ceding a single inch of this land because it doesn't belong to the Palestinians alone or to the Arabs alone. It belongs to all Muslims, and not just the Muslims of this generation or of this age in which we live. This generation may weaken or relent. But we await the future Islamic generations—"But God willed to justify the Truth according to His words, and to cut off the roots of the unbelievers; that He might justify the Truth and prove Falsehood false, distasteful though it be to those in guilt" [Koran 8:7].

Terrorists' Use of Jordan as Haven Discussed

93LD0034C Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
30 Aug 93 pp 16-18

[Article by Wa'il al-Abrashi]

[Text] The attempt on Interior Minister Major General Hasan al-Alfi's life through a suicide operation has not opened just the file of Salim Rahhal, a Jordanian terrorist whose ideas and methods were adopted by Nazih and Diya', the two men who executed the operation. The attempt has also opened the file of Jordan as a crossing point, at times, for radicals going to and coming from Afghanistan; as a haven for some of them at other times; and as a center of support with weapons, advice, and planning provided by radical organizations residing in the country at yet other times.

Rahhal's most dangerous pamphlet, "A Struggler's [Mujahid's] Guide," says in part: "Society is a battlefield. If suicide will kill us and kill them, then let us commit suicide. Thus, we will rise and they will fall. The earth will be purged of their uncleanness and our pure souls will flutter over it."

On a related matter, terrorist Nazih Nushi went to Jordan repeatedly. As for terrorist Diya'-al-Din Mahmud, he stayed there for one and one-half months, beginning 5 June 1990. He was just 18 years old then. Immediately upon his return, Diya-al-Din continued to look for Nazih for more than two months until he found him, as has been confirmed by the investigations.

Nazih Nushi, Salim Rahhal's disciple, found out that Diya' had returned from Jordan saturated with the same ideas and principles, so he recruited him into the organization with utter ease.

A Jordanian official has said to ROSE AL-YUSUF, "Salim Rahhal's file has continued to be open since Egypt deported him in August 1990. The Egyptian security authorities asked us repeatedly to extradite him prior to and after the restoration of Egyptian-Jordanian relations. In recent years, we told Egypt that Rahhal left Jordan in

1987 and has not returned since. We also told them that if he is wanted in Egypt, then he is wanted a thousand times over in Jordan.

"We in Jordan have also opened Salim Rahhal's file and demanded his arrest, after we confirmed his involvement in violent acts against the country's Christians and his connection with Muhammad's Army, a terrorist military organization that has staged explosions and murdered Christians in Jordan. Before it was uncovered in 1991 and before most of its elements—who were collecting donations from people on the pretext of aid for the Afghan mujahidin—were arrested, this organization had been planning to assassinate some Jordanian notables."

The Jordanian official added, "Rahhal's connection with Jordan has been totally severed since 1987. Some returnees from Afghanistan have mentioned Rahhal's name as one who is still in Afghanistan and who has not left that country yet because he is a prominent element there."

The Jordanian official denied that Jordan is a haven for Egyptian radicals and disclosed that the Jordanian intelligence service has lists of all known convicted elements of Egyptian radical organizations. He also disclosed that the Jordanian authorities prevent these elements from entering Jordan, even as transit passengers. He said that Jordan has often denied most such passengers entry to the country from Syria, which would have allowed them to go to Egypt by land, and that they were taken off buses and returned to the border.

The Jordanian official further disclosed that, during the period when conflict raged between Syria and Jordan, Amman was a haven for a large number of Muslim Brotherhood members who had fled Damascus, and also for a large number of Palestinians who espoused Islamic slogans. Perhaps it was in that period that Jordan tolerated the entry and residence of members of various Islamic organizations in its territory. But the situation is different now.

The Jordanian official noted that the new names of members of Egyptian radical organizations who are announced as people who enter into and depart from Jordan, such as the name of terrorist Diya', are names of elements who are new to radicalism, who have not been convicted before, and who are not known yet, and "consequently, we have not been able to include them in our lists."

As to what security reports say about weapons smuggled from Jordan to Egypt, the Jordanian official acknowledged that streets, shops, and homes in Jordan have abounded with weapons since the Gulf war. That is when citizens were permitted to acquire and purchase weapons for self-protection, fearing that the war could extend to Jordan's streets. By the time that crisis ended, weapons had been accumulated in Jordanian homes in a manner that posed a threat to the stability of Jordan itself. Many countries, including Egypt, complained about weapons smuggled to their territories from Jordan. Recently, Jordanian authorities issued a sharply-worded decree calling for collecting weapons from citizens and compensating citizens for them. Regrettably, weapons handed by citizens over to the Jordanian police were less than expected,

because most owners have decided to sell their weapons to individuals for prices that exceed the compensation offered by the government. Thus, Jordan has become a weapons black market. Perhaps radical elements in Egypt and in other countries have exploited this fact in order to purchase weapons from Jordanian citizens through middlemen and then to smuggle them to Egypt.

The official added, "There are numerous religious organizations, parties, and movements that have taken Jordan for their headquarters. But we will not relent if they employ violence, whether in word or in deed, to achieve their objectives and to implement their programs."

The official denied unequivocally that Egypt has asked Jordan to extradite anybody since tension developed in the two countries' relations in the wake of the Gulf war. He asked with surprise, "Why hasn't Egypt asked for security coordination with Jordan instead of making accusations against us?"

Let us move from Jordan to the file of Salim Rahhal, the prince of suicide. It is important to open this file now that radicals have carried out their first suicide operation against Interior Minister Major General Hasan al-Alfi, especially since we have discovered a strange surprise in this file.

Salim Rahhal was deported by the security agencies from Egypt to Jordan in August 1980. In the space opposite Rahhal's name in the indictment on case 104, one finds the word "escaped," even though the State Security Authority had deported him from the country.

The State Security Agency has never regretted the deportation of a foreigner as it has regretted the deportation of Salim Rahhal. After he had been deported, it was proved—in the wake of the September arrests, then al-Sadat's assassination, and later the Greater Jihad case—that Rahhal had played a major role in the developments and that he was the most dangerous leader of the jihad organizations. On top of this, Rahhal was the only thread who could confirm the Jihad Organization's connection with foreign circles.

But the opportunity was lost with his deportation. This is what former Interior Minister Hasan Abu-Basha said in a radio interview, stating verbatim, "Rahhal is the planning head of the Jihad Organization. This confirms the positive evidence I have that there are foreign elements behind the organization." Here end Abu-Basha's words which have been proved true 13 years after Rahhal's deportation.

The story has more than one puzzle to it.

Muhammad Salim Rahhal, a Jordanian student at al-Azhar University, was arrested in 1979 and charged with taking part in forming an armed organization seeking to topple the regime. He had with him in the same organization Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, one of the five men executed in the al-Sadat assassination case and author of the book, *The Concealed Duty*. Rahhal was jailed at al-Qal'ah Prison, which is now a museum, for just a few months and was then released, along with all his followers. He then resumed his studies at al-Azhar but did not end his contacts with radical elements. Rather, his activity increased noticeably and he traveled constantly to the

Lower Egypt provinces. His followers in al-Mansurah, al-Zaqaziq, and Alexandria increased in number.

Rahhal's file confirms that he was not active in Upper Egypt and that he had never gone there!

Rahhal was arrested anew and deported to Jordan in August 1980, i.e., one month before the September resolutions were made. The immense role he had played and the fact that he was behind most of the jihad organizations that had been arrested were not discovered until later, as Abu-Basha has said.

The surprise is that Muhammad Salim Rahhal was defendant No. 149 in the Greater Jihad case—case No. 462, Higher State Security—and that he was sentenced to a 15-year prison term. This was a stiff sentence, especially since 110 Jihad members, including Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, who had been expecting stiff sentences that could reach the death penalty were acquitted.

But why was Salim Rahhal deported just one month before the September resolutions that would have certainly included him?

A security source who has followed the Salim Rahhal case from its beginning has asserted that the security agencies were aware of Rahhal's danger and of the importance of keeping him as a card in the hand and as a guide to lead them to the foreign circles behind the Jihad Organization. This is an important card that the security agencies have constantly missed, especially since there was definite evidence that Rahhal had come to Egypt with a specific role drawn up for him abroad. However, the decision to deport him and to keep his name out of the trials and of all those developments was necessary to absolve al-Azhar of the charge of being infiltrated by radicalism and to steer it completely clear from involvement in radical events. Rahhal was not just a student of al-Azhar, but also a man surrounded with interest by a number of students because of his high education and his persuasive powers. Above all, he lived at the Syrian Dormitory of al-Azhar Colonnade and never moved from it to any other dwelling. Rahhal held his confidential meetings at this dormitory to recruit students into his organization and to convince them of his ideas and principles.

At the time, the Syrian Dormitory of al-Azhar University was called Rahhal's kingdom. What is surprising is that after being released from al-Qal'ah Prison in 1979, Rahhal returned to al-Azhar Colonnade to perform the same role.

All this happened at al-Azhar. So, Rahhal had to be deported.

But this step has been greatly regretted, considering that Rahhal was a significant card whose importance was confirmed further when the Greater Jihad case—Higher State Security case No. 462 of 1981—was considered.

What is Salim Rahhal's threat and what, precisely, is his role?

The Rahhal file confirms that he was the first to give elements of the jihad organizations justifications for clashing with the authority. He devised for them religious

rules making it permissible to fight a backsliding ruler, to seize public property, and to rob and kill Christians. Rahhal put down all this in written memoranda which he called *The Struggler's Guide*. In these memoranda, Rahhal considers society a battlefield and he decrees that suicide is permissible if it is the way to get rid of evil leaders. This is a malicious idea through which he seeks to rid himself of aides by whom he feels threatened. So he assigns them to suicide operations in which they get killed.

Moreover, a large part of 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj's book, *The Concealed Duty*, is premised on discussions Faraj had with Rahhal when the two were at al-Qal'ah Prison in 1979 and later at the Syria Dormitory of al-Azhar. 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj was a disciple of Rahhal's, and so was 'Isam al-Qamari who was killed by police bullets while trying to flee. The same goes for Nazih Nushi who was killed in the attempt on Maj. Gen. Hasan al-Alfi's life.

S.A., a friend of Salim Rahhal's who was arrested later on the charge of financing the organization through some Kuwaiti citizens, asserts that after Rahhal departed, the security agencies kept their eyes on a person called Ahmad Rashid, viewing him as Salim Rahhal's eye in Egypt after Rahhal's departure. They watched and then arrested Rashid who confessed to many things concerning Salim Rahhal, including the story of Muhammad Munawir, a Kuwaiti businessman "whose acquaintance I had made during a previous stay in Kuwait. So I was accused of being the organization's main financier."

S.A. added, "Rahhal disagreed with 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj and a large number of elements of the jihad organizations. Before departing, Rahhal characterized these elements as a 'bunch of kids,' because they confessed against each other." S.A. has pointed out that Rahhal was a skillful organizer. In his pamphlet, *The Struggler's Guide*, Rahhal has written a separate chapter entitled: "What To Do If You Are Arrested." In this chapter, Rahhal offers a complete step-by-step recipe to be followed by a detainee in dealing with the interrogation and state security agencies. The qualities which strugglers must possess, as he says, in their battle against infidel governments are:

- be loyal, committed, and worthy of being trusted with private and public secrets.
- be highly educated, intelligent, and quick-minded.
- look appropriate and wear acceptable clothing that befits the situation (notice that he was the first to advise that flowing robes and beards be replaced by modern clothing when operations are carried out).
- be athletic and trained in self-defense, such as karate and Swedish exercises.
- be trained on the use of all prevalent and available weapons.
- be familiar with first aid.
- be able to drive, especially cars and motorcycles.
- be possessed by a greater wish to die than to live when executing an operation. They should save their lives whenever there is no need for them to sacrifice them.

Rahhal is tall and he was well-built. He wore a militia-type beard similar to those worn by elements of the Lebanese

militias. He studied Hadith at al-Azhar's College of Theological Principles. He was preparing to enroll in higher studies.

Rahhal was born in 1954. Before coming to Egypt, he was a member of the Islamic Liberation [al-Tahrir] Party which believes in the Islamic caliphate and which rejects political activity. So, Rahhal broke away from that party and came to Egypt with greater belief in political and military activity, and even suicidal activity, than in the caliphate.

The question raised now, especially in the wake of the Rahhal-style attempt on Hasan al-Alfi's life, is: how many radicals misled by Salim Rahhal's ideas continue to exist in Egypt?

Cairo Seeks Entry Into African Trade Agreement

93AF0820B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 24 Aug 93 p 9

[Article: "Egypt Seeks To Join Preferential Trade Zone Agreement of Countries of East and Southern Africa"]

[Text] Cairo—The Ministerial Council of the Preferential Trade Zone Agreement of the countries of East and Southern Africa will discuss in a meeting to be held next November Egypt's request to join the agreement that combines these countries. In case the request is approved, a recommendation will be submitted to heads of the council member states to ratify it.

Informed economic sources confirmed in statements they made yesterday that the purpose of the current tour that Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa is making to a number of African countries is to eliminate the obstacles that confront Egypt's accession to the preferential trade agreement and to get support for Egypt's request to join the agreement from the countries included in this agreement, namely Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, and Kenya.

Husayn al-Abyari, head of the Africa Desk at the Egyptian Trade Representation Agency, has said that the advantages for Egypt from joining the preferential trade agreement include the benefit of mutual exemptions, keeping in mind that Egypt has attained a greater degree of industrial progress than the member states. This will open the door for the entry of new [Egyptian] goods to the African market.

Al-Abyari added that the advantages of joining this agreement also include the settlement of payments between the member states by way of banking arrangements through the clearing house headquartered in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. They also include the establishment of a data exchange system within the agreement's member states.

Al-Abyari noted that, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, products exchanged between the member states enjoy preferential treatment, depending on the rules of source of origin. The provisions also state that national participation in the capital of products imported into or exported from one member state to another must be no less than 51 percent; that industrial products in which the national capital constitutes 51 percent or more shall enjoy

100 percent preferential treatment; and that this percentage shall be reduced gradually, depending on the percentage of participation by the national capital.

The agreement also calls for abolishing non-customs restrictions and it is supplemented by a commodity list that is reviewed every two years. This list, called the general list, has grown to include nearly 700 commodities divided into six groups. The first reduction rate in customs fees for these groups has been determined, and it ranges from 70 percent for capital goods to 30 percent for foodstuffs.

Egyptian economic sources have said that Egypt's accession to the East and Southern Africa Countries Agreement will not affect its relations with the North Africa countries, to whom it is tied by bilateral preferential treatment agreements that provide for customs exemptions, plus a number of offset system agreements and a variety of other agreements.

The same sources noted that the trade volume between Egypt and the preferential trade zone of the East and Southern Africa countries amounted to 488.5 million pounds last year, including 187.6 million in Egyptian exports and nearly 300.9 million in imports. The sources also pointed out that the trade volume between the two sides amounted to nearly 424.5 pounds in 1991, including 112.1 million in Egyptian exports and 312.4 in imports, compared to 301.9 in 1990, including 59.4 million in exports and 242.5 in imports.

It is to be noted that the preferential trade zone agreement for the East and Southern African countries was concluded in December 1981 and went into effect in September 1982. This organization is headquartered in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. This agreement is the biggest African economic bloc. Participants include Burundi, the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Zaire, Namibia, and Botswana.

Tax Increase on Imported Paper Challenged

94P50008A

[Editorial Report] Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic of 1 October reports that Finance Minister Muhammad al-Razzaz has proposed increasing taxes on imported papers from 5 percent to 15 percent. The paper reports that officials and intellectuals believe that such tax increase will force Egyptian publishing companies to close down and relocate outside Egypt, possibly in Lebanon. They argue that it would place the Egyptian book industry in danger and result in a drain of Egyptian intellectuals, something that will ultimately be harmful to Egyptian culture. Among those who have argued against the implementation of this tax are: Muhammad Matbuli, one of the biggest publishers in Egypt; Secretary General of the Publishers Union Mohammad Hassan; Education Minister Faruq Husni; economist Muhammad Abu-Bakr; and Tahir Bishr, president of Chemical Industries Company. Such criticism prompted Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi to ask for a re-evaluation of this resolution in order to determine whether

further studies are needed and whether the government should take any measure in this matter before implementing this increase.

Sugar Statistics Show Production Increases

93AF0822A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
16 Aug 93 pp 36-37

[Text] The agricultural sector recorded steady development and remarkable achievements in all areas during President Mubarak's regime. During his regime, the area under cultivation increased by about one-half million feddans. In addition, the productivity of field crops, vegetables, fruits, poultry, and animal products doubled. All these achievements could be primarily attributed to Dr. Yusuf Wali, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture and land reclamation. Since he assumed the responsibility of the agricultural sector, Dr. Wali's efforts, positive contribution, and stern follow-up have been remarkable.

Sugar producing crops are among the important crops that the Ministry of Agriculture has in its development plan;

consequently, the Sugar Producing Crops Council implements many projects for agricultural development and the achievement of a steady increase in the production of these crops.

Engineer Faruq 'Afifi, president of the Syndicate for the Graduates of the Schools of Agriculture and president of the Sugar Crops Producing Council, confirmed that, during the last ten years there has been a steady increase in the productivity of both sugar producing crops and sugar due to the collaboration among all Council personnel for the implementation of the Ministry of Agriculture's strategy and also their efforts to implement these strategies in the form of projects and targets financed only by the Council with no help from the state budget.

Egypt Ranks First in Sugar Cane Productivity Per Feddan

- The productivity of sugar cane at 43 tons per feddan in 1993 has reaffirmed Egypt's steady ranking at the top of all sugar cane producing countries.
- Engineer Faruq 'Afifi goes on with his statement to ROSE AL-YUSUF saying: "If we were to compare sugar cane production in 1981, the year representing production before the five-year plan, with its production at the end of the first and second five-year plans as well as with the current season's productivity, as portrayed by the table, we can deduce the following:

Production (million tons)	1981	1987	1992	1992
Yield	before the plan	end of 1st plan	end of 2d plan	present season
Approximately	8.6	10.4	11.6	11.7

- We notice a clear gradual increase in sugar cane production in the country as a whole during the periods of the first and second five-year plans as compared with 1981.
- The increase achieved in 1987—the end of the first five-year plan—was 1.8 million tons, representing an increase of 20.9 percent.
- The increase in 1992—the end of the second five-year plan—was about 3 million tons, representing an increase of 34.8 percent.
- The increase achieved this season—the beginning of the third five-year plan—was about 3.1 million tons, representing an increase of 36 percent over 1981; and an increase of 100,000 tons over 1992, representing an increase of 0.7 percent.
- Sawhaj Governorate preserves the first rank in sugar cane productivity per feddan:

Engineer Faruq 'Afifi goes on to say: "Sugar cane production per feddan this season was highest in Sawhaj Governorate when it reached 47.8 tons per feddan. Aswan, al-Minya and Qina Governorates followed in descending order with a productivity per feddan of 45.3, 43.5, and 42.4 tons respectively."

(Qina Governorate maintains top rank in the quantities of sugar cane and sugar produced).

The quantity of sugar cane delivered this season to sugar factories in Qina amounted to 4.7 million tons representing 56.5 percent of the total of sugar delivered in Egypt.

Whereas, the quantity of sugar produced in factories in Qina Governorate was 51.308 million tons, representing 56.5 percent of the total sugar production in Egypt.

- Sugar production this year increased by 389,000 tons over that of 1981; this increase represents the production of four new sugar factories. The cost of investment in these new factories was about 1.5 billion pounds.

Our Sugar Production

The president of the Sugar Producing Crops Council confirmed that this year's (1993) production exceeded the million figure and would be thus the highest figure for sugar production since it began in Egypt.

Figures for sugar production in Egypt will be followed starting from 1981, the year before the first five-year plan was implemented.

It is perceived that there has been a steady increase in sugar production since 1981, as follows:

- The increase in sugar production in 1987—the end of the first five-year plan—over 1981, was about 311,400 tons, representing an increase of 50.6 percent.
- The increase in 1992—the end of the second five-year plan—was about 377,000 tons, representing an increase of 61.4 percent.
- The increase this year (1993) was about 389,500 tons, representing an increase of 63.4 percent.

This season (1993), about 8.4 million tons of sugar cane were delivered to sugar factories, whereas, 6.3 million tons were delivered in 1981; the increase between the two years was about 2.070 million tons, representing an increase of about 32.5 percent.

The quantities of sugar cane delivered to sugar factories for the 1993 season have been the highest ever.

700,000 Tons of Sugar Beet

Engineer Faruq 'Afifi indicated that the total quantity of sugar beets delivered this season to Kafr al-Shaykh sugar beet factory amounted to 719,000 tons compared to 663,000 tons delivered last year (1992), representing an increase of about 56 tons, or 8.4 percent.

The increase in the quantity of sugar beets delivered this year (1993) over that of 1982 was about 533,600 tons, representing an increase of 287.6 percent.

A Salute of Appreciation and Regards

Engineer Faruq 'Afifi expressed his gratitude and appreciation to sugar cane and sugar beet growers. He said: "On this occasion, I am pleased to express my deepest regards to and appreciation of sugar cane and sugar beet growers for their confidence in and commitment to fulfilling the Sugar Producing Crops Council plans and projects in order to achieve the targets and policies of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is under the patronage of Professor Dr. Yusuf Wali, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture and land reclamation.

"I would also like to record my gratitude to and appreciation of the efforts of the personnel of all apparatuses that contributed to the implementation of the Council's programs and projects to promote the productivity of sugar producing crops. Therefore, my thanks and appreciation are extended to the personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture different apparatuses and departments, the center for agricultural research and its research institutions, especially the institute for sugar producing crops research, the institutes for soil and water research, and that for plant disease prevention research, the land improvement apparatus, the ministries of industry, supply and internal trade and that of public works and water resources, the Egyptian Sugar and Distillation factory, the Delta Sugar Company, the sugar cooperatives members of the General Society for Sugar Cane Producers and its branches in al-Minya, Sawhaj, Qina, and Aswan governorates, the Agricultural Reclamation Associations, the sugar beet cultivation departments in Kafr al-Shaykh, al-Daqahliyah, al-Buhayrah and al-Fayyum governorates and growers' cooperatives.

At the end of his talk, engineer Faruq 'Afifi confirmed that the personnel of the Sugar Producing Crops Council as well as sugar cane and sugar beet growers all over the country affirm their allegiance to President Muhammad Husni Mubarak and they reassure his excellency that they would continue the successful process of increasing the productivity of sugar producing crops.

Ex-Interior Minister Blames Extremism on Successors

93LD0036A Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 29 Aug 93 p 66

[Article by Ahmad Mustafa: "Zaki Badr ... and the Settling of Accounts!"]

[Text] In an article published by AKHBAR AL-YAWM in which the opinions of former security chiefs, including Nabawi Isma'il, Hasan Abu-Basha and Zaki Badr were appraised over the latest unsuccessful assassination attempt against Interior Minister Hasan al-Alfi, I was surprised by Zaki Badr's opinion in which he precisely stated—as reported in the newspaper interview—that the assassination attempt was the consequence of a three-year-old security policy, the discussion of which was lengthy, required unhurried and careful analysis, and which should not be discussed loosely after each incident!!

With these remarks Zaki Badr has in view that former Interior Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa was the reason behind the deterioration of security conditions throughout the period of his tenure.

From the onset I announce with all candor and explicitness that I do not defend Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa. Rather, the opposite is true, as I had attacked his security policy in several articles published herein while he was in command and again three months prior to his departing the Ministry. However, as one who is cognizant of the true nature of things, I ask former Interior Minister Zaki Badr: "Truthfully, who destroyed the security of the Interior Ministry—you, or 'Abd-al-Halim Musa"?

In answer to this question, I tell Major General Zaki Badr: It would have been worthier of you to remain silent and not speak at all of the Interior Ministry's security policy.

Was it not you who initiated dismissal of outstanding leaders in the federal security apparatus, and distanced them from working for the agency that had employed them all their lives, and all of whom knew of "where the ants crawled" under the footsteps of every extremist and terrorist throughout Egypt, including Major General Fu'ad 'Allam and others, in order that they not challenge you to the future leadership of the Ministry?

Was it not you who "nominated" Public Security Chief Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa and Federal Security Chief Mustafa Kamil to the position of governor in Asyut and al-Daqahliyah, respectively, in order that they not stand—in the future, that is—in the way of your removal from the leadership of the Ministry, despite the two having asked you, while in your office during your tenure, and by the graciousness of your father, not to dismiss them, after you had promised that you would not do such? You reneged on your promise, and both were surprised when they were called in and told of their appointment as governors!!

Was it not you who dismissed all outstanding personnel from the police apparatus in both criminal investigations and state security, in order that none among them emerge as worthy of succession to you as Interior Minister? Did you not—you were the first Interior Minister to always appear impudent—

use obscene language with all chiefs in order that they appear weak and you come across as a giant?

Were you not, oh Zaki Badr, the first Interior Minister to ignite the fire of harshness in dealing with the extremists, choosing to confront violence with violence? You used to tell political and criminal security chiefs that you had no wish to hear them say that so and so was captured or arrested; instead, "Kill...kill...kill!!!"

Succeeding you as Interior Minister was 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, who tread in your footsteps, and who, during the latter part of his tenure, dealt with "many leaders" in a similarly haughty and arrogant manner, and expressed loudly his opinions of everything "worthy or otherwise," to the extent that everyone took a stance against him. Thus, whenever a serious incident or crisis took place—for example, the al-'Ataba girl, and others—he found no one by his side as they all had shunned him, and because he had become oblivious to everything but his chair, envisioning nothing but the "glory, pomp, and bloom, garnish, and ornamentation of this worldly existence."

Moreover, was it not you who contrived to establish the foci of power at the "Interior Ministry" when your "office manager" became anyone who mattered at the Interior Ministry: he talked, ordered, forbade, transferred, and acted in all matters under your authority and with your knowledge. All this took place within your earshot and in your full view, with no one able to oppose or take issue with him. However, nothing of this sort occurred at all during the terms of former Interior Ministers Nabawi Isma'il, Hasan Abu-Basha and Ahmad Rushdi!!

Last but not least: Was it not you who established and consolidated rules that became fixed following your departure from the Interior Ministry, namely the "settling of accounts"; in other words, you pensioned off, transferred, and displaced all your former adversaries, and everyone related to your predecessor Interior Ministers!! After all this, who is responsible for what has happened to the security institutions in Egypt?

MB Official Lists Roots of Extremist Violence

93LD0036B Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 18 Aug 93 p 8

[Article by: Taha Khattab: "Dr. Ahmad al-Malat Affirms 'Absence of Freedoms and Emergency Law Behind the Incidents of Violence and Terrorism'"]

[Text] Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Supreme Guide and Chairman of the Islamic Medical Association, Dr. Ahmad al-Malat maintained that the absence of freedoms, incompleteness of democracy, and the persistence of the Emergency Law for 40 years were behind the latest incidents of violence.

He added that the absence of the religious deterrent, waning of the leadership role of the mosque in education of the populace, spread of unemployment among youth and the flagrant challenge to their feelings, the control of everything that is Islamic, the scurrilous extravagance, the repugnant disparity between standards [of living], the state's condoning and ignoring of abominations, the want

of Islamic religion courses in education, and the infusion of these courses with all that is Western, and the absence of the word "jihad" are some of the most conspicuous reasons for the violence. He emphasized the need to discontinue the policy of counter-violence and that the government should initiate such action by crushing the sources of corruption, such as alcohol, gambling, and usury. Dr. al-Malat called for the restitution of Islamic education and non-reliance on American education, and added that freedom was the soul and blood of nations, and that it must be absolute, as should be democracy. He also called for free elections.

Interior Ministry's Crime Statistics Disputed

93LD0036D Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
16 Aug 93 pp 18-19

[Article by: 'Adil Hammudah: "Authority and Wealth Beget Corruption"]

[Text] Were we to believe the latest Interior "Ministry" statistics on crime in Egypt, it would be as if we are living in "Utopia"—the righteous city—where humans are angels, evildoers are a breed threatened with extinction, and well-being is the norm, the language, the currency, and the air breathed by everyone.

If we were to believe these numbers, one day the Interior "Ministry" would be locked up for good. In the latest public security report, felonies were shown to have dropped from 6,753 forty years ago to 2,438 today, representing a 63.8 percent decrease. Misdemeanors, too, decreased from 38,999 twenty years ago to 30,518 today—a 21.7 percent drop. All this, while the population has doubled in size and the number of police officers has decreased noticeably. In the last few years, the number of security personnel has decreased by 15,529, representing a 41.4 percent decrease—an unheard of decrease anywhere else on earth. This has increased the burden on every security officer, who after having to guard 180 citizens, now finds himself having to guard 308 of them!

What is intended here is that the Interior Ministry statistics are preposterous. How do population and security increase, while crimes decrease? How could such occur before our announcement of the rise of Plato's romantic and imaginary republic, whose existence is nowhere but in the minds of philosophers, poets, and "Moon" party members?

It is either that these numbers tell a lie and are unreflective of a reality that is fraught with toil, death, and tension, or that the Interior Ministry fights crime on paper, and every public security chief records a success over his predecessor by way of lowering crime statistics.

Or perhaps this report is issued by the Interior Ministry in "Monte Carlo," or that crime in Egypt has changed and disguised itself so that security is unable to identify it in its new guise. I rather believe the latter possibility to be more accurate.

Take, as an example, moral crime which, nowadays, is totally different. A prostitute no longer stands next to a light pole in a lonely street awaiting a passing client who

picks her up, as depicted in Egyptian movies of long ago. Rather, the woman is of a special sort: she rides a fast car, uses the facsimile, and understands the stock exchange. In her telephone book are the numbers of notables, some of them policeman and others are decision-makers. The price of the pleasure she confers is no longer money placed under her pillow, but the smoothing of deals from which she reaps millions. Could such a woman be arrested on a charge of prostitution?

Take another example: bribery. Interior Ministry statistics—believe it or not!—reveal only 40 cases of bribery in 1992, of which Cairo's share is 19—Cairo, with a population of 12 million. In other words, an incident of one case of bribery amongst a million. Could such be credible?! Bribery has become a given when it comes to dealings between citizen and public servant, and is now a mere convention, no longer worthy of being reported. Such governorates as Port Said, Ismailia, al-Daqahliyah, Bani Suwayf, al-Minya and Qina did not record a single crime of bribery during the last year. Moreover, the word "bribery" is no longer in common usage. Daily life has given us alternative expressions, such as "retainer" and "mind-opener." Indeed, these words have faded away, and bribery has become a behavior that is practiced in quietude, confidence, and without articulation. It has become a type of silent agreement between its parties: the citizen pays it to barely escape the bane of bureaucracy, and the public servant accepts it to make up the difference between his salary and basic needs!

Take, this time, the crime of embezzlement. Despite having six million employees in the government and public sector, Egyptian Government figures show only 44 cases of embezzlement—an increase of one case from last year. In the public sector, the figure dropped from 76 to 48 cases last year. Embezzled funds do not exceed 970 thousand pounds—or less than one million—of which 114 thousand were recovered. These are trivial sums, and do not add up to the price of a luxury car.

In a word, no one in Egypt prefers committing the crime of embezzlement, because it has become a crime whose punishment is greater than its reward. Moreover, it has grown to suit the era of a free market and become a more violent crime: that of profit and gain by position, or what we call corruption.

Being a crime of conscience outside the law but not overstepping it, corruption is a crime no one can precisely curtail. For whenever a high public official is entrusted with the granting or denial of permits to the private sector, his discretionary authority in the matter will have its price. Such price may be an automobile registered in his son's name, an apartment in his wife's name or a two-week trip to London at the expense of one of the companies dealing him. No embezzlement, bribe, or violation of law—in short, no crime. All because what is involved is the facilitation or temporary stoppage of procedures according to what is paid out. Objectors may resort to the judicial authorities, whose slow pace does not accord with market activity and the speed of capital turnover. Consequently, capitulation to the terms and requests of the concerned official is unavoidable. For his part, the concerned official wholeheartedly feels—and herein

lies the danger—that he is not committing a crime, but stands to gain his share of the deal or wealth.

Senior officials' favorite pastime in Egypt is the purchase of land and real estate. While prices for such are rising in Egypt, obtaining them at modest prices is within reach because of influence. I know more than one official who owns numberless apartments, villas, and chalets in Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, al-'Arish and the northern coast. These are obtained cheaply, and paid for in installments that go mostly unpaid, to be sold later on for millions.

No one can tell them, "No," and no one would dare oppose their requests lest they unleash the various authorities against him. In return, it is inevitable that these notables pay a price of a different sort by virtue of their positions and from which those who have been useful to them would benefit. Objectors are left to seek out the oversight agencies.

Oversight agencies never rest from submitting their reports and surveys of excesses; yet no one understands, and those who do, refrain from taking any action. Those who do take action do so for their own benefit—and so on.

The prime minister has stood up in the People's Assembly to proclaim, "The government knows where the ants crawl!"

This occurred during a session discussing the famous Lucy Artin case. The deputies' accusation was that the government—like the duped husband—was the last to know. However, the prime minister, with enviable courage, denied all, and announced that they knew everything, even where the ants did their crawling. Most likely they were correct; though they know, they do not take action. Or else they know but are unable to take action, since the boundaries between deliberate crime and wrongful decision, and those between corruption and good intentions, are no longer clear.

What separates those boundaries is a law—"Wherefrom hast you that?"—that has become laughable. Another law, still in abeyance, is that of the prosecution of ministers.

Yet what is of more import than these laws is the elimination of the causes for corruption, and the easing up of bureaucratic interference in economic activity. For as long as we have surrendered to the laws of the market, why do we interfere in everything large and small?

Authority is in the hands of the government and wealth is in the hands of individuals. At the instant authority and wealth meet, the devil of corruption will complete the threesome.

It is imperative that this relationship be organized in law. In other words, organization under the protection of new laws that take into account the variable economic and social conditions. Without this, we shall not understand crime in its new forms, and we will continue to search for its earlier forms never, of course, to find them. We will be pleased that such are nowhere to be seen, and our security reports will proclaim with elation that we now live in the righteous city.

Just the same, we will hear bullets reverberating in the streets, smell the putrid odor of corruption exuding from

government agencies, and watch prostitution networks fax their instructions. Were one to raise an objection, we would retort arrogantly and say with blind conceit: "It happens," and fall into a deep slumber.

IRAQ

Plight of Iraqis Under Saddam's Rule Explained

93AE0590A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
5 Aug 93 p 8

[Article by Huda al-Husayni]

[Text] Three years have passed since that black day, and here is the Iraqi leadership celebrating the third anniversary of the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and here is the Iraqi president delivering on the occasion an address in which he says, "That event bears fragrant memories for the Iraqis. The mother of battles still goes on, despite the international blockade."

Even if the world wishes to forget what has happened, the Iraqi leadership wants to emphasize that it is not repentant and that it is prepared to do what it did again, even if it means humiliation to the oppressed Iraqi people.

Iraqi papers, which are the leadership's mouthpiece, have reiterated the same words about the invasion day being an honorable day because Kuwait is a part of the motherland and because it has to be regained in the future.

BABIL, a newspaper owned by 'Udayy, Saddam Husayn's oldest son who is also the paper's chief editor, has "decided" that the "Kuwaiti sons" would select the Iraqi leadership if they were permitted to select through an internationally-sponsored referendum. Thus, and so simply, the paper has made its decision, making it sound as if it customarily polls the Iraqi people to determine whom they wish to select for their rulers! On the anniversary of that black day, Iraq's AL-JUMHURIYAH elected to interview 'Ala' Husayn 'Ali, whom the Iraqi leadership appointed as Kuwait's prime minister during the occupation. 'Ali said that all real Kuwaitis know that they are Iraqis, and they want unity with Iraq. 'Ala' Husayn 'Ali also said, or they said in his name, that the invasion was a historic occasion, anticipated for decades, to end the imperialist act which severed Kuwait from Iraq!

The Iraqi leadership deals with the Iraqi people's future lightly and arrogantly. It is as if the Iraqi president is afflicted with sadism or schizophrenia, or both. The people struggle severely for subsistence and he enjoys hearing the reverberations of his defiance of the truth, the facts, and history. Had the Iraqi leadership decided throughout these three years to live for a single day with the people's oppression, such evil would not have afflicted Iraq.

In the past three years, the number of women wearing black [in mourning] has increased and the Iraqi president's pictures have proliferated in Iraq's streets. Arrivals from Iraq say that these pictures are renewed constantly. This is certain, considering that the man in charge of the office that paints and spreads the "leader's" pictures is former Information Minister Latif Nusayyif Jasim.

Three years later, Iraq is still divided into three sections: north, center, and south. If the north is protected from killing in this period, then the south is not.

Kurds are the Iraqi president's number one target. If he gets the opportunity, he plans to be in the north by the end of 1993. It is well known that the Kurdish people's problem is that the West is exploiting them as part of its game against the Iraqi president and that the West will abandon the protection it gives these people in order to please the countries adjacent to Iraq. Kurdish self-rule is possible in Iraq. But it is impossible where Turkey or Iran are concerned.

Three years later, there are two domestic goals for which Saddam Husayn strives: first, regain total control of all Iraqi territories. Now that he has nearly wiped out the rebellion in the south, despite the no-fly-zone imposed against the Iraqi Air Force, Saddam will turn his attention to the self-rule area, Kurdistan. With the allies' response restricted to air raids, many military observers doubt that ground forces can be amassed rapidly and before Husayn makes some gains on the ground. It is not just the Americans who have this feeling. The Turks and the Iranians are also considering how to deal with Saddam Husayn. However, none of these parties view him as a ruler with extraordinary power but rather as one with limited power.

Saddam's other objective is to regain control of the weapons of mass destruction. It is well known that by accepting resolution 687, which ended the second Gulf war, Iraq agreed to destroy all the weapons of mass destruction it possesses. The UN Security Council passed resolution 715, which calls for long-range UN control of the manufacture of such weapons in Iraq.

As for the south, Saddam Husayn knows that he has turned the southern part of his country into an area where it is difficult to live. By declaring the area south of latitude 32 a no-fly-zone for the Iraqi Air Force and a zone watched by the British, French, and U.S. air forces, the West believed it would protect the marshland area and the inhabitants of the south. But since this zone was declared last August, the inhabitants have been pursued and persecuted more intensely and marshlands have been drained. Saddam Husayn has surrounded the marshlands with 40,000 Republican Guard troops who stop the entry of any food into the area. Women may be able to smuggle in some food, but those who flee the area speak of horrible deprivation. Daily shelling goes on and mines planted in the marshlands have harvested as many lives as they can and have wounded thousands. These mines have been there since the popular uprising that followed the Iraqi Army's defeat in the mother of battles.

The UN Humanitarian Affairs Office drafted a 12-month program that was to begin as of last April and that needs \$490 million to provide aid to the Kurds, the Shiites, and the Sunnis in the center. But to date, the office has not been able to collect this money for aid.

Saddam has also sent explosives to the north and has deployed the Republican Guard along the border. Guard forces entered Kurdish villages located near Irbil at harvest

time, scared people away, and looted their harvest. He has also dispatched men from his numerous intelligence agencies, as well as his party official, to the south and he has appeased tribal leaders in the south in an attempt to incite them against each other and to control them by humiliating them with gifts of cars and money. Southern youth suspected of being hostile to the government are now subjected to interrogation and then to punishment, which often reaches the extent of execution.

Saddam has raised the army's and government employees' salaries and has threatened farmers who try to benefit from their crop. For their labor, Saddam has paid farmers paper money that has no value, because Iraqi banknotes are printed ceaselessly. This causes inflation to escalate steadily.

As for tribal leaders, Saddam has employed them to bring "infiltrators" or "collaborators," as the regime calls them, to security men to be punished. Ba'th Party representatives in the south operate under the slogan of: 1993, the year of the great victory and of obliterating the blockade.

In central Iraq, where the regime has full control of people's fates, nightly killings are as regular as sunrise and sunset. People try to avoid mentioning Saddam's name. They say "the man" or they speak of Iraq as if the country is flown by automatic pilot. They say: he said, he did, or he toured. The exceptions are the officials who recount his titles and attributes, who glorify him, of course, and who mention his name with awe.

A recent arrival has recounted what happened on the Iraqi president's birthday. He told his tale when he was asked about the Iraqis' opinion of an opposition faction that considers the possibility of reinstating the monarchy and about a member of this faction who has declared himself heir to the throne. The recently-arriving Iraqi said, "In Baghdad, there are whispers to the effect that Saddam is thinking of proclaiming himself king and of appointing 'Udayy, his son, crown prince." He added, "After Saddam rode the gold-gilded carriage that is drawn by six horses into the Presidential Palace on the occasion of his birthday, he received congratulations from a number of cabinet ministers who had a surprise waiting for him. They had brought Saddam a crown adorned with jewels and begged him to wear it. It is said that he tried to decline, but that in view of their entreaty, he 'relented' and tried the crown for a few minutes. The ministers thanked him because he relented and responded to their wish." While this Iraqi was recounting the anecdote, we remembered the story of Bokassa, president of the Central African Republic, who appointed himself emperor and crowned himself and who ended up in a prison cell after he had enjoyed eating the flesh of students and children.

A British journalist who visited Baghdad recently has characterized the living conditions in the capital as surrealist: prices way beyond the reach of small salaries, gas supplied at almost no cost, and cars costing hundreds of thousands of dinars standing idle because of the lack of spare parts.

As a result of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and of the thefts committed against Kuwait and the Kuwaiti people, crime has proliferated in Baghdad and in other Iraqi cities. Society's condition has become more desperate and prostitution has spread. The authorities try to stem the crime phenomenon by executing en masse criminals who have committed various kinds of crimes and by leaving their bodies exposed for a couple of days in this hot weather so they will rot and will be a lesson to others. The others should, of course, learn not to express their opinion on anything. One diplomat has said, "It is possible that the Iraqi people are suffering and it is possible that they are complaining. So what? Who cares?"

But a warning report issued by the UN FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] says that Iraq's food condition is similar to a pre-starvation condition. To confront this condition, the government has to import 5.4 million tons of food at a cost of \$2.5 billion.

The FAO report adds that food available to the Iraqi citizen is less than that available to the individual in any disaster-stricken African country. The report points out that the monthly food-consumption of a six-member family cost 110 dinars[ID] in 1990, whereas this same consumption costs ID5,400 now.

It is well known that the ordinary worker's monthly income is ID250 and that a high-ranking official's monthly salary is ID750. Neither gets enough to provide the food his family needs.

A sack of flour, which is a staple that every Iraqi family needs, costs ID900, compared to three dinars in 1990. This is terrible.

Milk and butter disappeared from shops nearly a year ago and eggs have become unknown. The price of a bottom-quality kilogram of meat is ID400.

Iraqi people content themselves with what the rationing system allows them: some bread, tea, and rice, plus whatever few vegetables are available.

It is said that another thing has disappeared from Iraqi markets, namely the Iraqi silver dinar. Some have kept these dinars as a reminder of happy past days. But the main part of this currency has been re-melted to make washing machines [ghassalat] and keys.

The economic situation looks most insane when we realize that the inflation rate amounts to 5,000 percent and that the dollar value is rising daily. Two weeks ago, the price was ID79 per dollar. Yet, the government price was ID0.34 per dollar.

Despite all these tragedies, the Iraqi president continues to characterize the catastrophe he created by invading Kuwait as fragrant memories, and his son continues to pile up promises that Kuwait will be regained, as if Kuwait was not a state even before Iraq was created! In his speeches, the Iraqi president continues to talk of Arab honor, the Arab nation, and Arab gallantry, as if he has kept for

himself an open line to retreat to these qualities or to the Arab nation that has become more divided since the darkest day in its history.

When the Iraqi Intelligence Service building was bombed, the Iraqi leadership capitulated to the UN demands. But then it changed its mind and rejected them, as if it wanted military blows to be continued against the Iraqi people because they keep silent on this leadership! After refusing to have cameras installed at two missile bases, the Iraqi foreign minister sent with the Iraqi UN delegate in New York a "position paper" in which he said Iraq was prepared to agree to long-range control and surveillance of its weapons industry, as demanded by Resolution 715. But as a condition for the concessions, the Iraqi paper demands that the oil embargo be lifted and that Iraq be allowed to trade freely. The paper also demands abolition of the no-fly-zones in northern and southern Iraq. It further demands that UN inspectors use Iraqi helicopters and Iraqi surveillance planes. Of course, all these demands will be rejected. Moreover, the agreement UN Envoy Ekeus discussed with the Iraqis, and which permitted installation of the cameras, provided that the cameras not be put into operation until the Iraqis are notified—this agreement will be discussed at the end of this month or the beginning of next month.

The United Nations still waits to receive from Iraq a list of the names of all foreign companies which supplied it with all its nuclear weapons, programs, and technology. The United Nations also wants the details of how these programs are installed and how they operate. It further wants Iraq to agree to long-term surveillance of its entire military industry.

But even if Iraq capitulates to all these demands, it is unlikely that the Security Council will agree to lift the embargo soon. This is because the allies insist that the embargo should not be lifted until Iraq adheres to all the UN resolutions pertaining to it. This means that Iraq must, first, agree to and sign the border demarcation agreement with Kuwait. This act was sponsored by the United Nations in the wake of the occupation of Kuwait. Moreover, Iraq must lift the economic blockade against Kurdistan in the north, must stop pursuing rebels in the south, and must respect the Iraqi citizen's human rights.

But we wish the Iraqi leadership would be asked to protect the Iraqis from its members and from starvation. This leadership treats the people as if they were a burden to it and as if their sole mission is to die in order to achieve the leader's aspiration, even if this aspiration is of the kind that invites disasters to Iraq, to the neighboring countries, and to all the Arab countries.

Saddam Husayn accuses the allies of being the reason behind [starvation of] the Iraqi people because they persist in their blockade. But he forgets that during this blockade, he has reorganized his army, which is nearly 400,000-strong and which is equipped with 2,200 tanks and with 2,500 troop carriers. With the money that he withholds from his people, he has been able to rebuild military plants that produce T-72 tanks. But he has not been able to find

enough money to build a plant to produce milk for Iraqi children who die daily in large numbers.

Three years have passed since that black day, and during these years the Iraqi living standard has collapsed. The Iraqi population has decreased, whereas the Iraqi president has become more arrogant, haughty, and vehement. If the world's patience can withstand this condition, then the day will come when the suffering Iraqi people will lose their patience, even though their rulers are intentionally pushing them toward surrender and despair.

Syria-Turkey-Iran Policies Towards Kurds Analyzed

93LA0160A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 1 Aug 93 p 13

[Article by Salah Badr-al-Din: "Kurdish Issue: Comprehensive Solution Through Regional Accord"]

[Text] In eight months, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria, and Iran have met three times—first in Ankara, then in Damascus, and the third time in Tehran (7 June 1993)—to discuss Kurdish developments, especially to follow up on what goes on in Iraq's Kurdistan. From the outset, the three countries have voluntarily assumed the role of "protector" of Iraq's unity, when nobody has assigned them this role, whether at the popular, regional, or international level. Because of the administrative and governmental void in northern Iraq and of the impact of this void on the three countries, they have undertaken to punish any "Kurdish secessionist tendency." At least, this is what has appeared from the announced details of the meetings.

The three countries' attention has been openly focused on the Kurdish situation since the second Gulf war and from the time the Kurdish movement was able to gain control of three-quarters of Kurdistan Province in the wake of the March 1991 uprising. This interest has surfaced after decades-long official neglect, which was interspersed with total disregard for and denial of the human and political rights of 30 million people. This interest has been bolstered and expanded by the void created by the Iraqi regime's diminished military, administrative, and economic influence in the wake of the crushing defeat the regime suffered in the war and in the wake of the subsequent projection of the alternative.

From the outset, the three countries' activity within the framework of first bilateral and then trilateral coordination has focused on several common denominators and unified objectives: preserve these countries' regimes and fulfill their aspiration to create a regional order in the wake of the two Gulf wars and of the new results and the facts they have produced and in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and of the end of the cold war, all of which have created new realities. This is in addition to the fact that the three countries feel more strongly than before that they share meeting points and closely similar interests in the Kurdish and Iraqi issues. Finally, these countries wish to make their voice heard by the "greater U.S. ally" on preserving the existing borders and on not changing these borders the way the borders of some European countries have been changed.

The positions taken by these countries during the Gulf war motivated them to demand a role in arranging the region's conditions, especially in connection with Iraq's future and with its alternative system. The international alliance responded to these wishes by varying degrees. At the same time, the United States and the West showed caution as to the dimensions that the Kurdish issue could assume. This is why the interest in Kurds has been confined to the humanitarian aspect. However, there is no guaranty that humanitarian aid, which has not met essential needs in the first place, will continue.

As of the first days of the events in Iraq and of the accelerating and unexpected developments on the Kurdish side, the three countries have taken a "precautionary" position, if we may use the phrase. This position calls essentially for clinging to the condition existing prior to the March 1991 uprising, namely the condition inherited by the Iraqi Government from World War II and from the resolutions of the League of Nations, especially resolutions concerning border demarcation. This position is based again on disregarding the ethnic and geo-political realities existing on the ground, which are embodied in the presence of 30 million Kurds in the region and in their endeavor to rid themselves of slavery, partition, and persecution and to create a future based on the principles of fraternity, freedom, democracy, and peace.

The three countries' Kurdish policy has been boundlessly dynamic recently, and it has moved rapidly from one tactic to another, without settling on a constant position. This policy has been based on the principle of "managing the Kurdish crisis" and not the principle of dealing with it or proposing solutions for it. These countries' decision-making circles are still the captives of this approach that wastes time, squanders money, and drains energies in the wrong place.

One can sum up the nature of this policy by noting three of its phases:

First phase: confronting any Kurdish national revival in northern Iraq; opposing the national liberation-oriented tendency among Kurds; and going ahead with the effort to absorb the Kurdish phenomenon, even if this dictates dispatching armies and occupying parts of the Kurdish region of Iraq. This is why the three countries have entrusted their security and military agencies with drafting a comprehensive policy on Iraq as of the summer of 1991. This means that Iraqi developments have been dealt with through a security-military approach, not a political approach.

The resolutions of the Ankara meeting (14 November 1992) were tantamount to threats against the Kurdish people and to total rejection of the Kurdish people's choice of the "federal option," of legislative elections, and of creating a local parliament. The meeting was followed by a sweeping military offensive against Iraq's Kurdistan, by assassinating leaders of the Kurdish movement in Iran, by increased pressure on Kurdish nationalists in Syria, and by the delivery of warning letters to the Kurdish political leadership in Iraq through various means, including statements by prominent officials of these countries who denounced the

Kurdish step and who characterized it as "secessionist" step that "breaks up Iraq" and "serves Israel."

Second phase: a temporary truce to monitor the outcome of the Ankara meeting and the subsequent developments. The three countries' circles concerned were surprised by the adverse results of their rigid policy. The national unity of Iraq's Kurdistan was bolstered further and power was transferred from parties to legitimate institutions without problems. Kurdistan's democratic experiment is in the process of developing a model founded on pluralism, peaceful dialogue, and free coexistence.

These developments preceded the Damascus meeting (February 1992) and were the focus of the contacts between the three countries, which had been compelled to recognize the *fait accompli* in Iraq's Kurdistan. However, the Damascus meeting resolutions gave the impression that the Kurdish side had backed down. This impression was reinforced by the activities and statements of an Iraqi Kurdish leader in Damascus at the time.

Third phase: after the Kurdish administration had succeeded in accomplishing a number of steps (normalizing the security conditions in particular; boosting the opposition's movement, embodied in the Unified Iraqi National Congress; developing advanced relations with a number of governments and international organizations and parliamentary institutions concerned with human rights and humanitarian aid) and after it had developed a solution to the problem of relations with [Turkey's] Kurdistan Workers Party, the three countries launched their pressures to maintain the "compromises" option. They offered to "barter" accession of the [Kurdish] factions living in Damascus and Tehran to the Unified National Congress in return for a certain price. The three countries also raised the issue of extending the presence of the alliance forces entrusted to protect Kurds and the supply lines passing through Turkey. The question of the Kurdistan Workers Party's activities was raised as an element of provocation and was used to confuse the issues. It became evident that what was targeted at the time was the "independent Kurdish decision-making." This was demonstrated by the Tehran meeting (7 June 1993) resolutions which noted that the three countries feared the "threat posed to their domestic security by the ceaseless anarchy existing in northern Iraq as a result of the loss of authority there." Syria's foreign minister pointed out explicitly the need for holding "regular consultations" on the situation in northern Iraq, because the anarchic situation there has not changed in the past two years. The minister stressed "Damascus' willingness to host an Iraqi opposition conference," and herein lies the heart of the matter. Turkey's foreign minister pledged to "continue the war against terrorism in the region, should the situation dictate it." Meanwhile, Iran has been carrying out air raids and unleashing concentrated shelling against the Iranian Kurdish movement's positions in Iraq for the entire month. At the same time, Syria persists in arresting Kurdish nationalists and in presenting them to the Higher State Security Court.

Even though the "battle" to confiscate the Kurdish independent decision-making continues, signs indicate the

presence of some sort of "steadfastness" on the Kurdish side. This is made evident in brother Mas'ud Barzani's statement (AL-HAYAH, 22 June 1993) in which he said, "The characterization by the Tehran conferees doesn't apply to the real situation in Kurdistan. What prevails here is law, order, and a democracy that can be considered a model to be emulated. I believe that some neighboring countries wish that their security situation was like the situation in Iraq's Kurdistan. We consider such statements and positions intervention in Iraq's affairs, our affairs specifically, and a calumny against the truth and the reality. To us, federalism is a principled issue which we will not abandon."

There is no doubt that this regional interest draws attention to an extremely serious problem that did not exist in the Kurdish political movement before, namely the problem of "fabricating" contradictions between this and that part of Kurdistan and of fanning subsidiary conflicts within the same body. Here, one asks: Is there contradiction between the peoples of the southern and the northern parts of Kurdistan? Will not the movements in both parts continue simultaneously? The serious recent developments show that the countries that share the Kurdish population are trying to "revive the conflicts," especially between the [Turkey's] Kurdistan [Workers Party—PKK] and Iraq's Kurdistan Front and to transform the former into a negative element in the Kurdish situation in Iraq. In the wake of the announcement of the federal option in 1992, violent clashes occurred between the two sides and now the signs of new inter-Kurdish clashes loom in the horizon. Why and for whose interest? The four countries sharing the Kurdish population have their own contradictions and conflicts with each other, even though they agree on the Kurdish issue. There are Syrian-Turkish, Turkish-Iranian, and Syrian-Iraqi contradictions and conflicts. Do Kurds have to be the fodder for these conflicts? Should we overlook and disregard the fact that the latest wave of violence, which started in Turkey in the wake of the Kurdistan [Workers Party] operation in which a number of unarmed Kurdish soldiers were killed, coincided with the inauguration of the fourth dam on the Turkish side of the Euphrates River and after Syria issued a strongly-worded statement against Turkey?

There is a vast difference between legitimate continuation of the Kurdish national struggle everywhere in a natural and effective manner and without foreign interventions (such struggle is in the interest of Iraq's Kurdistan and it strengthens its negotiating hand) on the one hand and the movement of factions and parties that act on the strength of other interests and objectives that do not take into consideration the strategic interests of the Kurdish people and of their liberationist movement or the difficult objective conditions that are being experienced by the pioneer newborn experiment in the southern part [of Kurdistan].

The success of this experiment and model is a victory for all the Kurdish people and for all their national organizations and parties. It is a victory for the peaceful democratic option which seeks to settle the entire Kurdish issue without violence and inter-fighting. This option will open the door

to deal seriously with Kurdish issues in all parts [of Kurdistan]. If this experiment were not extremely important historically, the Ankara, Damascus, and Tehran meetings would not have been held and the Iraqi regime would not have tried to foil it with its blockade and its explosions.

Where to and what follows?

Without "begging" the sympathy of the countries that share Kurdistan, we believe that their persistence in their current "Kurdish policy" will not do them or their peoples, including the Kurdish people, any good. This is why these countries have to move courageously and realistically from the tactic of "managing the Kurdish crisis" to the strategy of "dealing with the Kurdish crisis." They must learn from the lessons of the distant and recent past in this regard and must change their method and their conduct vis-a-vis the Kurds. They must realize for good that the Kurdish issue is not a military-security issue and that it is not enough to deal with the "Kurdish dossier" with the security and intelligence mentality that has produced nothing but troubles, losses, setbacks, and catastrophes.

It is regrettable that the practical positions of the countries that share the Kurdish people seem to be prepared to persist in the military intervention option on the pretext of the presence of "anarchy, lack of authority, and a threat to the domestic security of adjacent countries." Else, what does Iran's shelling of vast parts of Iraq's Kurdistan for the past two months signify? What do the Turkish military concentrations on the borders signify? What does the Syrian escalation signify? One of the aspirations that have been and continue to be dear to the hearts of patriotic Kurds is the aspiration to accomplish an advanced, civilized, democratic, and peaceful "Arab solution" to parts of the Kurdish issue and to transform this solution into a model to be emulated in the region. If this aspiration is realized, it will be compatible with the bases, rules, and principles of the historical relations between Kurds and Arabs. It will also be tantamount to a correction movement taking the right direction, abridging time, and saving energies, efforts, and resources.

It has been proved theoretically and on real grounds that it is impossible to attain a final solution to the Kurdish issue through "partial solutions" in this or that country. Peaceful and democratic solutions in one or more parts could constitute an element supporting and bolstering the idea of the comprehensive final solution. In no case is a partial solution the end of the road. Rather, it is a prelude to a more comprehensive solution, provided that "regional accord" is present. The rebellions and movements that have risen and focused their attention on Northern Kurdistan have not accomplished their goals. The experiment of the Mehabad Republic, which included the eastern part of Kurdistan, failed. The Iraqi Kurdistan experiment has not been completed, even though engulfed by most favorable conditions, and it is exposed to all possibilities. Syria's Kurds have made no important strides in their political struggle in the western part of Kurdistan.

The option of the "comprehensive regional solution" to the Kurdish issue has to be chosen within the context of an

accord among the four countries, with participation by the Kurdish people's representatives in an expanded UN-sponsored regional conference, and with the contribution of international and regional organizations, such as the Islamic Conference Organization, the Arab League, the European Parliament, and human rights organizations.

The immense dimensions of the Kurdish issue require an appropriate position that accommodates these dimensions and meets the requirements to solve the issue through a desired "regional conference." Until then and to achieve this end, the Kurdish experiment in Iraq must be safeguarded, developed, and dealt with in accordance with principled national, human, and democratic rules.

Kuwait Border Demarcation Called Cause for Peace

93LA0168A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
13 Aug 93 p 10

[Article by Huda al-Husayni: "After Completion of Iraq-Kuwait Border Demarcation: What Was the Give-and-Take for Each Side?"]

[Text] The technical committee that the United Nations appointed under Security Council Resolution 687 to demarcate the international border between Kuwait and Iraq has finished its work.

Kuwait is now conducting a broad campaign for countries to pressure Iraq to abide by Security Council resolutions, especially those related to the boundary demarcation, on the ground that this will promote regional peace, security, and stability and lift the sanctions imposed on Iraq.

Kuwait's deputy foreign minister, 'Abdallah Bisharah, who for many years was general secretary of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), passed through London. There was a long session with him about borders, Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations, and the Gulf countries with their army, weapons, and treaties. He began by reviewing the history of the Iraq-Kuwait border.

The technical committee to demarcate the Kuwait-Iraq border was formed under Security Council Resolution 687, which declared a cease-fire and regulated Iraqi relations with the United Nations in accordance with 12 conditions. Among the most important of these was Iraq's recognition of and participation in demarcating the border in accordance with previously made agreements between the countries signed in 1913, 1932, and 1963. Under these agreements, an Iraqi embassy was opened in Kuwait; the two countries exchanged diplomatic representation; and Iraq treated Kuwait as a sovereign state, renouncing its claims—at least apparently—and coexisting with the reality of Kuwait.

The Security Council therefore issued Resolution 687 on 3 April 1991. On 6 April 1991, Iraq sent its agreement to all the provisions and conditions, including the committee concerned with demarcating the border, which, as the resolution stated, was to be done on the basis of the signed agreements.

The Kuwaiti deputy foreign minister, 'Abdallah Bisharah, said that Iraq agreed to what was stated in the resolution—in other words, accepted demarcation.

In order to block the road to renewed insinuation by Iraq of its claims, the Iraqi National Assembly confirmed Iraq's acceptance of the cease-fire on 11 April 1991. Iraq's agreement to the Security Council resolution, demarcation, the work of the committee, and the documents on which the committee would base its work became clear and unconditional. As a result, coalition forces withdrew from Iraq, and the armaments destruction program began. Regarding the border, the UN secretary general named three international personalities of his selection, as the resolution specified, in addition to a representative of Kuwait and a representative of Iraq. Iraq chose as its representative Riyadh al-Qaysi, and Kuwait chose Tariq Razuqi, the Kuwaiti ambassador in Paris. The committee was headed by Mochtar Kusuma-Atmaja of Indonesia. In addition to the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait, its membership included Ian Brock of Sweden and William Robertson of New Zealand. The United Nations appointed Peter Makhud [name as published] to work with the committee as secretary to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq participated in the work of the committee from April 1991 until May 1992, a period of one year. Throughout the time, the committee devoted its labors to demarcating the land border on the basis of the documents.

Bisharah added: "During the work of the committee, the Iraqi representative participated and visited sites. I told the committee that he should produce documents explaining Iraq's point of view, but he did not comply." The committee thereupon authorized the border demarcating documents and Iraqi government maps that antedated the advent of the Ba'th Party in 1958 until the subsequent events in 1963, relying on them in the border demarcation. The committee produced a report saying that the border would be demarcated by virtue of technical actions; for the resolution made it clear that the committee's work would be technical and unrelated to politics—the committee would neither distribute nor take away land.

When the committee demarcated the border under the agreement, it found that Iraq had advanced. The fact is that since 1969, with the beginning of tension between Iraq and the shah's Iran, Iraq had begun to advance inside Kuwaiti territory. As an excuse, Iraq said it had asked the Kuwaiti Government at that time for permission to expand toward Umm Qasr to defend the port and that it had begun to expand through what was called a "programmed advance." The committee discovered that Iraq had entered about 600 meters along the Iraq-Kuwait border. It had built farms south of the Safwan checkpoint—the Kuwait border begins 1,200 [meters] south of Safwan. Iraq established a number of farms—perhaps a total of 12. They had been deserted. Near Umm Qasr, the committee discovered that Iraq had constructed two relatively small harbors, a school, and two warehouses. In the al-Rumaylah area, the committee found that Iraq had advanced and taken over five Kuwaiti oil wells.

Pursuant to all the agreements and their documents, the committee asked Iraq to withdraw from the Kuwaiti portion of the territory.

The Kuwaiti Government announced its readiness to compensate the Iraqi farmers, and the United Nations appointed an official to determine the compensation. When the technical committee came forward with its report and demarcation in May 1992, Iraq replied with a letter on 21 May 1992. Citing the Iraqi view of Kuwait's history, Iraq said that Kuwait was merely an insignificant village belonging to al-Basrah Province, along with other well-known language. It cast doubt on the technical committee, its fairness, and its work and called the results that had been reached "attacks on historic Iraqi rights," which Iraq would therefore reject and never accept.

The Security Council acted. It met in June 1992 and issued a statement rejecting the content of the letter as inconsistent with Iraq's acceptance of the Security Council resolution, its acceptance of demarcation, and its acceptance of the principles and documents on which the demarcation would rely. The Security Council therefore demanded that Iraq cooperate. Then it issued Resolution 773, supporting the work of the technical committee, announcing approval of the demarcation in accordance with the results that had been reached, and asking the committee to continue with demarcation of the marine border. The Security Council promised to protect and maintain these borders from any alteration and any Iraqi aggression. This was in August 1992. From then until January 1993, tension on the border increased because the Iraqis began to come and retrieve their property. There were oil drilling rigs and military and civilian assets. The fact that the Iraqis retrieved them indicated that they had decided the matter was serious.

Tension increased because of these operations and because of infiltration onto Kuwaiti territory. Something resembling a clash took place. On 4 February 1993, the Security Council issued Resolution 806, stating that the situation was dangerous and asking Iraq to desist from violations. Because of the seriousness of the situation, the Security Council decided to raise the number of troops to 3,000 and changed their responsibility from monitoring to peacekeeping. Forces that monitor, it should be understood, merely send reports; peacekeeping forces use weapons. The Council warned Iraq to desist from its actions.

The Iraqis having finished retrieving all their property, conditions on the border began to become quiet. The committee continued its marine work without the participation of the Iraqi delegate, who began boycotting as soon as the demarcation of the land border was finished. The committee completed its work between May 1992 and May 1993 and presented its report to the secretary general, who submitted it to the Security Council. The latter issued Resolution 833 on 27 May 1993, about two months ago, praising the work of the technical committee, promising to protect the borders, and asking Kuwait and Iraq to cooperate. Iraq's reaction was to send a letter to the Security Council dated 6 June 1993, renewing its demands, rejecting the committee's work, and accusing it of making

light of Iraq's historic interests, so that Iraq had apparently become a country deprived of an outlet to the sea.

The Security Council reconvened and issued a new statement on 28 June 1993, condemning Iraq's behavior, demanding that it stop objecting, and informing Iraq that the border was final and that Iraq's national interests had been preserved, since Iraq had a port at Umm Qasr and had Khawr al-Zubayr.

However, there was much discussion about the port of Umm Qasr and its division. Did the port, both on land and sea, belong to Iraq, or did part of it belong to Kuwait?

'Abdallah Bisharah said that Umm Qasr belongs to Iraq both on land and at sea, but he explained: "Kuwait has now regained the land that Iraq took over by advancing. Iraq never asked Kuwait for it, and Kuwait never gave it to Iraq. In 1969, the Iraqis said they were annoyed and repeated to Kuwait the same old story of Arab brotherhood, national interests, and so forth." Bisharah added: "As everyone knows, the Kuwaiti Government and people are sensitive to the Arab chemistry; so they allowed Iraq a thin strip. Iraq, however, started advancing. The committee went back and returned this southern portion to Kuwait. The port itself with all its installations is inside Iraqi territory. Kuwait regained part of the military airport—merely a runway—two small ports located at al-Khawr at the port, and the two warehouses."

There remains the issue of the Iraqi farms and farmers who, with the new demarcation of the border, found themselves inside the Kuwaiti portion. Their government refuses to accept compensation. Where does the solution lie? 'Abdallah Bisharah said, "The United Nations must remove them to implement its resolutions."

Who will begin the job of demarcating the new border? Who will protect it? What will happen to the Iraqi police point that remained inside the Kuwaiti border? And if the farmers refuse to withdraw, what will happen? The answers, according to 'Abdallah Bisharah, are as follows: "The border has now been demarcated. All that remains before us is the removal of the farmers. The Iraqi police station has been removed; there are no longer any Iraqi forces there. The United Nations has established along the border a demilitarized zone extending five km into Kuwaiti territory and 10 km into Iraqi territory."

As for the farmers, their number increased when Kuwait announced compensation payments. The United Nations will have to reach an understanding with them and remove them, even if it has to use force; otherwise the border demarcation will remain incomplete.

The international forces are the ones that will defend the border. Bisharah stated that these forces would be able to block any Iraqi aggression.

We asked him why these forces are unable to protect civilians from falling into the hands of the Iraqis. Perhaps there is a problem of signs along the border, which are needed to indicate clearly where Kuwaiti territory ends and where Iraqi territory begins; for a single step in the wrong direction can create a victim who will lose seven

years of his life buried in Iraqi prisons. Who will close this frightening gap? 'Abdallah Bisharah replied: "There was a reason that led to those who strayed being put into Iraqi prisons. It was that there were no clear signs. Now all the signs have been put in place. Also, the United Nations forces that will use weapons have not yet arrived; the international monitoring forces are still along the border. By the end of the year, the forces that will maintain the border and fight will arrive. The world needs international forces. There is a crisis of funding and manpower. As for funding, the Kuwaiti Government has volunteered \$25 million as a beginning for the operation. As for weapons, they will come from each country that provides soldiers to participate."

'Abdallah Bisharah said that Iraq has no alternative but to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council, or the sanctions will continue. The Security Council, he said, cannot lift the blockade and sanctions from Iraq while it has not implemented and obeyed the border demarcation resolutions, since this is an integral part of the cease-fire resolution, 687.

We mentioned to Bisharah that the Iraqi opposition itself has rejected the new border demarcation. "The Iraqi opposition," he said, "was not familiarized with the details. It imagined that Iraq had been deprived of an outlet to the sea, which is not true. The Iraqi information media and their supporters are spreading false claims. The truth is that there is the port and that Iraq's outlet to the sea has increased from its former size by an extra 600 meters. Kuwait used to possess half of Khawr al-Zubayr; now it possesses nothing on it, because the committee decided to give more of al-Khawr to Iraq.

'Abdallah Bisharah thinks that in the new border demarcation Kuwait did not gain territory, but gained the only means to stop Iraqi provocations and attacks on Kuwait. Kuwait became certain that the one real means to build security, peace, stability, and a government to defend these important things—that only demarcating the borders could provide the means. "That is what we have gained."

But is Kuwait sure it can win Iraqi recognition of the new border? 'Abdallah Bisharah said that Kuwaitis know that this may not come about with the present Iraqi government, "but this government must recognize that sanctions will be lifted only after yielding on the demarcation issue and the matter of the border. If it doesn't, the blockade will continue. This means that the situation is unstable. It also means that the fate of the Iraqi regime, which is more anxious about survival than about Iraq's unity or anything else, is unknown; for in order to survive it is very eager for the sanctions to be lifted—and they will not be lifted unless the regime recognizes the demarcation."

Even if the regime accedes to the demarcation, Kuwait will not trust it. Nevertheless, the demarcation will be documented and inviolable. 'Abdallah Bisharah does not accept the possibility that another Iraqi government, as happened in the past, will come and abrogate the border demarcation agreement. He holds that this cannot happen after today, since the demarcation has taken place pursuant to United

Nations resolutions. The political shape of Iraq will change. It will be a normal government, a normal army, and normal behavior controlled by international monitoring. Bisharah affirmed this and said that the Iraqi media frequently speaks about unreal matters. It refuses to acknowledge that Iraq is now under international monitoring, pursuant to United Nations resolutions. The situation will continue until the world and the international community feel that Iraq has become a normal state in harmony with the concept of civilized international behavior.

Bisharah denied the claim that Iraq has reestablished its army and put its military factories into operation. Compared with what it was in the past, Iraq, he said, will remain a modest power. Its military and arms programs are subject to international inspection. Iraqi foreign policy is also being monitored. It had been an expansionist policy that caused disturbances, problems, and controversy and interfered in the internal affairs of other countries. Bisharah stated that Iraq must eliminate all these things from its program. Emphasizing the matter of terrorism, he said: "The abandonment of terrorism was mentioned in the international resolutions. As seen in the conspiracy it orchestrated to assassinate Bush, Iraq has passed over this point—namely, that the international resolutions stipulate elimination of the tendency toward terrorism."

We asked Bisharah's opinion of the view that sees the new border demarcation as the seed of another war. He refused to go along with those who hold this opinion, for this reason: "We and the modern Iraqi government—and there will be a civilized, modern government—shall build fraternal relations with intertwined interests. There will be no wall between Kuwait and Iraq in the future. There will be a network of regional cooperation. The tension spots, possibilities for tension, and explosion points will be dealt with in two ways. First, Iraq—either this government or the one to come—will recognize the legality and legitimacy of the demarcation. This is something very important.

"Second, a network of relations will be built that bears fruit for both countries and creates an interest that the relations between them should be normal and developing. This is our idea. The Kuwaiti people have an enlightened view of the future." Bisharah stated that these relations will not be established with the current government in Iraq, "which is lying in wait for us."

But doesn't 'Abdallah Bisharah believe that Iraq will not recognize the new borders, because it does not recognize Kuwait's independence, but still considers Kuwait the 19th province? How will Kuwait deal with the situation?

Bisharah answered: "The only prospect for us is confrontation. Our conflict with the current Iraqi regime is a conflict over existence, not over borders. However, the border is the basic way to remove the tension. Demarcating the border is a basic recipe for security and stability. We will not let the Iraqi regime enjoy the withdrawal of allied forces and enjoy the advantages of the cease-fire without fulfilling its obligations. Its obligations are to coexist with Kuwaiti sovereignty and abide by the border demarcation."

About Iraq's insistence on calling Kuwait "the 19th Iraqi province," Bisharah said that it is just a charade, and Iraq knows it. Iraq knows that it is rejected regionally, among the Arabs, and internationally. He does not automatically link Iraqi recognition of Kuwait's independence to recognition of the border demarcation. Iraq might recognize the independence of Kuwait with borders at Kuwait City. What the Kuwaitis want is for Iraq to recognize the legality of the border demarcated, guaranteed by the United Nations. Bisharah said: "We do not care. If Iraq does not recognize it, the sanctions will remain in place. Iraq will continue to be considered a refractory, disobedient, and rebellious state, and will have to accept the consequences of such rebelliousness." Bisharah stated that Kuwait is in full daily contact with the international community and the leaders of the coalition. He said that the current Iraqi regime is rejected locally, regionally, among the Arabs, and internationally.

He denied that it was Kuwait that, during the war, asked that Saddam not be toppled for fear of partition of Iraq. "We naturally are against partitioning Iraq," he said. "We do not want anything of the sort to happen. The international community insists on the unity of Iraq. But we never asked anyone not to topple Saddam Husayn. That is not true." He reiterated: "We never asked the allies not to overthrow Saddam Husayn. Indeed, we think the departure of the Iraqi regime will benefit first the Iraqi people, then us, then the Arabs, and then the international community."

Kuwait is now digging a trench along the border with Iraq, 150 miles long, 3 meters deep, and 5 meters wide. The work of the Asian workers will be finished in three months.

What will the function of this trench be? Bisharah said: "The trench is being dug .5 km south of the border. It is not a trench for defense or to stop armies or halt tanks. It is a trench to stop smugglers from reaching Kuwait and to obstruct infiltrators, because smuggling and infiltration are an integral part of the Iraqi plan, which is to pump the largest possible number of Iraqis into Kuwait and sabotage Kuwait's society.

"The trench extends the length of the border. About five guarded access ways cross it. The trench extends to the sea. It is to confront or contain the second war that Iraq is launching against Kuwait. Kuwait is an attractive country for smugglers, who come from Iraq supplied with alcohol and weapons. The arms are brought by people paid by Iraqi intelligence. We have even taken the necessary steps to prevent smugglers and infiltrators from using the sea."

Bisharah thinks that Saddam Husayn uses every occasion to repeat that he will return to Kuwait in order to infuriate and disturb the Kuwaitis. The Kuwaitis, however, to implement their policy of confrontation and not giving an opportunity for favorable judgment, report the words of the Iraqis daily to the United Nations. "They speak, and we transmit what they say. We document what they are saying. This is our policy. We reply to Saddam Husayn in the United Nations. For example, we write that the newspaper owned by the Iraqi president's son has written that 'our people in Kuwait will soon see

us.' We tell the secretary general that these statements, which do not accord with the Security Council's resolutions, are part of Iraqi policy and that therefore the sanctions must continue."

Bisharah stated that Kuwaitis as people feel sorry for what the Iraqis as people are suffering under the current regime. However, Bisharah also stated that Kuwaitis are confronting Iraq's dubious intentions by greater preparedness and by acquiring technology and training. "We are the ones who were killed. We were not confronting Iraq. For 30 years, Iraq looked at us with disparagement, contempt, and disdain. It used us for its interests. Its relation to us was as if we were a village of Takrit, and it followed a policy of blackmail, violence, and humiliation. Now we are not prepared to return to that period."

I asked him, "You speak as if you had an army!" He replied: "We have many armies. First we must build the unified Gulf force. The GCC's policy must be a firm plank, because the Gulf countries are targeted—targets of sabotage on the ground that they are a cohesive economic, strategic, and political force.

"We in the Gulf realize that the danger is great and that something must be done at the Gulf level."

We read 'Abdallah Bisharah the contents of a secret British military report that the GCC's military manpower remains small and that their training is very meager and insufficient to form a capable army; that the Gulf countries therefore have no other choice than continued military dependence on Western expertise and armies for many years to come. He said that this needs to be offset by implementing a system of collective security. The principle of collective Gulf security has to be implemented, meaning that responsibility for the region will be collective. Next, technology must be absorbed and schedules must be set. For example, by the end of the century there must be a Gulf deterrent force.

Linkage between the Gulf and the international world is an integral part of Gulf strategy. Kuwaiti strategy in particular is based on signing defense treaties with the five [permanent] Security Council members. We hope that Kuwait will sign one with Moscow next month.

Concerning large purchases of arms, 'Abdallah Bisharah said: "Kuwait has had a very bitter and painful experience. We are buying weapons and building an army. Now there are security mechanisms to ensure Kuwait's independence, sovereignty, and security henceforth and for a long time. Our old fault was trusting too much in the system of brotherly neighborliness. The disaster befell us from it. Now we will not leave Kuwait open."

We asked 'Abdallah Bisharah whether the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran frightens Kuwait. He said that although nuclear weapons frighten everyone, "I have confidence that Iran is not trying to obtain nuclear weapons, because they would be a waste of all its economic, political, and social forces and would gain nothing. It would lead to

a revolution in the regional strategic concept and would therefore have dangerous repercussions."

Asked whether the Gulf was thinking of obtaining nuclear weapons if it became certain that Iran possessed such weapons, he said: "No, no! What you are saying seems like a movie scenario!" He thinks that it is in the interest of both the Gulf and Iran for neither party to try to obtain nuclear weapons, because they would lead to a disturbance of the existing balance of power, which ought to be based on mutual understanding, not on weapons of deterrence. As an example he cited how the Iraqi nuclear program proved destructive to Iraq and to regional security and stability.

About Jordan, whose king said he did not know that the Iraqi regime wanted to invade Kuwait, Bisharah said: "The Kuwaiti people, the Kuwaiti Government, and the Gulf monitored behavior that did not accord with logic. They felt that Jordanian behavior during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait did not inspire satisfaction or reassurance. I do not want to complicate matters. While we are in a period of looking for constructive horizons, I do not want to delve into an old chapter and search for sore spots. However, there is a general conviction in Kuwait that the Jordanian position was unsatisfactory. Allow me to make do with this simple statement of matters. I do not wish to say any more."

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] If Jordan recognizes the new border demarcation between Iraq and Kuwait, will the feeling of uneasiness diminish?

[Bisharah] I think that a country that is in harmony with the decisions of legitimate international authority, one that was in the foundation rank—I have had experience in the United Nations and know that Jordan is a serious country, not an aggressive one, and has been a country in harmony with the rules of international conduct. They had other considerations in our cause. Now I think the government of Kuwait has said frankly in the Kuwaiti parliament and abroad through foreign minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the deputy prime minister—he said that the basic starting point for dialogue is that the Arab states should call on the Iraqi regime to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council, especially those dealing with the border demarcation, as final resolutions, and to consider these resolutions an essential international contribution to building regional security.

I think this is a good starting point!

Russian Ministries Said in Conflict on Iraqi Policy

93AE0593A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 14 Aug 93 p 4

[Text] The two Russian ministries, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, renewed yesterday their accusations about each other's Iraqi policy. While Oleg Davidov, deputy minister in the ministry of economic relations, called for lifting the ban on Iraqi oil and accused the foreign ministry of adopting a "nonconstructive" stand and following in the United States' footsteps, Igor Milikhov, deputy chief of Middle East affairs in the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an interview with AL-HAYAH, accused the ministry of economic relations of having "narrow interests" and of being pressured by those Russian institutions having contracts with Iraq.

In an interview yesterday, Friday, with the COMMERCIAL DAILY, Davidov reported that Moscow was incurring heavy losses because of the suspension of dealings with Iraq, particularly regarding the suspension of oil imports, which Russia had been re-exporting to India and Bulgaria. He further stated that Moscow should demand the cancellation of the international ban on Iraqi oil sales. He also mentioned that the Russian Foreign Ministry was taking a "nonconstructive stand" on this issue. He then added that walking in American footsteps regarding Iraq would hurt Russia economically, mentioning in particular the fact that Baghdad was one of the largest importers of Russian arms.

For the first time, Davidov revealed the official loan figures and said that they had been confirmed to be a total of \$6 billion during his talks in Baghdad. He also indicated that Moscow demanded the payment of the \$1.8 billion that were overdue, whereas, Baghdad insisted on postponing payment until the sanctions were lifted. He indicated that Moscow was willing to wait, because Iraq is a country that is able to repay and also because Russia cares about the Iraqi market. He further indicated that Moscow would be risking losing the Iraqi market if her dealings with Iraq were frozen.

AL-HAYAH asked Igor Milikhov, deputy chief of the Middle East administration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to comment on Davidov's statements. Milikhov stated that the ministry that Davidov represents was following "narrow interests" and was pressured by institutions that had contracts with Iraq.

Igor added that the foreign affairs ministry had a broader understanding based on the grounds that Iraq had been an aggressor and has thus hurt all the Arabs and violated international legitimacy. He denoted that Russia's withdrawal from the unified stand could impact her in the form of "illegitimate actions" performed against her. Igor further pointed out that the current Russian stand is taken into account when considering economic relations between Moscow and the Arab states as well as the other states. He also indicated that "were Russia to lose the confidence of the international community, it would be difficult for her to get loans and acquire technology. For all these reasons, Moscow could not ignore the stand of the Gulf states who happen to be observing Russia's dealings with Iraq."

Igor confirmed that his country's stand is "stable," therefore implying that any practical steps undertaken in dealing with Iraq "would be only implemented after the cancellation or the loosening" of the sanctions. He also stressed the fact that the agreements signed by Davidov "would not be operational" at present.

As for Milikhov, he indicated that a big fuss was raised concerning the visit of what he described as "the experts' delegation" to Baghdad that, besides Russian, included

American, European, Japanese and Korean companies that were seeking to negotiate contracts—either directly or through a third country—to be implemented after the lifting of the sanctions. He considered the fuss to be politically motivated, because the Western countries wanted to ensure—in advance—the operation of their companies in Iraq.

AL-HAYAH asked Milikhof about the truth of the rumors that the Ukraine, as an alternative to Russia, attempted to penetrate Iraqi markets. He responded by saying that he had no information about such a move. However, he added: "The Ukraine is an advanced country that has products which could be marketed in Baghdad; besides, Kiev is in need of energy sources."

Furthermore, parts of a report published in Moscow and prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, indicated that the Western countries had exported to Iraq equipment to manufacture and transport chemical weapons. The report, which did not mention the year that the equipment was exported, stated that Germany had provided Baghdad with equipment to extend the range of the Russian "Scud" missiles. The same report further indicated that Germany, the United States, Italy, and France had provided Iraq with materials to manufacture missiles and long-range artillery, and that they had also set up laboratories for plutonium extraction. The report also stated that Brazil and Switzerland had exported to Iraq equipment to develop "Scud" missiles and nuclear arms.

Movement for Restoration of Monarchy Praised

93AE0582A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 20 Aug 93 p 18

[Article by Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hamid]

[Text] Recently, much argument has been raised in Iraq about the advantages of establishing a constitutional monarchy as an alternative to the present regime. Arguments have centered mainly around the relationship between a monarchy and the existing opposition movements and opposition parties. The question arising is: Is a monarchy an alternative to these movements and parties? Or would it represent a unifying element and a guarantee in the future to these movements and parties?

The advocates of a constitutional monarchy claim that the monarchy represents neither a new organization in the political arena nor a party; it is nevertheless an "umbrella" for all. They further claim that a constitutional monarchy would, God willing, guarantee freedom and democracy in the future Iraq. Such talk is pleasant and can occupy a place in the heart of every ardent Iraqi. I doubt not the nationalism of all Iraqis, including members of the opposition parties. However, for some members, selfishness has overshadowed nationalism. It is therefore the duty of the advocates of a constitutional monarchy to prove their true nationalism. As they claim to be an umbrella for politicians, they must also be an umbrella for nationalism and self-denial.

It is premature to speak about Iraq's rule, because the desired political vacuum that should exist in order for freedom and democracy to be implemented in its wake,

neither exists, nor is there any indication it will come about in the near future. However, this is a good basis for considering Iraq's future rule in order to guarantee our children's future and in order for them to enjoy the freedom and affluence that we have not enjoyed. Accordingly, it is presently required that supporters of the constitutional monarchy movement and the currently operating parties direct all their efforts toward assisting and aiding those Iraqis displaced all around the world. Let me say, with full confidence, that those displaced Iraqis are in great need of assistance with regard to their education, residence, language proficiency, work, marriage, etc.

History in Iraq has been going backwards and has made no advancement since 1958; in fact it has stopped. The proposal for a new regime seems to be the completion of a political avenue the features of which have not yet been defined. This political avenue has not yet fulfilled the role desired of it, that role that the late Faysal described as defined to serve Iraq and the Iraqis. Since all other proposals have failed, there is no objection to trying a new one that would lead Iraq to the shores of safety.

Who is al-Sharif 'Ali-bin -al-Husayn to appoint himself king over Iraq?

I believe it is the right of any Iraqi to nominate himself under any proposal for ruling Iraq, if he is loyal to Iraq and Iraqis and his intention is clear. Whether the rule would be in the form of a monarchy or not, the ruler's role is a responsibility and not a privilege. However, this matter is left altogether to Iraqis to decide.

We have seen but little of al-Sharif 'Ali. However, his background is good because he has had neither contact with the present regime nor with its collaborators. Besides, he does not belong to any party at present and has not belonged to any in the past; in any case, there is no harm in belonging to a party, as long as the goal is to benefit the nation. He is also not biased towards any sect or ethnic group, as is the case with most of those involved in politics in Iraq. It is true that he nominated himself at the same time that the constitutional monarchy was proposed. "In fact, there is no movement without a symbol and no symbol without a movement"; the two are complementary to each other. Also, nobody has the right to claim that the Iraqi throne belongs to him. Our target should be the nation's sake only.

During the monarchy rule in Iraq, Iraqis practiced the simplest forms and practices of democracy and understood the meaning of security. They also understood the meaning of international relations and how to practice them. These political practices are what Iraqis inside Iraq, even more than those outside her, aspire to.

For some people, carelessness is begot of pride; though methods may differ, the goal is the same for all. Therefore, it would be more beneficial if those people evaluated this proposal and supported it for Iraq's sake. They should also collaborate with this movement in order for it to mature and become capable of building the future Iraq.

Statement Issued by Kurdistan Revolutionary Party

93AE0627A Baghdad AL-'IRAQ in Arabic 17 Aug 93 p 2

[Article: "Kurdistan Revolutionary Party Statement on Party's 47th Anniversary"]

[Text] In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

And say: "Work (righteousness): Soon will God observe your work, and His Apostle, and the Believers" [Koran 9:105]. God is always true.

Our proud Kurdish masses, masses of our great Iraqi people, strugglers for freedom everywhere,

In these glorious Iraqi days that are embroidered with the majesty of patriotic creativity in construction and development; with defiance of the blockade and the aggression; and with building the mainstays of an ambitious future under the banner of Comrade Struggler Saddam Husayn, the symbol of our unity; the leader of our proud march; and the hero of our people's great epics—in these glorious days, the 47th anniversary of the struggle procession of our Kurdistan Revolutionary Party [KRP], which was born in August 1946, shines on all parts of the beloved Kurdistan and on our Iraqi people's great struggle. This anniversary brings back to mind glorious and immortal pages of our KRP's struggle for the national rights of our Kurdish masses and for the freedom, dignity, independence, and progress of our Iraqi people. At the same time, this anniversary fortifies in the hearts of our Kurdish masses and of our party's strugglers and friends the decisive will to struggle, to fight bravely, and to sacrifice in order to liberate the wounded Kurdistan from the lackey's control and domination and to restore to it its pride and freedom under the canopy of self-rule. The anniversary shines to consolidate and preserve our firm national unity and to employ all of our party's capabilities and resources to defend our redeemed homeland: the beloved Iraq of the Arabs, the Kurds, and of self-rule.

The 47th anniversary reminds us of the difficult historical phase from which our party emerged to embody our ambitions and our people's hopes and aspirations. It motivates us to get in touch with chapters of the honorable national struggle that our party waged in defense of our great Iraqi people's national objectives while making generous sacrifices for the Kurdish national rights at the same time. We are filled with pride by that march, which abounded with generous offerings and with great sacrifices and which was made glorious and noble with the blood of our party's honorable martyrs who died in the struggle to defend our noble ethnic and national rights. We are, moreover, filled with pride by the great and influential struggle role our party's strugglers played in supporting the national struggle march with constant giving; in defending our fateful causes; and in vying to get to the struggle arenas in order to gain the honor and glory of defending the great Iraq. The glorious battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah [Iraq-Iran war] and the immortal mother of all battles were the real ground for testing true national belonging and faith in unity of the land, history, and national objectives. In those

battles, our KRP offered bright martyrs who have become glorious stars who light our party's march and our glorious national history with their generous sacrifices.

Our proud Kurdish masses, masses of our great Iraqi people, and strugglers for freedom everywhere,

From the time it came into existence, our party has believed in fundamental constants in its national struggle. Through field action, these constants have turned into strategic principles for the party's revolutionary march. These principles are led by the following:

1. The party's principled commitment to defending Kurdish national rights.
2. The party's firm belief that its national struggle for Kurdish rights is a part of its greater strategic national struggle to defend the beloved Iraq.
3. The party's firm and unshakable faith in unity of the Iraqi soil, people, history, goals, and struggle.

Throughout 47 years of its struggle, our party has embodied these clear principled goals; has courageously and bravely defended these honorable national values; and has carried arms to defend Kurdish national rights.

Our party has also carried arms in defense of the great Iraq and has embodied these values and principles in its strategic alliance with the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. Under the canopy of the glorious 17-30 July revolution and through the faith and struggle of Saddam Husayn, the comrade struggler and revolution leader and hero, this ally achieved all the national rights of our Kurdish masses through the 11 March 1970 declaration. That declaration put an end to the national bloodletting; restored unity of the people, including Kurds, Arabs, and other fraternal ethnic groups; and transformed the great people into a single and daring national force that united to develop the redeemed country; to confront the ferocious fateful challenges; and to face our imperialist, Zionist, and colonialist enemies. All Iraqis rallied behind that declaration and all Iraqi citizens, both Arabs and Kurds, fought under the banner of Saddam Husayn, the leader, the symbol, and the self-rule engineer, in defense of the great Iraq. Our KRP, the struggle vanguard of our Kurdish people, had the honor of an influential presence in all the fateful battles and the honor of fateful and struggle solidarity with the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, our ally. This party has been and will continue to be the sole ideological party to achieve our proud people's national rights as part of its revolutionary experience.

Our proud Kurdish masses, masses of our great Iraqi people, strugglers for freedom everywhere,

While we stand proudly before the great accomplishments and gains achieved by the victorious 17-30 July revolution and by its engineer and hero, comrade leader and struggler Saddam Husayn, for our Kurdish people at the various social, economic, and cultural levels, we feel the pain, grief, and anxiety of the tragic condition under which the wounded Kurdistan lives. Kurdistan is dominated by lackeys who are the servants of imperialism and the slaves

of the racist Zionism. These lackeys have sneaked into the region under the protection of imperialist bayonets and they have committed the most heinous crimes against our Kurdish people under the guise of their false national slogans. These lackeys have sabotaged the self-rule institutions, violated our Kurdish people's freedom, and shredded all ethnic, national, and human values and principles. They have destroyed production establishments, have stolen private and public money, and have sold everything to the foreigner, as they had previously sold their honor, conscience, and dignity and had agreed to be lackeys, traitors, and servants of imperialism and its agents. Thus, they have earned the curse of God, of history, and of our Kurdish masses until kingdom come.

The tragedy of the wounded Kurdistan appeals to free men, strugglers, humanitarian and legal institutions, and political parties and forces throughout the world, and especially to human rights defense organizations, to launch an international campaign to denounce the killing, the murders, and the human rights violations practiced by the lackeys in the beloved Kurdistan. This campaign should also demand expulsion of the treasonous traitors from the beloved Kurdistan so it will regain its freedom and pride under the canopy of the revolution and the revolution's accomplishments and care and so our Kurdish people will exercise anew their ethnic rights and their honorable national role under the banner of our firm national unity.

Our KRP, the struggle vanguard of our Kurdish people, takes this glorious occasion of its 47th birthday to extend profound greetings to comrade leader and struggler Saddam Husayn, the self-rule engineer and hero, may God preserve him, and to renew to his excellency the allegiance of love, loyalty, sacrifice, bravery, and relentless struggle to liberate Kurdistan and to expel the vile lackeys from it. It is a pledge to give creatively and patriotically in every field and to work and exert efforts to enhance and elevate Iraq's glory and to bolster its magnificent steadfastness against the tyrannical blockade, against the murderous enemies, and against whoever contemplates undermining the sovereignty, security, and independence of the great Iraq.

Glory and immortality to the righteous martyrs of our party and of our Iraq; victory to the great Iraq, the Iraq of Arabs and Kurds, of national unity, self-rule, and of the immortal mother of battles; and victory, glory, and honor to our Kurdish masses who are heroically confronting the murderous lackeys in the wounded Kurdistan every day.

Let all capabilities unite in the national development march. Our KRP will always remain a national vanguard in the struggle for the great Iraq under the banner of Saddam Husayn, the leader, the symbol, and the comrade struggler, may God keep him victorious and triumphant for our great Iraqi people.

Forward we march.

The KRP Political Bureau

15 August 1993

KUWAIT

Petroleum Minister Comments on OPEC Agreement

94AE0003A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 1 Oct 93 p 10

[Interview with 'Ali Ahmad al-Baghli, Kuwaiti petroleum minister, by Randah Taqi-al-Din in Geneva; date not given; "Kuwaiti Petroleum Minister to AL-HAYAH: 'OPEC Agreement Concluded By Political Will; Major Producers Preferred Price Rises to Increasing Quotas'"]

[Text] Kuwaiti Petroleum Minister 'Ali Ahmad al-Baghli has said that the OPEC conference agreement was concluded by political will. He added, in an interview with AL-HAYAH yesterday morning, that major producers preferred to raise oil prices to increasing production quotas.

[Taqi-al-Din] The day before yesterday, Kuwait delayed the conclusion of the organization's ministerial meeting by insisting on a larger production quota. How do you assess the agreement? Now that you have accepted a quota of 2 million barrels per day?

[Al-Baghli] The agreement was the best one possible, given the circumstances, particularly as the amount of increase allowed members was about 900,000 barrels per day. There were demands from several countries for production quota increases, and Kuwait was at the top of the list of these countries. The Iranian position was that any increase given to Kuwait must also be given to Iran; that while Kuwait may have endured seven months of war, Iran had experienced eight years of war; that while Kuwait may have a population of 1.6 million, Iran has a population of 66 million. The Emirates, too, tried to disengage its production from Kuwait's. In addition to these two issues, there were mounting demands from some member states. It was suggested that Kuwait be given a quota of just 1.9 billion barrels per day, and the members of the organization were asked to support this number. It was also difficult to change the production ceiling the organization was committed to, mandating production of 24.5 million barrels per day. I may say frankly that there was sympathy with Kuwait and its demand for production of 2 million barrels per day, and all these reasons put together led to our acceptance of the 2 million.

[Taqi-al-Din] What steps will Kuwait take now to implement the agreement?

[Al-Baghli] Our production this month reached 2.161 million barrels per day, and we will reduce production to 2 million barrels as from the beginning of the month. We will abide by the agreement and hope others will do the same.

[Taqi-al-Din] Why were you insisting on a production increase up to 2.161 million barrels, especially as 161,000 barrels would not boost income very much?

[Al-Baghli] Historically we have had a quota equal to that of the countries equal to us in production capacity and market share, with our production equal to theirs. It is a matter of principle. We have a goal to achieve, and we have achieved it gradually.

[Taqi-al-Din] You met a few minutes ago with your Saudi counterpart, Mr. Hisham Nazir. May we know what transpired in that meeting? Did you pledge to the principle of Kuwait's production being equal to that of other countries in the future?

[Al-Baghli] I did not discuss what was concluded in the meeting with my Saudi colleague. [We discussed] other subjects affecting Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, such as the "southern gas" project, in particular the station at al-Zur which was destroyed during the invasion.

[Taqi-al-Din] What about the project?

[Al-Baghli] The project basically consists of getting quantities of al-Khafji gas to use in Kuwait. We want to revive the project and dust it off.

[Taqi-al-Din] The Iranian minister said that the question of Kuwait was solved after a telephone call between Iranian President Rafsanjani and the Emir of Kuwait. Was that statement true?

[Al-Baghli] Yes, the call was made for Kuwait to accept the 2 million barrel per day quota, to help adjust prices. We accepted it on the basis of joint cooperation, and we hope the door will be open for the countries of the organization to cooperate, especially for the neglected and affected OPEC states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait.

[Taqi-al-Din] We have been told that King Fahd and Shaykh Zayid [of the UAE] also contacted the Emir of Kuwait for the same reason.

[Al-Baghli] I don't know. All I know is that Rafsanjani spoke to the Emir, and I learned that after the atmosphere grew tense between me and the Iranian minister Wednesday afternoon.

[Taqi-al-Din] What is your current production capacity?

[Al-Baghli] Between 2.4 and 2.5 million barrels per day. We will surpass this amount early next year.

[Taqi-al-Din] What is new on the redevelopment of the oil industry front?

[Al-Baghli] There has been excellent progress in refinery capacity, and late this October the al-Sha'biyah refinery will begin to refine 130,000 barrels per day, in the first phase. Refining capacity at the al-Ahmadi refinery will reach nearly 100,000 barrels per day next month. By the end of the year we will have a refining capacity of 660,000 barrels per day, an increase of 230,000 barrels per day over our current capacity. This means we will use nearly 130,000 barrels of refined oil derivatives, and export nearly 500,000 barrels abroad.

[Taqi-al-Din] How do you expect prices to evolve after the conference?

[Al-Baghli] When the conference ended, the price of oil rose 67 cents, and I hope the price increases continue, in order to give producing countries in increased incomes what they did not get in increased quotas, because many countries are in poor financial shape. We, too, are under many financial pressures and need additional revenues.

[Taqi-al-Din] What will happen if some do not abide by their quotas?

[Al-Baghli] Kuwait will request an emergency meeting to explore the situation and review quotas. We do not want a repeat of what happened in February. I must point out that the countries violating their quotas are the ones that are pushing for a settlement. I may say frankly that Iran and Nigeria were in the forefront of the countries violating their quotas. Yesterday the Iranian minister told me, "I will give orders to decrease production to 3.6 million barrels per day."

[Taqi-al-Din] Do you support the view that in this conference the major producers supported price increases over raising production quotas, which means a new direction in OPEC?

[Al-Baghli] Yes, that is true. Saudi Arabia was content to freeze its quota, we were satisfied with a lower quota, and the Emirates too, and other countries that got low quotas. We sacrificed a good part of our quota in order to improve prices. There must be political will behind the commitment to quotas, and that is what happened this time. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran intervened to arrive at this agreement.

[Taqi-al-Din] Are you worried about the return of Iraqi oil production?

[Al-Baghli] Yesterday we were delighted to have reached this accord. Do you want to torment us again? If the Iraqis come back [into the market], we will face the situation responsibly, as we did yesterday.

MOROCCO

Evolving Political, Economic Climate Reviewed

93AF0827A London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English
10 Sep 93 pp 5-6

[Unattributed article: Morocco: Pomp and Changing Circumstance"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The political season opened in Casablanca on 30 August with King Hassan II inaugurating the world's largest mosque outside Saudi Arabia and certainly its most ostentatious. Three African presidents (his friend Omar Bongo of Gabon, Guinea's Lansana Conte and Mali's Alpha Oumar Konare) and a host of other dignitaries flocked to witness this monument to Hassan's status as, *Al'Amir al Mumineen*—Commander of the Faithful. The celebrations emphasized that he feels more comfortable than ever, in marked contrast to his neighbors in the turmoil of Algeria (AC Vol 34 No 17).

The 25 June elections brought an opposition victory but there was no room for an Algerian-style Islamist takeover by ballot. The first general elections since 1984 produced the result his critics at home and abroad most wanted: opposition parties emerged but not strongly enough to destabilize the kingdom. The critical question now is to what extent the opposition, parliament and government will be allowed to make policy. Constitutional changes

passed by referendum last September make the government answerable to parliament, not directly to the king. In reality, Hassan and his closest advisors will continue to dominate.

For the first time, the opposition can battle within the system to win more power from the Palace. Opposition politicians may enter the government to take over in October from Karim Lambrani's caretaker team. Hassan could propose a center-left coalition when parliament reconvenes in late September. The two leading *Koutla* (*Bloc Democratique*) [Democratic Bloc] parties had formed an alliance prior to the elections: the *Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires* [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] (USFP) emerged with 48 seats, the nationalist *Istiqlal* (Independence) with 43. They were followed by the loyalist *Mouvement Populaire* [Popular Movement] (MP, 33 seats), which has support mainly in the Berber heartland, and by Ahmed Osman's *Rassemblement National des Independents* [National Rally of Independence] (RNI, 28 seats), now repositioned in the center ground. The conservative *Union Constitutionnelle* [Constitutional Union], the largest party in 1984, won just 27 seats.

Elections decide 222 of the 333 parliamentary seats; the rest are chosen by "indirect elections", among professional and other associations. Due on 17 September, these provide parliament with an in-built loyalist majority. This time, though, loyalist parties are divided. A government to include the USFP, *Istiqlal*, Ali Yata's ex-communist *Parti du Progres et du Socialisme* [Party of Progress and Socialism] (PPS), former Posts and Telecommunications Minister Mohand Laenser's MP and RNI cannot be ruled out. The European Community and other donors, who have been advocating a more open system and greater "social justice", would welcome this.

'Social justice' has become something of a catch phrase: the World Bank and other proponents of structural adjustment agree that Morocco could do with more democratic influences to ease the growing divide between rich and poor. Hassan may see a center-left government as the best way to achieve this while causing minimum discomfort to his power base in the "300 families" which still control much of Morocco.

Hassan can certainly live with a government that includes the loyal opposition. Intriguingly, a recent flirtation between Islamists and legal opposition groups, notably *Istiqlal* and even the USFP and its *Confederation Democratique du Travail* [Democratic Labor Confederation] (CDT) trade union, could help bring more moderate Islamist opinion into the system without Hassan having publicly to give ground.

He has other reasons to feel comfortable:

- Islamist opposition remains limited and an equivalent to Algeria's *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) has yet to appear, though a few Moroccans have been implicated in FIS activity. The largest group, *Al Adl wal Ihsan* (Justice and Charity) remains illegal. Its *Murchid* (Guide), *Aabdes-salam Yassine*, has been under house arrest since

December 1989 and senior members in goal for longer still. The movement claims some 500,000 supporters but this is impossible to verify. Mosques are tightly controlled and groups infiltrated by police. Smaller Islamist groups are emerging, too, and are strongest in universities, urban areas and, like *Chebiya Islamiya* (Popular Islamic), in the migrant community abroad.

- The Western Sahara dispute drags on. The Polisario Front may even act on threats to resume armed conflict if Rabat continues to block the peace process. Despite the first ever negotiations in the territory in July, and plans for more (probably in France), problems over participation in the referendum remain. Rabat is still dragging its feet. Yet with the small force (under 300) of the United Nations' Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) in place, resorting to arms is more difficult. UN troops say there has been remarkably little tension since the September 1991 ceasefire. However, Polisario remains armed and ready, a fact underlined at May's 20th anniversary celebrations when it surprised military observers with a parade of 3,500 male and 900 female infantry troops, accompanied by 61 T-55 tanks, Soviet-made rocket launchers with mobile tracking stations, 18 SAM-6 missiles, other anti-aircraft vehicles, plus dozens more armored cars and other vehicles. Also on display were United States', South African and other arms captured from Moroccan forces.

Polisario seemed near collapse in 1991-92, when senior members Brahim Hakim and Omar Hadrami defected to Rabat, while support from Algeria fell. But now it has regained some momentum, with moral support from a more nationalist government in Algiers. It has most to gain from a UN-sponsored settlement, with an open referendum its only hope of establishing a state. The inclusion of the 'Saharan provinces' in Morocco's elections was widely noted but brought little response from governments which matter. UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali in July suggested he might take a hard line to push through the referendum yet his hands are tied by budgetary constraints and concern on the Security Council that an independence vote could undermine Hassan.

- Relations with Europe are being consolidated. As AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL predicted in 1992, relations with France and the EC have taken a sharp turn for the better (AC Vol 33 No 19). It was to Rabat that new French Premier Edouard Balladur made his first trip outside Europe on 23-24 July. Morocco was Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's first Arab destination. At the same time, a new French ambassador arrived, Henri Benoit de Coignac. Meanwhile, Moroccan-born Cooperation Minister Michel Roussin has close links to the Palace.

Spain and Portugal are also developing their links. A major Spanish arms deal, valued at US \$500 million by the

Madrid press, is again on the agenda after being shelved due to financial concerns and pressure from pro-Polissario groups.

Plans for an EC free trade zone are moving ahead. Rabat's lobbying produced a breakthrough in June, when the EC called for talks to accelerate and made a first concession on farm products. Morocco should be the first of the EC's Mediterranean free zones, though talks have also opened with Tunisia. The EC Commission should start full negotiations by November, for an agreement in 1996.

The economy is attracting good reviews abroad, even if performance is not impressive. Drought means that a higher than expected current account deficit is forecast for 1993 and that gross domestic product fell by 2.3 percent in 1992. Yet growth rates of 4.5 percent per year were maintained in 1987-91 and the economy is more resilient than it was in the dark days of the early 1980s.

After nearly a decade of structural adjustment, Morocco is emerging as an attractive market for everyone from small-scale Spanish manufacturers to US investment banks. Marking the new mood, Citibank has been mandated by Morocco's leading private company, *Omnium Nord Africain* (ONA), to raise a \$25 million Euroloan. This confirms Finance Minister **Mohamed Berrada's** view that Morocco should return to the international capital markets by borrowing through its private sector, rather than taking on new sovereign risk. This will not be easy and when the Citibank/ONA loan will be signed and who will participate are subjects of speculation.

Privatization is finally attracting foreign investment, which is music to the ears of Hassan's foreign admirers. The largest sell-off came in July, when a French subsidiary of Switzerland's *Holderbank* paid \$64 million for the state's 51 percent stake in cement company *Cimenterie de l'Orientale*. Further major privatizations are planned over the next year, which could draw more foreign corporates and stimulate Casablanca's stock exchange.

Following criticism about lack of information, [Commerce, Industry &] Privatization Minister **Moulay Zine Zahidi** has stressed "transparency" in asset sales. The pace of privatization is growing. Sales include the purchase for 145 million dirhams (\$15 million) by businessman **Ali Bouaida** of the state's 51 percent of the *Societe des Petroles du Maghreb* (Petro). Other bidders included the local arm of Shell. Petro owns 140 petrol stations. Bouaida is officially described as a dealer in petroleum products based in the south, where he had developed markets, including in the disputed Western Sahara, to which the Petro chain will now be extended.

The Middle East peace breakthrough adds to Hassan's diplomatic credentials. At home, he was severely criticized for welcoming the then Israeli Premier, **Shimon Peres** to Rabat in 1986. Links have been maintained. Now, he is again seen as an important regional power-broker by Washington, by Europe and by Gulf states for whose princes Morocco is a preferred base for rest and recreation.

In the coming months, it will become clear just how comfortable Hassan is. He will try to undercut the legal opposition by offering it a place in government. This will provide no more than a coalition.

The *Koutla* parties have already protested at the election in July of four ministers from the outgoing center-right government: **Taieb Chkili** (Education) who raised eyebrows by standing for the communist-turned-liberal PPS; the respected Foreign Trade, Investment and Tourism Minister, **Hassan Abou Ayoub** (said to be a candidate to replace Berrada at Finance), for the MP; another effective technocrat with a growing political reputation, **Mohamed Kabbaj** (Public Works) and relative newcomer **Abdallah Belkiz** (Youth and Sports). This group may already be pencilled in to Hassan's ministerial list.

The gradual opening to the opposition has been paralleled by a small improvement in human rights and a start in tackling the wholesale abuses of official power which are inflicted on large segments of the population.

Signals of the new policy include the trial and 9 August execution of **Mohamed Tabet**, the Casablanca police chief disgraced by the rape and other abuse of over 1,300 women over many years. The Tabet affair also allowed the government to undercut Islamist claims that the authorities openly sanctioned official vice. Clearing another sensitive issue, CDT Secretary General **Noubir Amaoui** was released on 12 July after 17 months in goal for slander, a detention heavily criticized at home and abroad.

The opening of the Hassan II Mosque showed Morocco in its pomp and the King as a major leader of the Islamic world. But with social pressures rising—and an emerging middle class, as well as the poor, calling for a juster division of national wealth—Hassan, now 64, cannot rest easy if the uninspiring Crown Prince **Sidi Mohamed** is to continue the Alaouite line.

To ensure the succession, Hassan may now have converted to the belief that the monarchical system must evolve, albeit very slowly. Just how slowly will be seen in his choice of government. Most observers believe this will be loyalist with a tinge of opposition. They are looking to see whether Hassan's most loyal (and powerful) servant, Interior and Information Minister **Driss Basri**, keeps his job in a government where his arch-enemy, the opposition, is also present.

Deputies Advised To Withstand 'Secret Party'

94P50017A Rabat AL'ALAM in Arabic 18 Oct 93 p 1

[Unattributed front-page editorial]

[Text] Political organizations are taking the course set for them by the "secret party" in this country. In setting this course, the secret party acts as a "manipulative force" for change whose aim is that there be no change. It is lamentable that the secret party succeeds in imposing its manipulative force upon the democratic process and subsequently upon political bodies, turning them into lame organizations unable to function. The secret party has three goals in doing this:

First: to demonstrate that the democracy which our people desire equates to a paralysis of production and a paralysis of executive systems, and to prove that it is full of shortcomings since all of its signs are negative.

Second: to maintain the status quo even if it means that Morocco does not extract itself from the vicious cycle in which it has been living for many years.

Third: to cultivate despair with the democratic system in its civic applications. By way of analogy: It's as the tortured person says who finds his mistreatment outside of prison worse than it was inside: "Put me back in jail!"

This manipulative force has attempted to dominate all levels of government in our country that have been opened up to democracy, from preparing the country's laws and electing its institutions, to managing the way those institutions carry out their work. Today the manipulative force appears to have so overwhelmed these political bodies with its pervasive vehemence that people now call them a joke. For when a so-called democratic institution finds itself obliged by a notion of "respect" to spend long hours debating the inclusion or the exclusion of a committee, it is indeed possible that the people will call its work a joke.

Parables of various origins tell the story of a country threatened by a foreign invasion. The people sought out the country's wisemen to solicit their guidance as to what defensive measures they should take. They found the wisemen gathered at one of the great halls embroiled in a major dispute. Over what? Over the answer to this question: Are the angels masculine or feminine? When the people of that threatened country saw this they looked to their own common sense and to their own devices and they defended themselves by way of holy war. "Wisemen? Who needs them?!" This is just what the manipulative force wants people to think of the Council of Deputies which began its work by debating for several hours a suggestion to include two committees, one for human rights and the other for emigrant and employment matters.

If it is true that you can tell a book by its cover, then we would like to admonish the Council and its administration that they do not have time to waste. There are basic issues connected with the country and its future, with the life of its citizens, their bread, their production, their employment, their education and their housing, with their economy and commerce and farming, with the application of laws by them and for them, and with the rehabilitation of their administrations. There is the issue of clearing up the way we do business, getting rid of indolence, of futility, corruption and fraud. We encourage the Council to mobilize itself in the interest of the citizens and in realizing citizen rights. There is legislation that needs to be passed; there is oversight of government operations that needs to be done; there are burdens upon the citizenry that

need to be lightened; there are debts weighing upon the shoulders of the nation and the people that demand to be paid and that demand a way be found to do this without oppressing the people. There is the matter of the government in the provinces, the cities and the villages, in the prefectures and the wilayas, from which the citizens suffer and about which they raise their voices in complaint. The Council needs to ask the government about this. There is abuse of human rights that the parliament needs to investigate so that this abuse will no longer continue.

In summary, there are fundamental issues a thousand times more important than researching the gender of angels or defending to the death the establishment of a committee for human rights or one for renter affairs. The Council of Deputies must assert its existence, and not as a lame council as the manipulative force would have it. It must stand firm in the face of the manipulative force to keep that force from succeeding in its aims of making the people lose hope in democracy and in rule by political institutions, of continuing "business as usual," and of marginalizing the political institutions which must undertake a program to fulfill their constitutional duties in legislating laws and overseeing their implementation.

The Council of Deputies got off to a bad start. But if it is to avoid the trap which the manipulative force has set for it, it must spend a new year in attending to the fundamentals, giving them their due study and discussion, and avoid getting sidetracked. It must not allow some of its members to waste the Council's time and thus carry out the plan devised by the manipulative force to paralyze the Council and to disillusion the people with democratic institutions.

SUDAN

Extremists Training Camps Reported

94P50015A

[Editorial Report] Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic of 10 October reports that the Sudanese Government has recently established three new training camps for extremist elements from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. One camp is in the Kisab region, another in Om Dubaykirat, [name as published] and the third is located northwest of Om Durman, next to the Fatachah military region. Extremists come to these regions from refugee centers in the regions of Ash Shuwak and Sharifi, located in Eastern Sudan. Brigadier General Kamal 'Ali Mukhtar, who died recently in a helicopter accident in southern Sudan, used to supervise these camps. Brigadier General al-Fatih 'Urwah currently supervises these camps with the assistance of NIF [National Islamic Front] elements who ideologically train the recruits with a view toward dispatching them to their respective countries, in order to disrupt their security and usurp their governments. Iran is financing the camps' activities through its embassy in Khartoum.

BANGLADESH

Paper Derides Commonwealth, Advocates 'Dismantling'

BK2210101593 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 22 Oct 93 p 6

[Text] The conference of countries belonging to the British Commonwealth is about to begin in Cyprus with a great deal of pomp and ceremony, it can boast of one of the highest concentrations of heads of state and prime ministers from the countries carved out of the defunct British Empire. To prop up the declining value of this somewhat dated forum, the Queen of Great Britain herself is gracing the occasion. However, with due respect to all the sublime statements coming from various leaders about the ideals and role of the Commonwealth, one finds it hard to see the value and relevance of this anachronistic institution in present times. Apart from colour and lights of publicity, the gathering seems a meaningless moot providing photo opportunities for leaders of nations to relax and recuperate in this resort island. Ever since UK joined the EC, its economic links with its former colonies were drastically scaled down. Britain chose to become a full-fledged European power abdicating its special role in the affairs of Commonwealth. Except for a few, it is a family of poor relations who are a nuisance, after all. The richer nations keep their distance except for one ritual every two years. In the same way Canada has now chosen to be a part of North American Economic bloc subject to trade restrictions applicable to the member states of that association. The other country with a highly developed economy and potential to accelerate the growth of less developed economies, Australia, is now concentrating on the Pacific region to meet the fast changing international situation. Australians are only waiting for the next ship sailing out of Commonwealth docks.

Another area where this association was in an advantageous position to play a significant role was the resolution of intra-member conflicts. Most of the disputes in the former colonies of UK arose from the irrational boundaries which had more to do with the expedience of colonial powers than with historical, cultural, and geographical factors on the ground. The Commonwealth could have addressed this problem with greater assurance and authority due to its historical association with these countries, but the organisation's recommendations and resolutions are not binding on the members. Even formal declarations are drafted on the basis of consensus rather than logic or moral considerations. That drastically cuts at the roots of its moral authority as well as its value as a forum for promoting good causes. The way the resolution of sanctions against the racist regimes in South Africa was tenaciously stone-walled by Mrs Thatcher underscore its lack of principles.

The ideologues and apologists of the Commonwealth, in their bid to justify its continued existence, would have us believe that it is promoting the growth of multi-party democracy in its sphere of influences. This is ridiculous fiction. More governments in the Commonwealth even

today are authoritarian. At present the Commonwealth's service to democracy is restricted to sending teams of observers to monitor elections. But few rich states in this family have any inhibitions about doing business with dictatorships. Pakistanis know that so well, don't they?

We would strongly advocate the dismantling of this nostalgic out-fit. The world has passed it by and so it must go the way of all species, whose time is up.

IRAN

Rafsanjani, Nurbakhsh, Economy Discussed

93LA0195A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
24 Aug 93 p 6

[Article by Ja'far Ra'ed: "Iran Needs Courageous Decisions"]

[Text] ABRAR, the morning newspaper published in Iran, reported in its issue of last Wednesday, 18 August 1993, that the president, Shaykh Hashemi-Rafsanjani, said: "Keshvar beh tasmimat-e shoja'aneh niaz darad," which means in Arabic: "The country needs courageous decisions."

ABRAR is the mouthpiece of the extremists, or the Muslim leftists as they are referred to by the terminology used to designate the various factions and political splinter groups in Iran. But this paper is known for its independence and does not belong to the group of "Mohtashemi/Kho'iniha" which opposes the current government. Also, it is said to be in contact with the office of the Spiritual Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i. ABRAR is published daily in Tehran, and what sets it apart is that it does not volunteer to carry indiscriminate campaigns against the administration of the president as is the case with the newspaper SALAM, published by "Hojjat ol-Eslam, Kho'iniha," a leading figure among the Muslim students who follow the line of Imam, a group responsible for the occupation of the American embassy and for the attack on embassies of Arab states neighboring Iran. ABRAR does not follow the approach of SALAM and those like it. However, it does not hesitate to publish the letters it receives criticizing the government and its policies, its agencies, and its employees.

It is known that the president is concerned about the economy and is intent on improving the economic situation in the country, and when he declares that the country needs courageous decisions, he means that the country needs to adopt daring policies, probably harsh at the beginning, in order to improve the economic situation in Iran, a situation which has satisfied neither the people nor the government.

In this respect, we can say that the no-confidence vote by the Parliament against Dr. Nurbakhsh was counter to the expectations of the president and the observers who were aware of what went on behind the scenes. An agreement was reached between the various factions governing the Majles and President Hashemi-Rafsanjani over the support of the ministerial composition after a short review

and debate. But Deputy Hojjat ol-Eslam, Hosoyini-Shahrudi had a plot. In fact, he surprised the president at a critical moment by unleashing a harsh attack on Dr. Nurbakhsh, accusing him of failing to defend the dignity of state officials.

The story is that this deputy, who represents his locality of Shahrud and is head of the Parliamentary Financial and Economic Committee, traveled to Washington early this year as a member of an economic and financial delegation headed by Dr. Nurbakhsh, the minister of economy, to attend the meetings of the World Bank. But the immigration officers at the airport, found out that Deputy Shahrudi was among those who had occupied the American embassy in Tehran. As a result, they cancelled his U.S. visa and arrested him for 24 hours and sent him back to Iran. Deputy Shahrudi had expected the head of the delegation, Dr. Nurbakhsh, to express his solidarity with him at the airport and to insist on his release and to threaten to return home with the delegation. Contrary to his expectations, the minister of economy did not act according to his wishes, because he wanted to succeed in the mission for which he went to Washington. The extremist deputy kept the incident to himself and took his revenge at the appropriate time. He delivered a vindictive statement against Dr. Nurbakhsh, which made him lose the vote of confidence in Parliament. That was a surprise to the president who, nevertheless, reacted calmly and with self control. He nominated Mr. Vahaji, a former minister, as minister of economic affairs. At the same time, he announced the appointment of Dr. Nurbakhsh as his personal assistant to head the Supreme Council, as well as his special adviser for financial and economic affairs. The president seized that opportunity to praise the contribution of Dr. Nurbakhsh in preparing the relevant programs that helped put the country on the road to reconstruction and development.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani proved his mastery as an administrator in charge of the government when he admirably held on to Dr. Nurbakhsh so as not to upset his assistants and to let everybody know that the president does not waver in appointments to important posts in Iran.

It is relevant to mention that before presenting the members of his government, the president gave a remarkable introductory speech, noteworthy for its spontaneity, simplicity, and modesty. The speech was well received by the members of Parliament, as well as by those who read it later.

Rafsanjani started his speech on a personal note talking about his private life and that of his family in order to quell the numerous criticisms leveled at him and his family. In that speech, he said:

"Whoever was close to our private life, saw with his own eyes that we used to have a maid to help in domestic chores, today we no longer have one. As to our standard of living, it was much better than it is now." The president added in a choking voice: "The wife of the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran cleans dishes, sweeps the floors of the house, and cooks." He continued: "My

mother and my brothers and sisters are still living in the same village where we lived before, and their living conditions are harsher now than before the Revolution. Some of them make a living sewing clothes. This is a matter of pride for us and this has to go down in history." He asserted that rumors cannot repress facts.

The president of the Islamic Republic of Iran spoke in detail about the private life of his children, both his boys and girls. He refuted all the accusations and slanders directed at them. As for himself, he said that he keeps his presidential salary in a special fund and does not use it except when necessary, because he lives on his savings [accumulated] prior to the Revolution. He added that his children live in the building he owned from his private business before he became president. He also said that sometimes he delegates to his sons abroad the overseeing of certain agreements on behalf of the state so as to shut the door in the face of middlemen and usurers. He added that one of his sons participated in the defense of the country in its war with Iraq. As to his daughters, he said that one of them works with sick women to alleviate their pain. He also said that a great injustice was done to the Iranian women and that is for him a source of embarrassment, and he called for an end to that situation. He hinted in his speech that he usually consults with the Spiritual Leader of the country, but he asserted that only the broad outlines of policies, not the details, are submitted to him. Further, he disclosed that the detailed plan for the future policies of the country contain six hundred items which were all discussed in the appropriate parliamentary committees.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani announced to the citizens that within six months, the outlines of the development of the country for the coming years would become clearer to them and they would know about the future conditions in colleges, schools, and the cultural field in general, as well as industry and agriculture, and the infrastructure projects such as roads, railroads, energy, communications, minerals, exports and imports. This work plan would be comprehensive. Also, there would be a plan for the gradual decrease in subsidies of certain basic commodities. Those subsidies would be replaced by other forms of assistance to improve the living conditions of the poor and the needy.

The president asserted that the projects of his government encompass also the continuation of construction and rebuilding of the devastated areas left by the war and the destruction caused by the bad policies of the previous governments. The president acknowledged that a great number of people were suffering from discrimination in the distribution of opportunities and possibilities. However, he said the government has spent enormous amounts of money in the past three years helping the dispossessed. He expressed his hope that the success of the future projects would decrease the gap between the regions and between the poor and the rich.

As to the foreign policy, the president had the following to say:

"I can assert that the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran have never been based on hostility, and have never

sought to make trouble, and never will. It is our belief that Islamic influence will develop and grow better in a setting that is peaceful and secure than it will in a setting that is tense, and troubled, and plots prone surroundings. We possess logic, but those who create problems and confusion do not possess any logic and want to impose their ideas on others by force.

"We are trying our best to shape our place in this world as a cultural and moral center. This is our policy, and we do not resort to armed force or terrorism, or any other wrong doing they falsely accuse us of." The president of the republic asked his audience to take a look at Iran's neighboring regions and make a comparison between the upheavals in those regions and the security prevailing all over Iran. He said that this security and stability are among the goals of the government. He added that the government is not protecting this security, it is the people who are protecting the stability in the country. He said: "We should appreciate this security and stability and we should seize this opportunity to rebuild our country and to safeguard our position in this world through our logic and our rational utterances."

In his speech, the president also mentioned those who have defended the country and given up their lives and their valuables. He said that those who have sacrificed have an everlasting right, and that all are obliged to take care of their material and cultural needs. He reaffirmed that that has been the policy of the state and one of its priorities, and will always be. That, he said, is the greatest duty of the state.

His speech was warmly received, and many congratulated the president in person. Among the wellwishers were Hoojat ol-Elislam 'Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, speaker of the Majles, and Ayatollah Muhammad Yazdi, head of the Judiciary, and many others. In his response to such a warm welcome, Rafsanjani declared: "I am overwhelmed by what was said about me. I am an ordinary citizen and a weak soldier in this society, but the will of the people and yours have made me carry on this responsibility. It is my hope that during this last term of my presidency and in this difficult phase, we can cooperate together so as to lead the Revolution towards an acceptable stage and be able to start the Second Program (the Second Plan)."

The president added that the broad outlines of the policies of the Second Plan have been submitted to the high authority, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, and that as soon as the Ayatollah gives his support and approval, the Second Plan will be submitted to the public. Finally, he said that the draft of the Second Plan has been distributed to the press. And he expressed his hope that all those routine procedures will come to an end, and that the Second Plan will soon see the light.

Azerbaijan's Plea for Combat Volunteers Rejected

93AE0599A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
16 Aug 93 p 4

[Text] Official Azerbaijani sources yesterday disclosed that Iran has rejected an Azerbaijani plea to open two centers for the registration of volunteers to fight on Azerbaijan's side against Armenia.

Meanwhile, Iran has reinforced her military units stationed at her borders with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while fighting is getting each day closer to these borders.

Azerbaijan had last year opened centers for the registration of volunteers and the collection of aid in a few Turkish cities. However, as Tehran tends to support Armenia in the ongoing war, she allowed Azerbaijan neither to recruit volunteers nor to collect material aid from the Iranian provinces where Azerbaijanis are found. At the beginning of the current week, when Iran gave a strong warning to Armenia to stop her current rush to invade the southern part of Azerbaijan, which is parallel to the Iranian borders, there was an indication that Tehran might change her policy.

This strongly worded warning indicated that Iran will not, under any circumstances, agree to the annexation of land by force. However, there was no indication that Tehran would close the vital passageway over the Aras River across which Armenia receives most imports needed for her to go on with her military activities. Similarly, though the Baku Government has repeatedly asked Iran to stop providing Armenia with oil, there is no indication that Iran intends doing that.

Currently, the fiercest battles are ongoing in a pocket in the Upper Kardakh and in the Fazuli region in the southeast. It is clear that the Armenian forces, which are reinforced with tanks, heavy artillery and big numbers of helicopters, are hoping to reach the Talishi region situated on the Caspian Sea. The Armenians are hoping to provoke the Talishis, who are Sunni Muslims, speak an old Persian dialect, and have suffered from the Azerbaijanis for long periods of time, to revolt against the Shi'ite Azerbaijanis. Since the onset of war between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis five years ago, the Armenians have been using the ethnic and religious issues for provocation against Azerbaijanis.

Armenia attempted to ignite the old enmity between the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds by setting up a Kurdish republic—having self-rule—in the Lachin Pass. Armenia has also formed the Lezghi Liberation Front in order to cause a revolt among the Lezghi minority in western Azerbaijan. The ongoing war behind the Caucasus region represents an issue of great sensitivity in Iran, because there are 12 million Azerbaijani Iranians who feel directly concerned with their brethren's tragedy in the north.

At the same time, the Armenian minority in Iran, which is believed to be around 400,000 people, is very influential in Tehran and is afraid that the new conflict in the Caucasus region would bring about a new tragedy to the Armenian people.

It seems that the leadership in Tehran is divided on its policy of dealing with the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. According to diplomatic sources, president Rafsanjani tried to follow a neutral path; while keeping the Armenian supply line opened, he supported giving humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the Spiritual Leader 'Ali Khamene'i, is presently advocating giving Azerbaijan stronger support.

Composition, Development of Government Analyzed

93AE0591A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
17 Aug 93 p 6

[Article by Ja'far Ra'id: "Development of Composition of Iran's Government"]

[Text] From time to time, domestic opponents of Iran's open-door policy resort to muddying the waters of Iran's foreign relations, especially with neighboring countries.

At the outset of his first term, Hashemi-Rafsanjani told some of his confidants that he needed three or four years to prepare for fundamental reforms in Iran. We wonder: has the cleric president successfully accomplished in the past four years, i.e., during his first term, what he had sought to accomplish?

In our opinion, Rafsanjani has achieved considerable success in this regard. Domestically, the following has been accomplished:

1. The number of stern radicals in the Assembly of Experts, which performs the role of a constituent assembly in Iran, has been reduced and their leaders have been prevented from reentering this assembly, which plays an important role in developing the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. The Revolution Committees, which are armed units that were formed with the inception of the revolution to defend this revolution in cities and to strike its enemies, have been merged with the police and gendarmerie forces, and their role has been ended finally.

3. The Revolution Guard Ministry has been abolished and the guard and army commands have been unified. One commander has been appointed for both forces in some areas. This has also been the case in the navy, where 'Ali Shamkhani, a guard officer who belongs to the Arabs of Khuzestan, has been promoted to the rank of rear admiral and appointed general commander of the naval units and other units attached to them in the regular military and guard naval forces.

4. The door has been opened for large numbers of moderate rightist elements to enter the Majles; the role of the radical wing of the Majles has been curtailed and the initiative has been taken away from it; the number of turbaned clerics in the Majles has been reduced and the demagogues among them have been blocked from the Majles; and a university degree or its equivalent has been made a prerequisite for running for election to the Majles.

5. The issuance of permits for the publication of papers has been increased and made more tolerant and the trial of journalists has been assigned to specialized jurors. As a result, the number of newspapers, magazines, and quarterlies has increased greatly in Iran. Moreover, they enjoy relative freedom to deal with various issues.

6. The repatriation of expatriate Iranians and their participation in rebuilding the country's structure has been facilitated and some restrictions on the travel of those who live in Iran have been abolished.

7. The private sector has been encouraged [to participate] in the industry and commerce sector.

8. The exchange rate for Iran's currency has been unified as a prelude to the adoption of a sound plan to lead the Iranian economy in the right direction.

The above are not all the accomplishments achieved domestically, but they are among the most important.

Externally, the leadership has accomplished the following successes:

1. It has rid itself of the burden of the Western hostages in Lebanon. This was an insurmountable obstacle, which Iran managed to surmount after much ado.

2. It normalized relations with some Western countries, such as France, Germany, and Italy.

3. It improved relations with the Arab world, especially with Arab neighbors, considerably. However, domestic opponents of the open-door policy continue to try from time to time to muddy the waters with these neighbors and to impede the cleric president's efforts.

4. It has established firm relations with the countries that broke away from the Soviet Union.

5. It has engaged in greater social, economic, and political activity in international circles.

The above is a summary of what has been accomplished at the foreign level.

Generally, the president has succeeded to a large degree in steering clear off the maelstrom of instantaneous revolutionary reactions, both at home and abroad, and has steered the rudder of government toward establishing stability and entrenching the bases of the state.

An examination of the Iranian president's personality shows that he is not the type of leader who likes making instantaneous decisions and who prefers to proceed deliberately, calmly, and steadily and to take two steps forward and one step backward, if necessary.

In light of the above, we can analyze the composition of the cleric president's new cabinet and formulate some projections regarding its future plans.

The new cabinet includes 11 engineers, three physicians, five individuals who hold doctorates, and only two clerics, namely Hojjat ol-Eslam Fallahian, the intelligence and security minister; and Hojjat ol-Eslam Shushtari, the justice minister. It is normal that the justice minister in an Islamic government is a cleric. As to why a cleric has been kept as the intelligence and interior minister, it is because leaders of the opposition to the government are stern radical clerics and because some of them, such as 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami, consider themselves more entitled to lead the country than those who are currently in power. A few days ago, Mohtashami criticized severely, in an article he published in AL-ISLAM newspaper, the government policy in Lebanon and the government's agreement to pacify the south Lebanon front.

The intelligence minister also heads at the same time the special court for the trial of clergymen. Imam Khomeyni entrusted him with this task when the court was formed during the imam's life. Hojjat ol-Eslam Fallahian continues to head this court.

It can be said that the Majles' important political factions are represented in the cabinet. It also behooves us to note that the cleric president has intentionally kept some of his oft-criticized ministers, such as Petroleum Minister Aqazadeh, so he would not appear too flexible in submitting to the wishes of some Majles factions. What is most interesting in the new cabinet is that the Interior Ministry has been assigned for the first time since the revolution's inception to a non-religious personality, namely 'Ali Mohammad Besharati-Jahromi, who is a prominent government official. Jahromi sparked in the Foreign Ministry recently when he carried out some limited missions outside the country, such as when he toured a number of Arab Maghreb countries a few weeks ago. The Interior Ministry has been considered a formidable stronghold of revolutionary clerics. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded, the Interior Ministry post has been held by most prominent clerics, including Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashami. The latest cleric to hold the position was Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Abdollah Nuri. In this position, each of them was more than just a cabinet minister and each had great influence and, at times, had his own big entourage. To assign this important ministry to a government official means ending this ministry's special and distinguished role and making it act in harmony with the other government ministries. As a result of this step, province leaders will be replaced and changes will be introduced to the other Interior Ministry agencies, such as the gendarmerie and the police, in accordance with the state's supreme interest and without any reservation.

Perhaps we could consider the appointment of a non-cleric to the post of interior minister, a signal of the end of the role of one of the country's centers of power. Another interesting aspect of the composition of the new cabinet is the introduction of a new ministry under the name of the Cooperatives Ministry. This ministry has been entrusted to Gholam Reza Shafe'i, who was born in 1950 and who is a prominent member of the Islamic Engineers Society. He studied at Tehran's Industry Ministry and got an M.S. degree. In the wake of the revolution, he started working in the Construction Jihad Organization and then became deputy chairman of the Organization of the Oppressed for industrial affairs. He entered the government during Mir Hoseyn Musavi's administration and became industry minister, a position which he held until 1989. If one casts a look at the new minister's file and then observes the embarrassment caused to the government at times by the independent organizations, such as the Martyr's Foundation and the Imam's Relief Committee, one gets the impression that the tendency is to do away with the independence of these organizations—an independence dictated first by the revolution's circumstances and then by the war conditions—and to put the numerous such organizations under the control of a specific ministry that

coordinates their activities with those of the other ministries. This task, i.e., the task of ending the independence of these organizations and of annexing them to the government as government agencies that follow the prime minister's directives, is the task of the new Cooperatives Ministry and of its head, namely Minister Gholam Reza Shafe'i, who is an expert on the affairs of these independent organizations. He had previously held a prominent position in one of them, perhaps the most important one.

Rafsanjani has kept Velayati as foreign minister because, with his broad smile and his elegant attire, Velayati has become a well-known figure in regional and international diplomatic circles. Velayati has successfully rebuilt the bridges with numerous countries. Moreover, he is trusted by the country's leader. When Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i was president of the republic nearly 12 years ago, he nominated Velayati to be his prime minister. But the Majles refused to approve his appointment at the time. So Velayati was replaced by Mir Hoseyn Musavi as prime minister. Dr. Velayati was appointed foreign minister in that cabinet. He was born in a Tehran suburb in 1945. He graduated from Tehran University's medical school in the capital and then carried on with his studies in the United States, and this fact was the subject of criticism by the Islamic Consultative Council in the early days of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Velayati got a degree as specialized pediatrician from Boston University. When the revolution erupted, he was a member of the Society of Muslims. He then became assistant chairman of the Red Crescent Society. Later, he was appointed deputy health minister, and he was especially concerned with the children of clergymen. Velayati participated in founding the Islamic Republican Party which nominated him to run for election as a representative of Tehran in the first Majles election. In 1981, he became foreign minister in Mir Hoseyn Musavi's cabinet and he has held this post to this day.

Six new ministers have entered the new cabinet, but none of them is a stranger to the job. This shows that the president has been careful not to risk the appointment of people totally unknown to him to cabinet positions.

The new cabinet ministers are:

1. Health Minister Dr. 'Ali Reza Marandi who was born in the 1940s and who completed his higher studies in pediatrics at Richmond University, the United States. He also studied at Miami Valley Hospital in Dayton and at Reyna University, the United States. He joined the ranks of physicians enrolled as members of the Islamic Republican Party in 1981. He held top health positions and was Khomeyni's private physician and head of the medical committee entrusted with supervising the treatment of the founder of the republic and the leader of its revolution in the final days of his life. Marandi is well-known for steering clear off politics, for being preoccupied with his medical duties, and for helping the poor and the destitute, all of which have gained him broad popularity.

2. Dr. Mohammad Reza Hashemi Golpayegani is the son of Ayatollah Ahmad Hashemi Golpayegani. He was born

in al-Najaf, Iraq, in 1946. He attended higher studies at the Industrial University and at the Polytechnic in London and then acquired his Ph.D. from Ohio University, the United States.

3. Defense Minister Mohammad Foruzandeh was born in 1953 to a poor family in Khuzestan. He completed his studies in the same province. When the revolution broke out, Foruzandeh, a second lieutenant in the army at the time, proceeded to join the Revolution Guard where he rose gradually from one command position to another. His latest position was assistant defense minister and deputy chairman of the armed forces chief of staff at the armed forces general command.

It is to be noted that the new defense minister attended a command course at the army's Command and Staff College, where he received a master's degree.

4. Commerce Minister Yahya al-Eshaq was born in 1949 to a religious family in Qom. He has a diploma in administrative sciences and business administration. The most recent positions he has held are: chairman of the committee for technical and industrial cooperation with the countries that gained their independence from the Soviet Union recently; customs director; and assistant commerce minister.

5. Housing Minister 'Abbas Ahmad-Akhundi comes from a religious Iranian family from al-Najaf. He attended an Iranian elementary school in al-Najaf and completed his college studies in Tehran, gaining an M.S. degree. He has held important positions in the Guard and in various ministries, including the position of director of Afghan Refugee Affairs. The latest position he held was that of Housing Agency director.

6. 'Ali Mohammad Besharati-Jahromi, to whom a reference was made at the outset of the article, held important leadership positions in the Revolution Guard prior to moving to the Foreign Ministry.

He worked as assistant petroleum minister. His religious studies were equated with a bachelor's degree and he later acquired a Ph.D. from the Foreign Ministry's International and Political Studies Institute.

From reading the above, one can imagine that the Iranian Government will proceed on the same path it has followed previously and it is following now, i.e., toward stabilizing domestic conditions and improving foreign relations. It will move with steady, but at the same time cautious, steps. We should not expect noisy challenges or hasty steps from it.

Regime To Promote Production by Limiting Imports

94LA0021D Tehran SALAM in Persian 8 Sep 93 p 11

[Text] Kerman—SALAM correspondent. While warehouses are full as the result of the excessive import of goods and thriving production, the government's current policy is to limit imports, and for the same reason the government has imposed limits to expedite production.

Mohammad Khan, general manager of national customs, speaking before a gathering of correspondents in the Province of Kerman, announced the above and said concerning the volume of exports: In the last five months exports increased 34 percent by value compared to the same period last year to a total of \$1.4 billion. If this level of exports continues until the end of the current year [20 March 1994], the total is expected to increase to \$5 billion.

He said the volume of exports during the First Five-Year Plan was 10 percent of the added value of the total gross national product. He said: This is six times the amount for the year 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989]. He also said: The Second Five-Year Plan will give unwavering support to production, especially agricultural and industrial production.

He said: Incentives have been provided to increase exports so that exporters can have authorization to import on the condition that they open credit accounts before shipping the goods. He said: It is expected that by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the volume of exports will reach a minimum of \$10 billion.

Continuing, he enumerated the characteristics of the Sirjan Free Trade Zone and said that this zone is one of a kind. He said: Most of the major customs facilities are special for this area. He said: These facilities will not be in conflict with the law.

In conclusion, the general manager of the National Customs Office discussed the creation of a customs office in Rafsanjan. He said: Every region in the country that has special export goods in quantity has the possibility of creating a customs office, and we will take steps in this matter.

Elimination of Agricultural Imports Suggested

94LA0016A Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian 15 Sep 93 p 8

[Article by Faramarz Qarabaghi, News Service]

[Text] One of the indexes of economic development is the movement towards the gradual reduction of agricultural imports, including grains and dairy and protein products. For our country, which is determined to preserve its political independence on the world arena, the gradual decrease up to the point of a complete stop to the import of essential agricultural products is considered a major aim. If no effective steps are taken to reduce or stop the import of agricultural products, undoubtedly in the future we shall face the danger of grains and protein products being used as an economic-political weapon by the exporters of such goods, and the exporters of such goods in our country, who are mainly Westerners or followers of Western policies, will pressure us into dependence. At the same time, there are many potential resources in the country to provide for the food needs of the people.

For example, one can point out the import of dairy products, such as cheese and butter, from other countries and the waste of part of the milk production in the country. While the Iranian markets are saturated with imported

dairy products, such as cheese and butter, some of the milk produced in the country spoils because of the shortage of resources and lack of sufficient conversion industries.

According to the minister of construction jihad, 4,300,000 tons of milk are produced annually in the country, but due to the low capacity of conversion industry factories, some of it is wasted. Also, according to Foruzesh, in addition to the annual import of 80,000 tons in tin containers, some cheese in paper packages is purchased from Europe and offered on the domestic markets.

At the same time, according to the minister of construction jihad, if the equivalent of one year of the foreign-currency cost of the imports of such products were spent on conversion industries, the country would now have no need to import cheese.

The reality is also no different from what the minister of construction jihad has expressed explicitly. If instead of purchasing dairy products from other countries and importing massive amounts of cheese and butter from such places as Denmark and Holland and advertising Dutch butter or Danish cheese we pay attention to strengthening conversion industries and supporting increased domestic production, certainly we shall conserve our foreign currency revenues for other uses, including investing in industries and fundamental social structures.

According to the minister of construction jihad, when with \$79 million conservation in the import of consumer goods, such as chicken feed, we can build 23 conversion factories, certainly by allocating a part of the foreign currency budget for the import of butter and cheese, we can increase the number of factories to convert milk to dairy products.

The important point is that the import of dairy and protein products can be logically justified when their domestic production is not possible. While the programs of the Ministry of Construction Jihad to increase the production of dairy and protein products and the Ministry of Agriculture in the increase of grain and agricultural products in the past four years showed that if we want to, we can hope for self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector, and this is not merely a slogan.

According to Engineer Foruzesh, annually about \$1 billion in revenues from the sale of oil is spent on purchasing protein, dairy, and other agricultural products while the possibility of producing these products in the country exists. Now, considering the statements of the minister of construction jihad, we can conclude that if these imports continue, an important part of the foreign currency revenues of the country will be spent on purchasing goods, which we are capable of producing. Second, in exchange for the sale of oil, that is, the loss of a part of the nonrenewable revenues generating resources, we have merely imported goods that play no effective role in development, and this means a slow-down of development, falling behind in the expansion of the industry sector, and being distanced from the advanced technology of the day. Third, the extensive import of dairy, protein, and essential agricultural products causes lack of attention to the development and

progress of the agricultural sector and related conversion industries. In this case, we must always be dependent on the policies of countries that export these products and certainly, with our growing population, we will be forced to either tolerate hunger or more dependence.

IRI Builds 3 Cement Factories in Azerbaijan

94LA0016C Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian
22 Sep 93 p 10

[Text] Tehran. IRNA. 23 Shahrivar [14 Sep] Based on preliminary agreements between the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan, three cement factories with a daily capacity of 500-600 tons per day will be built in that republic by the Azarab Factory of Arak.

Announcing the above statement, Engineer 'Azizi, the general manager of Azarab Industries Company, said: The Republic of Azerbaijan expressed interest in purchasing the cement factories during the exclusive exhibition of Iran in Baku in Ordibehesht [21 Apr-21 May].

Referring to the assistance of the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Azerbaijan in this connection, he said: The Ministry of Heavy Industries, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance will support the Azarab Factory in designing, building, and installing the cement factories in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

He explained: An Iranian bank will provide the necessary funds to build the cement factories in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Referring to the visit of a delegation from the Ministry of Production of the Republic of Azerbaijan some time ago to the Azarab Industries Company, Engineer 'Azizi said: The issue of providing funds and signing agreements in the above-mentioned area will shortly be finalized in a visit of the Azerbaijan officials to Iran.

Nuclear Plants Provide 20 Percent of Energy

94LA0016F Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian
6 October 93 p 10

[Interview with Reza Amrollahi, deputy to the president and head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, in Vienna; date not given]

[Text] Vienna. IRNA. 10 Mehr [12 Oct] Reza Amrollahi, the deputy to the president and head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, said in an interview in Vienna: The regime occupying Jerusalem is the main obstacle to achieving the goal of changing the Middle East into a region free of atomic weapons.

Having traveled to Vienna, the capital of Austria, at the head of a high-ranking delegation to take part in the 37th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], he also added: This regime will not allow its nuclear facilities to be inspected by the IAEA.

The deputy to the president added: Nevertheless, the Western media propaganda is upside down and, instead of

paying attention to the disruption by Israel, continually targets countries such as Iran and Pakistan.

Amrollahi added: The United States is trying to transfer the authority of the inspection section of the IAEA to the Security Council.

He warned: The aim of this action is to protect the Zionist regime from existing pressures in this agency.

He continued: Veto power does not exist in the IAEA, and the United States wants to bring veto power into the decisionmaking of this agency through the Security Council.

The head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization added: In our opinion, the United States will not succeed in this effort.

He continued: The preliminary steps for the building of two Chinese power plants, each 300 megawatts [MW], and a Russian power plant with 800 MW are being prepared in Iran.

According to him, the Russian power plant will be built in Bushehr, and the project for finding suitable locations for the Chinese power plants is about to be completed.

In conclusion, Amrollahi said: Iran intends to procure 12-20 percent of its consumer energy through nuclear power plants in the next 10 years.

It should be pointed out that the general conference of the IAEA started last week with the participation of delegations from 96 countries in the world.

The participants in this conference examine the ways to increase international cooperation in order to develop the nuclear industry and the source of nonpeaceful use of this industry.

Diabetes Afflicts 2.5 Percent of Society

94LA0021E Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Sep 93 p 11

[Text] Esfahan—SALAM correspondent. Of the 2.5 percent of the people in society who have diabetes, 70 percent of them have been identified and 30 percent of them do not know they have the disease.

This was announced by the chief of the province of Esfahan Center for Diabetes Research, Education and Treatment during a visit to this center by the governor-general of Esfahan. He added: 53 percent of the diabetes patients control their disease with pills, 33 percent with insulin and 12 percent with a dietary regime.

He then discussed the lack of diabetes research in the country. He said: In the year 1370 [21 March 1991-20 March 1992] the deputy minister of health care, treatment and medical education for research began planning and he began his work by starting 10 research projects throughout the country.

He said: To achieve this goal, the province of Esfahan Center for Diabetes Research, Education and Treatment, with the help of more than 30 members of the faculty of the Esfahan Medical Sciences University, began working on

epidemiology, side effects and the training of patients and medical cadre associated with the disease.

Concerning the study of side effects, he said: So far 1,500 patients have been admitted to this center, and these patients have been trained by aides, experts and training nurses. An internal medicine physician and specialists in cardiology, neurology, psychology, surgery, skin and pediatrics have conducted studies and examinations.

Reports on Schools, Illegal Charges

94LA0011G London KEYHAN in Persian 30 Sep 93 p 12

[Text] The new academic year in Iran began on 25 Shahrivar [16 Sep] (for elementary schools) and 27 Shahrivar [28 Sep] for other educational levels. Millions of students went to classrooms. But a large number also are deprived of access to schools, teachers, and books. Since the revolution in Iran, the educational system of the country has suffered various kinds of problems that not only have governments one after another been unable to eliminate, but also with the constant decrease in the material and human resources of the government and national revenues, the increase in population, the eight-year war, the regime's inattention to the importance of education, the increase in the "ideological" pressures of the government on education, and the increase of poverty in the country, gradually the level of these problems and deadlocks have increased, so that now in the area of education, too, like many other social areas in the country, we can speak of a deadlock. Despite the hopeful speeches and sermons of the Friday imams who spoke at the start of the academic year of the importance of the status of the teacher and the role of knowledge in the Islamic society, as news and signs indicate, the new academic year, too, if it does not face more difficulties in every respect, suffers from educational, cultural, and social problems, is no more hopeful than before.

The most important current problem of the educational system in the Islamic Republic is the shortage of classrooms and educational resources. The crisis of the shortage of schools and classrooms, which is the direct result of failure to look into the future and allocate the necessary funds, appeared from about 1368 [21 Mar 1989-20 Mar 1990] seriously. From 1358 [21 Mar 1979-20 Mar 1980] to 1367 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989], the number of elementary students increased at an annual rate of 5 percent, which is faster than the national population growth, while there was no sign of building schools and projecting resources for the young and increasing population. As a result of this situation, the ratio of students to the age group 6-19 years, which grew by 32 percent from 1352 [21 Mar 1973-20 Mar 1974] to 1356 [21 Mar 1977-20 Mar 1978], from the year that the revolution occurred to 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988] grew only by 7 percent, that is, it decreased from the annual growth of 5.7 percent in the first 10 years of the Islamic Republic regime to one-tenth, that is 6 percent annually. In 1368, the statistics of the regime itself indicated that "in the next five years, the student population will reach 18 million, and consequently we will need 370,000 new teachers and to build 100,000 new classrooms," whereas again according to the official

statistics of the Islamic Republic, in the years 1364 [21 Mar 1985-20 Mar 1986] to 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987], only 1,074 schools and 6,027 new classrooms were established, and this trend did not continue.

On 13 Azar 1369 [4 Dec 1990], Engineer Habibollahian, deputy minister of education for development and head of the national new construction of schools, said: "In the Five-Year Plan, we will face a shortage of at least 70,000 classrooms, and of the total 112,000 classrooms projected in the Five-Year Plan, even if 100,000 are prepared and made available to education, we will still face a shortage of 70,000 classrooms throughout the country."

According to other statistics published in Shahrivar 1371 [23 Aug-22 Sep 1992] in Tehran newspapers, the shortage of classrooms since that time, and also in the future, if this trend continues, will increase: "With the annual increase of 1 million students by 1377 [21 Mar 1998-20 Mar 1999], we shall have a shortage of about 300,000 classrooms."

Since 1368, numerous reports have been published in the press, according to which not only were there shortages of schools and classrooms in Baluchestan, Kurdistan, Fars, and Khorasan, but also "in one of the southern education zones in Tehran, we see a school that has more than 50 students in every classroom in four to five shifts daily, and most unfortunately it must be said that even if we have one teacher for those four shifts for every class, this teacher is himself a new contract teacher with a mountain of problems rather than an experienced teacher who has time to make up for other problems." (JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 29 Shahrivar 1368 [20 Sep 1989])

Not only has the problem of the shortage of schools and classrooms not been resolved since four years ago, but it also has worsened, and now six-shift schools and schools in which every group of students attends only two days a week also exist. Recently, the director of education of Qazvin said that in the new academic year, the schools in that city will work on a four- to six-shift basis.

But the difficulty is not only the lack of classrooms and schools. Also, excessive use of the equipment and resources of schools in several shifts every day has turned many of these schools to ruins, needing repairs and reconstruction. But there are not sufficient funds for this either. The head of "new building of schools" of the Ministry of Education said: "The Ministry of Education has about 90,000 educational buildings throughout the country for which allocated funds are not sufficient for repairs." As a result, the schools of the country are in a sorry situation, and this is not confined to the deprived and traditionally poor provinces. IRNA reported the condition of a school in Kalardasht as follows: "Students of the Fatemiyyeh Hasan Keyf Rahnema'i School use blankets in the classroom to keep warm." 'Abdolfatah Naqibi, the president of the Parents and Teachers Association of this school said: "Considering that the region is mountainous, with heavy snow and extreme cold, the conditions of the Rahnema'i school are bad in terms of lighting, health, and heating. Rahimi, the director of education of Kalardasht, verifying

the existing problems in the schools of the region, said: "The shortage of funds is the main factor in this chaos in the schools."

A Majles deputy, Hoseyn Tehrani, said: "We still have schools that are held under bridges, because the beloved children of our nation who must be educated have no room, no schools, no teachers, no benches to sit on, not even one room."

And the principal of Hejrat School in South Tehran said: "Students in these areas, because they do not have benches, sit on the ground, and they have been instructed that in order to protect themselves from the damp ground and the cold, they should bring along a straw mat, carpet, or blanket. Most elementary schools lack water and restrooms, and some schools share walls with cow stables, and due to the polluted air, the students suffer from lung diseases and infectious wounds. The stench and the swarming of thousands of flies and insects have bothered and caused the spread of disease among students and teachers." This principal added: "The miserable situation of students forced us to go visit their families. We saw that the floors of their rooms were covered with newspapers instead of carpeting. They have nothing with which to fill their stomachs or to buy paper and pencils."

Shortage of Funds, Means of Gaining Revenues

Despite the chaos, the Islamic Republic has never made education a priority. The deputy minister of education for development and new building of schools said: "In 1357 [21 Mar 1978-20 Mar 1979], the per capita cost of every student was 18,000 rials, which decreased to 8,200 rials in 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992]." He added: "The total developmental funds of the Ministry of Education in 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] was only 36 million toman."

The government of the Islamic Republic, which had found itself incapable of facing these problems, without paying attention to the Constitution of the regime itself, which correctly or incorrectly in Article 3 explicitly proclaims "free education and physical education for everyone at every level" as a right of the people and in Article 30 emphasizes, "The government is responsible for expanding the means for free education for the whole nation, up to the end of high school...and higher education at the level of self-sufficiency of the country free of charge," allowed and even encouraged the establishment of "national" (private) schools. But, deceptively, it calls these schools "nonprofit" schools and "exemplary public schools" and ratified a bill in this regard in the Majles. Since that time, not only have many people had to pay huge amounts for the education of their children, but also collecting tuition and all sorts of other money from the parents of children, even in government and "free" schools, despite the denials and threats of the officials, has become a normal practice. One of the readers of SALAM newspaper (for example) said recently in a telephone conversation: "I am a 30-year retired person who lives on 12,000 toman a month. The Imam Reza School in the "beautiful city" of Ku-ye Kan is asking for 15,000 toman to register my child. Now, how can a retired person with

such a low salary afford it? They should at least collect the annual tuition in installments so that families would not have problems paying it, and it would not make people be fed up with their lives. And still it is not clear whether or not such tuition is legal and in accordance with the Constitution."

Another said to the same newspaper on 12 Mordad [3 Aug]: "My landlord has added 2,000 tomans to my rent. When I asked the reason, he said that they have asked for tuition for my children's school."

Under such circumstances, Najafi, the minister of education, has said for the 1,000th time in an ABRAR newspaper interview: "Except for exemplary people's nonprofit and Shahed schools and also special schools for exceptional students, which have special regulations to collect tuition, in the rest of the schools, that is, government schools, no principal has the right to collect tuition. He asked the people to report the violations immediately to the education offices of the regions so that the violating principals are dealt with." He added: "A large number of inspectors for this ministry are sent to the schools on registration days secretly to supervise the registration of students."

But it is clear when every day reports on collecting tuition from students are published in newspapers and the parents of students tell the newspapers about their inability to pay on the telephone. Speaking of the issue of "secret inspectors" is more like a joke, and for that matter, under the circumstances, everyone knows that many of the government schools, even if they do not collect tuition or collect little of it, in any case, make up for their expenditures by collecting "extracurricular activities" fees and even unabashedly the cost of water, electricity, telephones, and kerosene and money to reward hardworking teachers and students. Many parents of the students say that they have even paid for the mandatory participation of their children in the marches and demonstrations ordered by the regime under the pretext of "field trips." Some schools openly tie the students' behavior grade to the amount of "voluntary people's aid" given by the parents.

Perhaps it was in order to escape the bad name of collecting illegal tuition from students that in Ordibehesht [21 Apr-21 May] this year an official of the Ministry of Education suggested that schools engage in the purchasing and sale of goods to provide for their expenditures.

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